MASTER 
NEGA  TIVE 

NO.  91-801 82 


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A  UTHOR  : 


TITLE: 


GREAT  PROBLEM  OF 
SUBSTANCE  AND  ITS 

PLACE: 

LONDON 

DA  TE : 

1895 


Master  Negative  # 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


COLUMBIA  UNIVEI^ITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARCIFT 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


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THE  GREAT  PROBLEM 


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SUBSTANCE  AND  ITS  ATTRIBUTES. 


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THE  GREAT  PROBLEM iVrj:;.;.-; 

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lUBSTANCE  AND  ITS  ATTRIBUTES. 


INVOLVING  THE  RELATIONSHIP  AND  LAWS 

OF  MATTER  AND  OF  MIND 

AS  THE  PHENOMENA  OF  THE  WORLD, 


DERIVED   FROM 


THE    ABSOLUTE. 


**  This  unifying  conception  of  Nature,*^ 

Ernst  Haeckel. 


LONDON 
KEGAN  PAUL,  TRENCH,  TRIjbNER  &  CO,  Ltd. 

PATERNOSTER   HOUSE,   CHARING  CROSS  ROAD 

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PREFACE 


It  is  allowed  on  all  hands  that  fresh  discoveries  have 
to  be  made  in  the  great  field  of  Science  :  it  is  con- 
fessed indeed,  that,  notwithstanding  the  advances 
already  made,  much  that  is  mysterious,  and  not  a 
little  that  is  contradictory,  confront  the  puzzled  in- 
quirer. Discoveries,  however,  will  be  made— not 
probably  tferough  the  medium  of  brighter  intellects 
than  those  which  have  already  been  engaged  in  the 
pursuit,  but  mainly  no  doubt  through  the  accumu- 
lated acquisitions,  of  which  we  in  these  latter  days 
are  the  inheritors ;  for  hereby  enlarged  scope  will  be 
afforded  for  philosophizing  by  means  of  the  additional 
facts  supplied.  Yet  the  very  plea  that  an  Author 
comes  forward  pretending  to  disclose  new  truths  is  not 
unlikely  to  be  received  with  some  scepticism,  if  it 
does  not  create  prejudice   against   his  claims. 


If  I  ask  the  reader  to  follow  me  in  a  track 
which  can  hardly  be  called  "  a  beaten  path,"  at  least 
as  regards  method,  I  trust  I  shall  not  lead  him 
through  a  murky  avenue,  where  twilight  has  scarcely 
dawned.  The  task,  however,  which  I  have  under- 
taken, is  not  in  itself  an  easy  one,  if  it  involves  the 


2 


252579 


VI 


Preface. 


pretence  of  safely  pioneering  a  route  through  a  terra 
incognita^  in  which  others  of  far  greater  capacity 
have  lost  themselves. 

I  have  to  acknowledge  many  deficiencies  in  the 
production  now  issued,  partly  owing  to  the  new 
ground  which  has  been  broken  for  the  first  time, 
partly  to  its  brevity  as  a  statement  of  principles, 
and  partly  to  the  fact  that  a  remedy  which  might  to 
some  extent  be  applied,  by  re-writing  the  whole, 
short  as  the  whole  is,  is  beyond  my  physical  achieve- 
ment. But  under  any  circumstances,  I  could  not 
pretend  to  construct  a  pathway  strewed  with  flowers, 
or  indeed  to  make  what  might  be  termed  "  a  royal 
road "  into  metaphysical  arcana,  which  have  been 
regarded  by  not  a  few  as  a  hopeless  attainment. 


While,  therefore,  I  invite  a  candid  examination 
of  the  principles  which  I  have  propounded,  I  bespeak 
a  charitable  and  forbearing  consideration  in  respect 
of  the  defective  execution  of  my  work. 

**  Errors  like  straws   upon  the  surface  flow ; 

He  who  would  seek  for  pearls  must  dive  below." 

The  unexplored  vista,  which  I  here  attempt  to  open 
up  to  my  reader,  is  so  unspeakably  important,  and  on 
that  ground  ought  to  be  so  peculiarly  interesting,  that 
I  trust  my  awkward  use  of  the  machinery  employed 
to  lift  up  the  deep  dark  veil  which  shrouds  the  great 


Preface. 


VII 


Unseen,  will  not  be  made  matter  of  reproach,  if  even 
but  a  faint  light  is  thrown  on  the  spirit-region  with 
which  our  worid,  and  we  who  live  therein,  stand  so 
intimately  connected. 

If  I  may  be  permitted  to  call  attention  to  some 
of  the  specialties  which  characterise  this  publication 
I  would  mention  the  following  .--The  inherent  attri- 
butes of  primitive  and  essential  substance  have  been 
eviscerated ;    for  substance    without    attributes   \^  a 
contradiction  in  terms.     The  expressions,  Spirit  and 
Matter,  have  been  respectively    defined,   while  their 
consanguinuity  and  connexion  have  been  traced  to 
what  is  obvibusly  their  natural    source.      The  great 
bugbear  of  the  age,  that  of  materialism   as  itself  the 
direct  foundation  of  mind,  has  been  relegated  to  its 
proper  province.     The  precise  source  and  foundation 
of  physical  Forces,  and  the  laws  whereby  they  have 
their    play  in   the  economy  of    nature,   have   been 
pointed  to,  as  determined  in  circumstances  consistent 
with  universal  experience.     The   basis  of  Life,   that 
is  of  Natural    Law   in   the   vegetable    and    animal 
spheres,  as    well    as  in    the  mineral    kingdom,   has 
been  duly  manifested  ;  and  the  great  law  of  Causality, 
as  an  all-pervading  principle  in  the  wonderful  chain 
of  existing  conditions,  has  been  fairiy  analyzed  and 
formally  promulged. 


Nor   is  this  all.     A    scientific   basis   (as  I  must 


vni 


Preface. 


regard  it)  has  been  found  for  a  harmonious  scheme 
of  Mental  Philosophy  ;  a  definite  foundation  has  been 
discovered  for  the  Ego  or  Soul  of  man,  as  essentially 
a  spirit-entity  ;  and  not  of  man  only,  but  of  every 
animal  creature — all  in  perfect  analogy  ;  the  range  as 
well  as  the  complexion  of  mental  states  being  in  all 
cases  limited  by  the  character  of  the  cerebral  organi- 
zation, with  which  each  is  equipped  ;  and  this,  with- 
out the  risk  of  sinking  into  the  quagmire  of  materialism. 
The  great  doctrine  of  Realism  has  been  established, 
according  to  the  inevitable  conviction  of  the  common 
mind,  in  that  a  significant  and  unmistakable  nexus 
has  been  ascertained  as  a  go-between,  to  connect 
the  material  object  externally,  with  the  subjective 
mind  internally.  Moreover,  the  initiation  of  Will 
and  its  operations  in  all  its  phases,  have  been  decy- 
phered,  and  its  freedom,  as  a  movement  of  the  Ego 
under  the  exercise  of  Judgment,  has  been,  as  1  think, 
satisfactorily  vindicated.  The  foundation  of  Morals 
also,  as  the  magnificent  prerogative  of  the  rational  mind, 
has  been  accounted  for  on  grounds  which  will  bear 
examination,  and  which  show,  what  is  a  fact,  that  the 
law  of  Morals  must  as  a  necessity  be  always  dependent 
for  its  soundness,  on  the  extent  and  accuracy  of  the 
intelligence  through  which  it  is  manifested. 


I  would  farther  call  attention  to  the  fresh  repre- 
sentation of  the  Absolute,  as  the  all-comprehending 
and  fundamental  Totality,  which  appears  to  me  to  be 


Preface, 


ix 


logically  reached,  on  the  one  hand  as  the  final  Ground 
or  Quarry  of  existing  beinghood  ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  and  in  immediate  connection  therewith,  as  the 
intelligent  Source  from  which  all  particulars  have 
emanated.  The  Scheme  of  Psychology,  moreover, 
which  r  have  propounded,  should,  from  its  simplicity 
and  harmony  with  facts,  recommend  it  for  acceptance, 
\i  it  is  free,  as  I  think,  from  the  contradictions  and 
incongruities  of  prevailing  systems,  and  will  satisfy 
fair  questioning  as  to  the  processes  whereby  accepted 
conclusions  are  fulfilled. 

If  I  shall  have  contributed  in  some  degree 
to  throw  down  and  to  destroy  what  I  must  re- 
gard as  one  of  the  most  complicated,  and  at  the 
same  time  most  mischievous  structures  ever  built  up 
by  the  perverted  ingenuity  of  man— I  mean  the  a 
priori  schemes  of  Kantian  and  Hegelian  transcenden- 
talism, I  shall  rejoice  ;  for  thereby  philosophy  will  be 
freed  from  one  terrible  incubus,  by  which  it  has  been 
too  long  enthralled. 


Let  me  say,  in  conclusion,  that  one  enormous 
advantage  of  obtaining  a  sound  knowledge  of  our 
human  mechanism,  and  of  the  relationship  in  which 
our  souls  stand  to  the  external  world,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  its  influences ;  and  to  the  Absolute  on  the  other 
hand,  as  ministered  through  a  Mediator,  for  the  higher 
elevation  of  our  souls,  will  more  and  more  be  appre- 


X  Preface. 

hended,  in  that  hereby  we  shall  ascertain  what  consti- 
tutes the  basis  of  sin,  and  the  true  idea  of  atonement, 
as  the  removal  of  sin.  There  are  other  theological 
questions  such  as  the  Divine  decrees,  and  the  grounds 
of  human  immortality,  which  will  be  found  briefly 
referred  to,  as  perfectly  manageable  topics  on  prin- 
ciples with  which  we  are  more  or  less  familiar. 

Perhaps  I  should  have  hesitated  making  such  a 
recital  as  is  contained  in  the  foregoing  statement, 
leaving  the  book  simply  to  the  judgment  of  critics. 
That  under  any  circumstances  must  be  the  case  ;  and 
I  commit  my  thoughts  to  them  for  frank  and  fair  con- 
sideration, as  the  thoughts  of  one  who  is  not  tied  to 
the  leading  strings  of  any  master,  and  who  cares 
only  for  the  achievement  of  truth. 

THE  AUTHOR. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Section  I. 


An  Inquiry  into  the  Findings  of  preceding  Investigations. 

Section  II. 

A  programme  of  principles,  which  go  to  satisfy,  and  in  their 
application  to  solve,  important  Physical  and  Metaphysical 
Problems. 

(1)  Absolute  Substance  :  (2)  Absolute  Impersonality  : 
(3)  Absolute  Personality  :  (4)  Applications  of  Absolute  Sub- 
stance; :  (6)  Origin  and  Operation  of  Affinity  through  Absolute 
Substance  :  (6)  Causality  through  Absolute  Substance :  (7) 
Other  Capacities  of  Absolute  Substance :  (8)  Mental  States  : 
(9)  Organization  of  Mental  States  :  (10)  Source  of  Emotions  : 
(11)  Source  of  Morals:  (12)  Modifications  of  Will:  (13) 
Principles  of  Will- Determination  :  (14)  Freedom  of  Will :  (15) 
Mr.  Drummond  on  Evolution. 


CHAPTER    L 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    EXISTENCE. 

Section  I. 

(^aracteristics  of  Matter  and  of  Ether,  and  of  the  Cosmical 
^orcta. 


1^ 


xii  Contents. 

Section  II. 

The  Cosmical  Forces  dependent  for  their  characteristics  on 
the  Affinity  of  the  conditions  brought  into  operative  Relation- 
ship. 

Section  III. 


The  Origin  of  Affinities. 


Section  IV. 

The    Cosmical    Forces    dependent    on    Energy    for    their 
Dynamic  Origin. 

Section  V. 

The  last  and  higest  Attribute  of  Ether. 

Section  VI. 

The   Liiw  by   which  Proi)agatioii   is  effected   as  compared 
with  Creative  effort. 

Section  VII. 
The  circumstances  under  which  Mind  is  developed. 

Section  VIII. 

What  constitutes  Intelligence. 

Section  IX. 

Mind  in  its  highest  as  well  as  lowest  expression,  operates 
in  conjunction  with  Matter. 


1 


''SI 


Contents. 
Section  X. 


xiu 


The  Foundation  of  Morals. 


Section  XI. 


Mental  States  are  reflective  of  Material  Conditions. 


CHAPTER    II. 

The  Foundation  of  Soul  Economy  and  the  grounds  of  varie 
Mental  Operation. 


THE    INTELLECTUAL    POWERS. 


Section  I. 


Dilemmas  of  Philosophers, 


Section  II. 


There  is  a  nexus  between  Matter  and  Mind. 


Section  III. 


How  the  Mental  Ego  is  constituted. 


Section  IV. 


The  Faculty  of  Perception. 


Section  V. 


The  Faculties  generally. 


I 


f] 


XIV 


Contents. 


(1)  Memory:  (2)  Imagination  :  (3)  Conception :  (4)  Reason- 
Faculties  :     (a)    Judgment:     (6)    Reasoning:     (5)    Brief 
Recapitulation. 


ing 


THE    EMOTIONAL    POWERS. 


Section  I. 


Motives. 


Section  II. 


Appetites  and  Desires 


Section  III 


The  Construction  of  Motives. 

Section  IV. 
The  Foundation  of  Morals  and  the  Law  of  Morals 


Section  V. 


The  Moral  Idea  the  Root  of  Moral  Law. 


Section  VI. 


Human  Responsibility. 


Section  VII. 


A  Higher  Law  than  that  of  mere  Morals  creates  Religioiu 


Freedom  of  the  Will  under  imperative  Laws. 


I 


Contents. 


Section  IX. 


The  circumstances  under  which  Freedom  prevails. 


CHAPTER    III. 


CONCLUDING    OBSERVATIONS. 


APPENDIX   I 


Professor  Stokes,  and  Rev.  Mr.  Birks  on  Ether. 


APPENDIX   II 

On  Causality  and  the  Being  of  a  Personal  God. 


XV 


Ii 


19        t      •        *  • 


INTRODUCTION; 


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SECT/ ON  I. 

AN   INQUIRY  INTO  THE  FINDINGS  OF  PRECEDING 

INVESTIGATORS. 

^Tp'HERE  do  not  seem  to  have  been  many  earnest 
A  or  hopeful  inquirers  into  the  profound  question 
of  Ontology.  The  difficulty  of  obtaining  an  adequate 
idea  of  substance  as  such,  seems  to  have  repelled  all 
procedure  in  this  investigation.  The  reason  of  this  is 
obvious.  If  we  lay  for  ourselves  a  foundation  which 
has  no  validity,  the  superstructure  cannot  stand  ;  and 
the  consequence  is  that  we  get  confounded  in  mystery, 
and  feel  our  incompetence.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
complicates  the  subject  by  telling  us  that  "whatever 
is  thought,  is  thought  under  the  attribute  of  existence;"* 
but  then,  in  the  very  next  breath,  he  gives  forth  the 
dictum  that  "existence  is  an  a  priori  notion,  native  to 
the  mind."  He  denies  that  the  idea  is  elicited  through 
experience  ;"  and,  on  the  plea  (as  he  says)  "that  what 
suggests  the  notion  of  existence,  is  itself  an  object  of 

*•  1  wouM  ask  wliat  kind  of  an  attribute  is  that  of  "  exist- 
ence "  ?  Wliatever  exists  must  have  some  attribute  whereby  it 
can  be  known.  If  by  existence  he  means  "  reality,"  I  agree 
with  him.  Even  a  phantom,  as  such,  though  in  the  mind,  must 
liave  existence,  otherwise  it  no  longer  is.  But  can  we  call  the 
mere  fact  of  beinghoo<l  an  attribute  ?  What  is  an  attribute  ? 
It  is  an  endowment  belonging  to  something  having  existence. 
Existence,  therefore,  is  not  an  attribute,  because  mere  existence 
predicates  nothing  respecting  the  thing  existing. 


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Introduction. 


* 


POftSCloustlds^'t*;   "  Where,"  he  asks,  "  is  the  object  of 
■c<)nsGJo«siidsfi 'not  already   thought   under   the   very 
;  at.tribM.tc  ;  which    this     doctrine    would    maintain    it 
! orrgiii^lly- tpi  suggest?"     Heie  lies  the  fundamental 
misconception  of  Hamilton,  and  the  host  of  others 
who  hold  that  there  must  be  a  pre-existent  condition 
of  mind,  involving  in  itself  a  consciousness  of  existence, 
antecedent  to  the  suggestion  of  any  object  ab  extra. 
Accordingly  he  holds  that  "  ens  is  to  be  viewed  as  a 
primuin  cognitumr     And  he  goes  on  to  assert   that 
"  we  are  conscious  of  the  conditioned  itself,  only  as 
not  unconditionally  conditioned  ;  for,  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned, of  the  absolute  or  the  infinite,"  he  says,  "  we 
have   no   cognition,    no   conception,   in    a   word,   no 
consciousness."     He  says  "  this  principle  is  valuable, 
as  affording  a  genesis  a)  some  of  the  most  momentous, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  most  contested  phenomena  of 
mind."     And  he  goes  on  to  say  that  "  in  the  principle 
of  the  conditioned,  two  great  principles,  the   law  of 
substance  and   accident,  and   the  law  of  cause  and 
effect,  find  their  origin  and  explanation.    They  are  no 
longer  to  be  regarded  as  ultimate  data  of  intelligence  : 
they  appear  now  as  merely  particular  cases,  merely 
special  applications  of  this  higher  principle.    Take  the 
former  (he  says)  the  law  of  substance.     I  am  aware 
of  a  phenomenon,  a  phenomenon  be  it  of  mind  or  of 
matter:   that  is,   I    am   aware  of  a  certain    relative, 

♦  Can  there  be  consciousness  apart  from  an  object  of  con- 
sciousness, and  can  there  be  an  object  of  consciousness  which 
is  not  elicite<l  through  experience  ?  What  he  calls  a  primum 
cognitum  is  an  ultimum  cognitum  derived  from,  and  the  necessary 
consequence  of,  our  experience  of  the  outward  realities  made 
known  to  us.     (See  following  note.) 


Hamilton  on  Substance.  3 

consequently  a  conditioned  existence.  This  existence 
is  only  known  and  only  knowable  as  in  relation. 
Mind  and  matter  exist  for  us  only  as  they  are  known 
by  us  ;  and  they  arc  so  known,  only  as  they  have 
certain  qualities  relative  to  certain  faculties  of  know- 
ledge in  us ;  and  we  certain  faculties  of  knowledge 
relative  to  certain  qualities  in  them."  *  He  asks  "  why 
am  I  constrained  to  suppose  that  this  relativity  is  the 
known  phenomenon  of  an  unknown  substance? 
Philosophers  say  it  is  an  ultimate  law  of  mind.  I 
answer  and  say  (he  continues)  it  is  a  particular  case 
of  the  general  law,  which  bears  that  not  only  the 
unconditioned  simply,  but  even  the  unconditioned  of 
the  conditioned  is  unthinkable.!  Take  an  object  (he 
says)  strip  it  by  abstraction  of  all  its  qualities,  of  all 
its  phenomena,  of  all  its  relativities,  reduce  it  to  a 
mere  unconditioned,  irrelative,  absolute  entity,  a  mere 
substance,  and  now  try  to  think  this  substance.  You 
cannot.     It  cannot  be  thought  except  as  a  negation 

*  This  is  true  so  far  as  it  goes.  '  We  have  knowledge  of 
certain  qualities,  as  these  are  conveyed  to  our  understandings 
by  means  of  the  faculties  or  instrumentality  given  to  us  for  that 
purpose.  But  this  is  not  pHmum  cognitum  or  first  consciousness. 
T\\Q  first  consciousness  is  that  of  self  as  the  object,  or  self-con- 
sciousness. The  secundum  cognitum,  in  the  order  of  conscious- 
ness, is  that  of  the  external  world.  The  third  in  the  order  of 
consciousness,  comes  through  the  internal  senses.  The  last  of 
all  is  the  consciousness  of  ens  as  a  noumenon  or  thing  in  itself, 
obtained  through  the  relativity  of  a  constant  which  is  found  to 
come  into  play  in  the  production  of  all  phenomena. 

t  Why  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  unconditioned  "unthink- 
able?" The  reason  is  because  he  strips  it  of  all  qualities  ;  and 
it  is  impossible  to  think  of  a  thing  which  has  nothing  whereby 
it  can  l)e  characterized. 


Introduction. 


of  the  thinkable."*  "Take  now  (he  says)  a 
quality  or  phenomenon.  A  phenomenon  is  a  relative, 
ergo  a  conditioned,  ergo  a  thinkable.  But  try  to 
think  this  relative  as  absolutely  relative,  this  con- 
ditioned as  unconditionally  conditioned — as  a  phe- 
nomenon and  nothing  more.  You  cannot ;  for  either 
you  do  not  realize  it  in  thought  at  all,  or  you  suppose 
it  to  be  the  phenomenon  of  something  that  does  not 
appear.  You  give  it  a  basis  out  of  itself;  you 
conceive  it  as  the  accident  of  a  subject  or  substance." — 
Hamilton  s  Edition  of  Reids  Works,  p.  9:^5. 

Such  reasoning  on  the  part  of  this  gigantic  meta- 
physician has  frightened  many  investigators  from 
tackling  a  subject  so  ticklish,  or  even  questioning 
conclusions  so  decisively  maintained  ;  and,  indeed,  if 
we  grant  the  premises  on  which  he  grounds  his 
assertions,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  they  can  be 
controverted.  But  we  do  not  grant  his  premises  ;  on 
the  contrary,  we  affirm  that  his  premises  have  no 
foundation  in  fact.  First  of  all,  where  have  we  any 
proof,  or  even  the  shadow  of  proof,  that  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  a  transcendental  consciousness,  that  is  an  a 
priori  consciousness  prior  to  experience?  In  this 
assertion  we  have  a  begging  of  the  whole  question, 

♦  Of  course,  if  we  take  away  all  that  belongs  to  an  object, 
there  is  nothing  left.  We  cannot  strip  away  qualities  and  have 
substance  left.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  substance  without 
quality.  We  may  remove  or  take  away  the  conditions  of  which 
quality  is  susceptible  ;  but  quality  itself  must  remain  as  the 
very  foundation  of  substance.  Quality  is  the  inseparable 
attribute  of  substance.  This  attribute  as  regards  primitive 
substance  may  not  be  patent  to  our  senses.  Hence  the 
phenomena  which  are  cognizable  by  us  are  but  the  secondary  or 
derivative  qualities  of  which  primordial  quality  is  susceptible. 


Hamilton's  Basis  Questioned, 


and  a  begging  of  it  without  the  slightest  real  grounds 
in  support  of  it.  There  is  no  such  phenomenon  as 
consciousness  apart  from  the  object  of  which  there  is 
the  consciousness.  There  is  the  spirit-entity  of 
course — the  raw  material,  which  has  the  capacity  of 
consciousness  ;  but,  if  there  is  no  object  submitted  to 
it  through  agency,  it  has  the  consciousness  of 
nothing,  that  is,  it  is  without  consciousness.  True  it 
is  that  apart  from  impressions  communicated  through 
the  senses,  there  is  fundamentally  what  is  properly 
self-consciousness.  But  what  is  this  primitive  self- 
consciousness  ?  It  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the 
consciousness  of  the  bodily  self,  as  will  afterwards  be 
shewn.  Secondly,  it  is  a  grievous  mistake,  and  a 
gratuitous  assumption,  to  suppose  that  in  this  spirit- 
entity,  which  constitutes  the  foundation  of  our  souls, 
there  are  any  antecedent  forms  or  conditions  of 
thought ;  that  is,  so  many  special  pigeon  holes,  as 
crannies  or  crevices  wherein  necessary  truths  are 
boxed  up,  and  which,  upon  being  stimulated,  give 
forth  ideas  of  time  and  space,  ideas  of  causality,  and 
other  ideas  of  what  is  called  ''  pure  reason."  The 
whole  is  a  gigantic  supposition  which  has  deranged 
the  investigations  of  mind,  because  it  can  be  shewn 
that  all  necessary  truths  are  but  deductions  from  the 
current  eventualities  of  our  experience.  The  Ego  (so 
called),  as  intrinsically  conditioned  with  the  primary 
attribute  of  a  conscious  capacity,  is  said,  when 
conditioned  forms  are  brought  to  it,  to  be  conscious 
of  these  ;  and  this,  exactly  according  as  they  are 
received  by  the  Ego.  The  forms  and  conditions  are 
not  antecedently  in  the  Ego  ;  but  the  Ego  appropriates 
and  lays  up  the  forms  and  conditions  of  things  as  they 


6 


Introduction. 


Quality  an  essential  of  Substance. 


I 


\ 


» 


are  imparted  to  it.  There  is,  therefore,  in  the  human 
mind,  no  antecedent  knowledge  of  existence,  apart 
from  the  facts  of  existence  which  are  imparted  to  us 
in  the  course  of  our  experience.  Hamilton  may  tell 
us  that  we  can  only  ascertain  "  the  conditions  of 
consciousness  by  its  application  ;  "  but,  we  reply  that 
the  conditions  of  consciousness  are  neither  more  nor 
less  than  the  consciousness  we  have  of  the  conditions 
of  things. 

And  now,  with  respect  to  the  distinction  which  he 
introduces  betwixt  "  substance  and  accident,"  he  for- 
gets to  consider,  or  seems  to  overlook,  what  consti- 
tutes the  absolute  and  inseparable  attributes  of  sub- 
stance, in  that  he  supposes  the  possibility  of  substance 
without  attributes,  and  then  calls  this  "  the  uncondi- 
tioned !"  Substance  without  attributes  (of  which 
nothing  can  be  predicated)  is  no  longer  substance.  It 
is  obvious  that  substance  as  such  must  be  characterised 
by  its  own  fundamental  characteristics, — its  intrinsic 
or  essential  attributes  :  otherwise  how  can  there  be 
such  a  thing  as  substance  ?  He  speaks  of  stripping 
an  object  by  abstraction  of  all  its  qualities  ;  but  the 
idea  is  absurd.  The  moment  we  take  away  all  its 
qualities  we  annihilate  it.  But  absolute  annihilation 
is  impossible.  There  must  be  a  foundation  which 
cannot  be  destroyed.  That  foundation  is  substance 
in  its  absolute  or  primordial  state  ;  and  the  forms  and 
conditions  which  are  superinduced  thereon  are  simply 
to  be  regarded  as  the  accidents  thereof.  It  is  obvious 
these  accidents  cannot  subsist  by  themselves  ;  for 
they  are  the  contingencies  of  which  substance  is  sus- 
ceptible. Substance  as  such  fundamentally  has  its 
own  generic  attributes,  which  are   inseparable  from 


substance  as  such,  and  it  is  the  particulars  of  these 
generic  attributes,  which  we  find  developed  in  the 
matter  of  the  world  of  which  we  have  experience,  and 
of  the  relativity  of  which  in  connexion  with  primary 
substance  we  have  constant  and  never  ceasing  ex- 
perience. The  idea  of  a  naked  .mbstratum^  apart  from 
an  absolutely  qualitative  basis,  has  nothing  whatever  to 
support  it,  but  everything  in  reason  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  this.  With  such  a  naked  substratum,  we 
are  grounded  at  once  in  an  Serbonian  bog  from  which 
there  is  no  escape.  There  can  be  no  substance  but 
as  grounded  in  quality,  and  representing  the 
potentiality  of  its  respective  conditions.* 

And  assuming  (as  we  feel  bound  to  do)  that  the 
ideas  of  things  which  we  receive  by  means  of  our  ex- 
ternal senses  are  representations  which  convey  to  us 
a  sense  of  their  reality,  our  knowledge  of  external 
objects  therefore  constitutes  of  necessity  a  conscious- 
ness of  their  reality,  as  they  outwardly  exist, — a  con- 
sciousness therefore  of  the  existence  of  a  material 
world.  Here  the  question  has  arisen,  —  What  is 
matter  ?  and  whence  have  we  matter  ?  We  usually 
define  matter  to  be — that  condition  of  substance 
which  is  cognizable  by  means  of  the  external  senses, 
or  still  more  profoundly,  that  condition  of  substance 
which  admits  of  limitation.  But  this  definition  is  not 
perfect  in  as  far  as  we  have  good  reason  to  suppose 
that  what  we  call  spirit-substance  has  its  forms,  and 
accordingly  has  its  limitations.  There  are  what  we 
call  matter-forms,  and  also  what  we  regard  as  spirit- 

*  Of    that    substance  we    shall    have    occasion    to    treat 
hereafter,  and  in  the  Appendix  I. 


A 


i; 


8 


Introduction. 


\ 


% 


forms,  and  the  distinction  betwixt  them  must  be  re- 
garded as  that  which  pertains  to  the  external  modifi- 
cation of  the  conditions — that  which  marks  the  crass 
and  tangible,  as  compared  with  that  which  is  very 
refined,  and  beyond  the  range  of  sense.  We  discard 
then  the  doctrine  of  dualism, — the  doctrine  which 
implies  the  existence  and  subsistence  of  a  twofold 
substance  of  independent  character  essentially  and 
eternally.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  two  substances 
absolutely  independent  of  one  another :  there  is  no 
experience  whatever  of  such  a  phenomenon,  and  we 
shall  come  to  shew  that  such  a  supposition  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  close  and  intimate  relation  in  which 
all  the  various  characteristics  of  substance  stand  inti- 
mately associated  and  connected. 

Since  the  days  of  Descartes,  philosophers  have 
been  occupied  with  the  idea  of  two  independent  sub- 
stances, matter  and  mind,  with  a  veering  tendency 
towards  materialism.  The  Positivist  school  have  no 
doubt  made  psychology  subsidiary  to  physiology, 
without,  however,  understanding  in  what  way  physi- 
ology paves  the  way  for  the  territory  of  mind. 
This  school  repudiates  all  inquiry  into  causes.  Stuart 
Mill,  while  holding  to  the  doctrine  of  sensationalism, 
seeks  to  explain  away  the  principle  of  causation  into 
a  combination  of  sensations.  Herbert  Spencer 
supplements  Stuart  Mill  by  his  theory  of  evolution, 
yet  without  giving  the  slightest  insight  into  the  theory 
of  causation.  The  new  German  psychology  makes 
consciousness  the  result  of  the  mechanical  unification 
of  sensations.  Lange  in  his  history  of  materialism 
seems  at  first  sight  an  apologist  of  the  materialistic 
philosophy  ;  but  it  is    not  that  materialism  is  to  be 


The   Vieivs  of  Philosophers. 


9 


regarded  as  a  philosophical  explanation  of  things,  but 
from  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  thereby  directed  to  the 
study  of  reality.  Materialism  in  this  view,  he  rightly 
says,  has  done  eminent  service.  Matter  itself  he  holds 
is  in  its  essence  emphatically  the  inexplicable.  It  has 
never  arrived  at  the  reality  itself,  but  only  at  that 
relative  reality  which  bears  the  impress  of  subjectivity. 
Henoe,  according  to  Lange,  the  necessity  of  being 
lifted  to  the  ideal,  to  something  siii  generis,  that  does 
not  belong  to  the  phenomenal.  "  We  are  brought 
face  to  face  with  the  a  priori,  not  in  the  realm  of 
intellect  alone,  but  of  religion  also." 

After  the  School  which  proscribes  all  inquiry  into 
causes,  and  that  which  explains  away  the  principle  of 
causation,  there  is  the  critical  School  which  dis- 
tinguishes reason  from  the  world  of  phenomena.  The 
Kantian  School  has  given  most  emphatic  recognition 
to  the  element  of  a  priori,  which  it  has  boldly  placed 
above  and  beyond  the  world  of  phenomena.  This 
latter  is  sacrificed  to  the  pretensions  of  mind.  This 
view  seems  to  follow  from  Descartes'  famous  deduc- 
tion, that  the  soul  has  essentially  thought  in  opposition 
to  matter  ;  and  in  this  he  imagined  lay  the  principle  of 
causation.  The  ego  not  being  regarded  as  the  product 
of  sensation  is  made  itself  to  establish  the  reality  of 
corporal  existence;  hence  the  untenable  dualism 
between  thought  and  matter.  Descartes'  famous 
maxim  cogito,  ergo  sunt,  is  thoroughly  logical.  But  in 
connexion  with  the  cogito,  there  has  to  be  an  analysis 
of  the  consciousness,  and  that  analysis  is  made  by 
inquiring,  of  what  does  the  consciousness  consist?  Is 
there  such  a  phenomenon  as  consciousness  without  an 
object  ?     We  answer  assuredly  not.     To  be  conscious 


10 


Inttoduction. 


The  solution  of  the  Problem. 


11 


I 

i 


of  nothing  is  to  be  without  consciousness.  Hence 
consciousness  implies  the  subject  in  which  this  feeling 
prevails,  and  the  object  given  to  it  is  that  which 
occasions  the  feeling.  Descartes  made  the  object, 
synonymous  with  matter,  and  without  considering  how 
matter  became  an  object  of  thought,  he  concluded  that 
the  soul  was  a  thinking  subject  of  itself,  and  quite 
different  from  matter  as  involving  space. 

Kant  took  up  the  question  of  soul  as  an  independ- 
ent thinking  subject  from  Descartes,  and  proclaimed 
that  thinking  things  could  never  occur  among 
outward  phenomena ;  yet  that  something  underlies 
phenomena  which  so  affects  our  sense  as  to  furnish  it 
with  notions  of  space,  matter,  form,  &c.,  which 
something  he  regarded  as  a  noumenon  or  thing  in 
itself.  Kant  said  that  we  can  never  know  things 
in  themselves,  because  (as  he  mistakingly  held)  the 
mind  comes  between  us  and  them.  He  held  that 
substance  and  cause,  like  time  and  space,  are  purely 
subjective.  He  sets  aside  the  Cartesian  proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God,  whether  cosmological 
or  optological.  The  world  does  not  enable  us  to 
arrive  at  any  conclusions  about  its  Author :  and,  as 
phenomena  it  is  made  the  product  of  our  own  facul- 
ties. Instead  of  regarding  the  existence  of  nature  as 
involving  space  and  time,  with  him  the  science  of 
nature  was  simply  the  application  of  outward  things 
to  the  thought  of  space  and  time.  Fichte  refused  to 
see  anything  but  the  Ego  in  the  world,  and  projected 
all  beinghood  therefrom.  Schelling  upheld  the  idea 
of  an  objective,  but  was  unable  to  distinguish  between 
knowing  and  being,  and  somehow  made  the  Ego  the 
hidden  forces  from  which  everything  emanated.  He- 


gel showed  the  Absolute  as  revealing  itself  in  the 
reason,  and  worked  up  a  logical  concatenation  of 
being  accordingly.  These  various  forms  of  substance 
have  proceeded  more  or  less  from  Kant,  whose  funda- 
mental axiom  was  the  subjectivity  of  pure  reason.  I 
ought  to  have  taken  into  account  the  views  of  Spinosa, 
who  like  Kant  may  be  said  to  be  the  offspring  of 
Descartes,  but  in  wholly  different  attitude.  Spinosa 
entered  into  the  question  of  substance  more  fully,  and 
with  greater  originality  than  any  philosopher  before 
him.  He  defined  substance  as  that  which  exists  in 
itself,  and  is  conceived  by  itself  He  very  properly 
regarded  substance  without  attributes  as  a  misnomer. 
If  a  thing  is,  he  held  that  it  must  have  some  attri- 
bute whereby  it  can  be  known,  and  quite  repudiated 
the  term  "  unknowable  existence  "  as  a  contradiction 
in  terms.  He  had  no  proper  idea  of  cause,  but  spoke 
of  causa  sui^  which  to  us  is  self-contradictory.  He 
defined  God  as  a  being  absolutely  infinite — that  is 
substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes  ;  but  he  was 
unable  to  separate  God  from  his  works. 

We  ask  now,  what  is  the  true  solution  of  the  great 
problem  before  us  ?  Let  us  proceed  upon  acknow- 
ledged grounds.  First,  nobody  doubts  that  he  has 
received  the  impression  (and  hence  the  idea)  of  an 
external  world  oi  matter.  Man  has  the  consciousness 
of  it.  "  There  is  no  scepticism  possible,"  as  Hamilton 
says,  "  respecting  the  facts  of  consciousness."  I  hold 
an  orange  in  my  hand  ;  its  colour,  figure,  taste,  smell, 
etc.,  are  before  the  mind  ;  still  all  lies  in  the  act  of 
consciousness  ;  how  am  I  to  know  that  such  impres- 
ssion  and  ideas  aie  anything  more  than  affections  of 
the  mind  ?     I  may  appeal  to  what  Dr.  Reid  termed 


'M^ 


ti 


I 


1 


12 


Introduction. 


"  rational  principles  of  action,"  which  may  be  regarded 
as  intelligence  in  general,  or  what  may  be  termed  the 
harmony  of  thought,  and  the  rediictio  ad  absurdmn  in 
the  conduct  of  life,  if  the  reality  of  external  objects  is 
questioned  ;  and  hence  the  dismay,  confusion,  and 
distress  that  would  ensue,  and  the  violence  done  to 
moral  principles.  If  Hume  comes  forward  and  still 
insists  that  this  supposed  reality  of  external  objects  is 
after  all  but  a  phantasm  of  the  mind,  and  that  we 
know  not  how  such  ideas  may  be  generated  in  the 
mind,  I  ask  farther,  that  the  facts  of  consciousness 
may  be  fairly  looked  at.  As  we  cannot  deny  the  facts 
of  consciousness  without  self-contradiction,  so  neither 
can  we  deny  the  characteristics  belonging  to  these  facts. 
Among  these  characteristics  there  is  thisone  universally 
allowed,  that  the  orange  we  hold  in  the  hand  stands 
external  to  us.  This  assurance  of  externality  is  a  part 
of  the  fact,  as  determinate  as  the  fact  itself  We  are 
fairly  entitled  then  to  take  up  the  hypothesis  of  external 
matter  when  so  assurcilly  suggested  and  presented  to 
us,  and  we  ask — can  this  hypothesis  be  sustained  by 
circumstantial  evidence  ?  Supposing  the  orange  to  be 
a  reality,  having  figure,  colour,  sapidity  attached  to  it, 
can  I  find  out  any  nexus,  or  chain  of  connection, 
between  this  supposed  outward  object  and  my  mind 
sufficient  to  convey  the  idea  of  it  thereto,  as  a  reality 
of  my  consciousness  ?  I  reply  that  I  do  find  this  in 
the  great  fact,  that,  everywhere,  and  universally  with- 
out exception,  the  luminiferous  Ether  radiates  or 
carries  forth  the  forms  and  conditions  of  external 
objects  from  the  objects  to  the  external  organ  of 
perception,  or  shall  we  say  that  the  material  object, 
whatever  it  is,  expresses  itself  in  the  immaterial  and 


The  Result  of  our  Findings. 


13 


all  pervading  Ether,  both  in  quality  and  in  form,  and 
therefore  indicates  the  characteristics  of  the  objects  ; 
in  other  words,  intimates  what  they  are  ;  and  that  this 
very  service,  coming  through  the  appointed  nerve 
channel  of  the  outward  sense,  operates  as  a  message 
conveyed  to  the  territory  of  cognition.  The  ascertain- 
ment of  this  fact  satisfactorily  answers  every  demand. 
We  have  but  to  find  out  how  the  whole  man  is 
structured,  and  how  it  comes  to  pass  that  mind  is 
engendered,  and  how  to  account  for  the  operation  of 
mind  in  all  its  various  departments  of  intellection  and 
of  volition  in  connection  with,  and  in  dependence  on, 
material  instrumentality  ;  and  how  a  spirit-homestead 
is  hereby  constructed,  fitted  for  translation  to  a  more 
refined  sphere  hereafter.* 

If  this  claim  which  we  make  shall  be  found  to  be 
solidly  and  soundly  substantiated — if  the  view  we 
have  sought  to  introduce  respecting  the  etherial 
medium  shall  be  found  on  further  investigation  to 
bear  out  the  prerogatives  of  primitive  substance,  and 
the  attributes  which  we  have  assigned  to  it — if 
the  structure  of  animal  nature,  and  more  especially  of 
human  nature,  bodily  and  mentally,  as  hereafter  set 
forth,  be  correctly  described — if  there  be  known  no  such 
economy  as  mind,  apart  from  the  body  with  which  it 
stands  connected,  if  the  supposition  of  a  pure  reason 
in  itself  and  by  itself,  apart  from  conditioned  form,  be 
one  of  the  most  groundless  imaginings  which  ever 
took  possession  of  human  thought,  if  it  constitutes  a 

*  Tlie  fact  of  a  proof  being  established  for  a  connection 
betwixt  the  external  object  and  the  subjective  intellect  will 
form  a  foundation  for  our  process  of  inquiry. 


)l 


14 


Introduction. 


The  Absolute. 


15 


I 


1  ■ 


gratuitous  foundation  of  mystery,  which  is  not  only 
unsupported  by  any   evidence,   but   which   leads   to 
confusion  and  contradiction  throughout  in  our  inquiries 
into  mental  constitution,  then  it  behoves  that  there 
must   be   an   entire   revisal    in   the    method    of   our 
psychological  pursuit.     I  have  ventured  into  a  groove 
of  thought,  which,  as  it  appears  to  me,  leads  to  a  clear 
and  harmonious  interpretation  of  the  phenomena  of 
the  world,  and  through  these  phenomena  to  the  funda- 
mental entia  from  which  they  are  derived.    As  regards 
the  execution  of  this  task,  I  have  but  one  desire,  and 
that  is  to  have  the  ability  to  re-write  the  whole  from 
the   beginning ;    but  there   are   physical    weaknesses 
which  prevent  this  being  done  ;  and  I  commend  my 
work,  with  all  its  defects,  to  the  candid  judgment  of 
the   intelligent.      But    I    have   yet,   as    introductory 
matter,  to  lay  down  the  great  principles  on  which  my 
scheme  is  founded. 


SECTION  II. 

A  PROGRAMME  OF  PRINCIPLES,  WHICH  GO  TO 
SATISFY,  AND  IN  THEIR  APPLICATION  TO 
SOLVE,  IMPORTANT  PHYSICAL  AND  META- 
PHYSICAL  PROBLEMS. 

1. — Absolute  Substance. 

np\H  AT  there  is  fundamentally  a  Universal  Substance 
A  which  exists  as  an  ens  by  itself,  which  is  the 
absolute  basis  of  all  beinghood,  which  is  uncreated, 
infinite,  eternal,  without  parts,  all  pervading,  unseeni 
that  cannot  be  displaced,  and  withal  impersonal  J 
generic,  moreover,  as  to  Quality,  and  therefore  having 
no  particular  condition  in  itself;  yet  having  all 
possible  qualities  under  one  homogeneous  unity,  and, 
therefore,  having  the  capacity  of  yielding  up  or 
supplying  all  possible  definite  oc  distinctive  qualities, 
each  of  which  may  be  drawn  forth,  when  sample 
examples  are  prescribed  for  that  purpose;  and, 
further,  also  generic  as  to  Energy,  and  therefore  having 
no  particular  Force  in  itself,  but  having  what  con- 
stitutes the  foundation  of  all  possible  forces  under  one 
homogeneous  potentiality,  and  consequently  the  ca- 
pacity of  yielding  or  expressing  all  possible  definite 
or  determinate  forces,  according  as  these  are  generated 
under  the  agency  of  specific  qualities  in  their  respective 
conditions,  that  is,  when  the  qualities  are  particularly 
conditioned  and  adjusted  to  one  another,  so  as  to 
introduce  the  operation  of  their  affinity.  We  shall 
hereafter  discover  the    fact    of   this    universal  and 


w. 


16 


Introduction. 


Absolute   Personality. 


17 


ij 


I 


immaterial  substance  in  the  Ethcrial  medium  by 
which  we  are  environed,  and  with  which  we  are 
coming  to  be  more  and  more  conversant ;  and  we 
shall  find  it  as  the  universally  operative  agency, 
explanatory  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  in  all  the 
departments  of  nature. 

2. — A  bsolute  Impersonality, 

That  Absolute  Impersonality  is  to  be  understood 
by  the  description  of  Absolute  Substance,  which  we 
commonly  designate  Ether  or  the  Etherial  Medium, 
and  which  we  must  regard  as  being  of  the  nature  of 
Spirit,  or  what  we  may  designate  as  Pneum  or  Spirit- 
substance,  having  the  wonderful  property  of  receiving 
and  involving  within  itself  any  number  of  impressions 
which  may  in  growth  be  developed  into  separate 
conditions  ;  that  said  universal  substance  is  properly 
to  be  regarded  as  Absolute  Impersonality,  and, 
therefore,  an  objective  platform,  constituting  the 
foundation  of  all  particular  substances,  as  well  as  the 
primary  substance  out  of  which  all  particular  sub- 
stances are  evolved  ;  and  looking  to  the  fact  that  in 
its  essential  being  as  an  absolute  Unity,  all  particulars, 
as  finite  and  specific  qualities  derived  therefrom,  must 
have  a  necessary  affinity  among  one  another,  differing 
according  to  their  conditions,  and  according  to  the 
laws  of  their  combination — an  affinity  in  virtue  of 
which  they  are  attracted  to  one  another,  or  repelled 
from  one  another,  according  to  the  character  of  the 
existing  conditions,  and  the  relation  in  which  they  are 
made  to  stand  to  one  another,  we  hence  find  that 
Energy  being  hereby  particularized,  we  have  the  source 


' 


and  spring  of  cosmical  Forces,  while  we  gather  also  that 
the  forms  and  conditions  that  belong  to  a  pure  etherial 
or  spirit-nature,  may,  by  the  application  of  an  occult 
influence  which  we  term  temperature,  be  developed 
from  the  etherial  into  the  material  sphere,  as  an 
inspissation,  or  thickening  of  conditions ;  and,  of 
course,  as  something  cognate  to  our  external  senses, 
and  through  these  made  perceptible  to  our  intellects  ; 
and  further,  we  find  as  a  fact  in  our  experience,  that 
all  the  existing  qualities  of  matter  in  all  their  possible 
modifications  or  conditions  are  in  universal  sympathy 
with  the  primary  mother-substance  which  constitutes 
the  foundation  of  the  Universe. 

3. — A  bsolute  Pe>  sonality. 

That  there  is  an  Absolute  Personality  as  well  as  an 
Absolute  Impersonality,  and  that  the  one  is  the 
complement  of  the  other — the  one  being  the  primary 
Subjective  with  a  manifestation  of  intrinsic  conditions 
in  distinctive  action  ;  the  other'  being  the  primary 
Objective  in  their  comprehensive  oneness,  the  sub- 
jectiv::  and  the  objective  being  in  eternal  unison  :  the 
former  being  the  Absolute  Unity  of  all  fundamental 
particulars  in  one  Personality,  the  latter  being  the 
Absolute  Unity  of  the  same  in  their  non-development, 
both  being  intrinsically  one  and  the  same  substance, 
with  this  distinction,  that  the  Personality  is  the  sum 
of  fundamental  Qualities  separately  developed  in  the 
eternal  activity  of  their  full  expression,  while  the 
Impersonality,  in  like  manner,  is  the  sum  of  funda- 
mental Qualities  in  the  fulness  of  their  non-expression, 
or  what  may  be  called  the  capacity  of  their  expression : 


18 


Introduction, 


The  Applications  of  Substance, 


19 


that  while  the  former  must  be  regarded  as  properly 
Deity,  in  being  the  absolute  thinking  and  designing 
Source  of  all   movement,  and   of  all    adjustment  of 
relationships,    the    latter   must    be   regarded   as   the 
necessary    circumstantials   of    Deity,   without   which 
there  could  be  no  creation,  and,  indeed,  no  perfection 
either  in  Deity  or  in  nature  :  that,  therefore,  it  behoved 
that  there  must  be  in    God  as   a  Personality,  those 
essential  limitations  of  qualitative  characteristics  out 
of  which  all  causality  springs,  and  which  are  essential 
in  order  to  the  production  of  those  limitations  which 
are    extracted     from     the     Impersonal,    and     which 
constitute  the  works  of  Creation  :  that,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  find,  there  is  in  primitive  substance,  not  only 
the  qualitative   attribute    that  admits    particulars    in 
the   objective   developments   of  substance,   but    that 
it     is    likewise     lighted     up    as     intelligence     under 
consciousness,  being  the  highest  prerogative  of  which 
substance  is  susceptible,  and  which  is  developed  only 
where  personalities  are  constructed  out  of  the  funda- 
mental Impersonality  ;  that  the  primitive  Personality, 
therefore,  as  having  the  highest  form  of  manifestation, 
must  be  regarded  as  the  Supreme   Intelligence  ;  and 
in    his   own    Personality  standing  apart  from  all  his 
works,  and  not  to  be  confounded  with  his  works  further 
than  as  a  manifestation  of  his  skill  and  wisdom,  his 
righteousness    and    goodness,   his    omniscience    and 
omnipotence. 

4. —  The  Appiicatiofts  of  Absolute  Substance. 

That  the  essential   nature  of  the  Etherial  medium 
properly  regarded  as  absolute  substance,  and  there- 


fore existing  in  itself,  is  to  he  considered  as  peculiarly 
of  the   nature  of  spirit,  by  which  we  understand  not 
only  a  tenuity  that  is  all-pervading,  and  all-penetrat- 
ing through  the  category  of  matter,  but  which,  as  we 
practically  find,  assumes  to  itself  as  spirit-substance, 
the  forms  and  qualities  which  are  derived  from  mate- 
rial conditions  :  that  it  is   manifested   in  the  depart- 
ments of  Pllectricity,  Magnetism,  Gravitation,  Chemi- 
cal and  other  afifinities,  and  the  Cosmical  Forces  gene- 
rally:— that  it  has  the  capacity  of  taking  on  and  setting 
forth  in  its  own  bosom  what  we  may  designate  spirit 
copies  of  all  material  objects,  and  that  by  an  endless 
elasticity  peculiar  to  itself,  it  has  the  power  of  freely 
admitting  any   number  of    copies  according  to   the 
number  of  material  objects  that  happen  to  be  present; 
and  this  separately,  distinctively,  and  simultaneously 
in  the  same  area,  without  collision  and  without  con- 
fusion :  that  this  power  of  representation  is  illustrated 
in  the  processes  of  growth,  by  reason  of  the  forms  and 
qualities  that  are  found  in  and  belong  to  the  germs  of 
plants,  and  which  through  the  action  of  the  etherial 
medium  are  made  to  bear  upon  the  nutritive  plasma, 
and  so  to  introduce  new  forms,  as  the  development  of 
the  plant  brings  these  into  manifestation  ;  and  thus 
not  only  growth,  but  variety  of  growth-forms  is  pro- 
moted, and  in  all  cases  in  accordance  with  the  germ 
that  is  present  as  a  pattern.     Farther,  that  the  Ether, 
which  we  are  inclined  to  designate  as  Pneum  in  order 
to  intimate  its  spirit-nature  and  immediate  applica~ 
bility    to  a  multitude  of   purposes,   is  the    medium 
whereby  Causality  is  made  to  operate,  and  its  effects 
are  made  to  appear  as  the  manifestations  of  natural 
law,  not  only  in  cases  where  the  causal  elements  arc 


iv   , 


20 


Iniroduction. 


The  Source  of  Affinity. 


21 


in  conjunction  but  where  they  arc  separated  by  long 
distances :  that  said  medium  is  the  causal  nexus 
whereby  external  objects  are  conveyed  to  the  eyes  of 
the  beholder,  and  thence  by  the  optic  nerve  to  the 
brain  :  that  this  medium  acts  as  a  solid  in  binding  to- 
gether distant  orbs,  as  well  as  atoms  of  matter  in 
dense  masses,  according  to  the  strength  of  their 
affinity,  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  fluid  in  which 
all  objects  live  and  move  ;  that  still  further,  it  is  with- 
out doubt  the  medium  out  of  which  all  animal  intelli- 
gence is  derived,  in  that  it  is  found  to  operate  subjec- 
tively also  in  developing  the  highest  attribute  of  its 
capacity,  viz.,  Consciousness,  according  to  the  organi- 
zation presented  by  the  animal  economy  for  the  mani- 
festation of  this  noble  prerogative. 

5. —  The  Origin  and  Operation  of  Affinity  through 

Absolute  Substance, 

That  we  must  regard  the  first  and  primary  creations 
of  the  Divine  Personality,  as  preliminary  and  prepa- 
ratory particulars,  in  order  to  the  building  up  of  the 
universe, — that  these  primary  creations  are  the  prim- 
ordial elements  or  specific  qualities  for  forming  the 
alphabet  of  an  objective  economy,  that  is,  the  a,  b,  c, 
out  of  which  the  book  of  the  world  is  composed,  and 
that  these  elements  have,  as  already  noticed,  a  neces- 
sary affinity  to  one  another,  being  of  necessity  related 
to  one  another  as  members  of  a  united  family,  and 
the  offspring  of  the  same  mother-substance :  that  it 
behoved  therefore  that  there  should  be  a  varied  readi- 
ness of  combination  in  these  primary  elements  in 
accordance  with  their  atomic  values  ;  and  so  combin- 


ing, that  they  would  be  the  molecules  of  composite 
substance,  even  as  the  junction  of  the  alphabetical 
letters  constitute  syllables  and  words  ;  and  again,  as 
words  have  to  be  joined  to  form  sentences,  and  sen- 
tences to  form  the  symbol  of  complex  thought,  so 
composite  matter  had  to  be  combined,  first  in  simply 
inorganic  forms,  preparatory  to  a  more  structural  for- 
mation, known  as  cellular  or  organic,  adapted  in  its 
combinations  for  vegetable  and  animal  life  : — that  the 
idea  of  life,  which  has  been  regarded  as  in  itself  pecu- 
liarly mysterious,  (for  to  life,  which  is  an  effect,  has 
been  mistakenly  ascribed  a  formative  and  causative 
power  in  the  mechanism  and  growth  of  plants, 
each  after  its  kind)  is  neither  more  nor  less  than 
the  normal  activities  of  organic  matter  in  following 
out  the  causality  of  those  relations  which  are  combined 
to  constitute  a  definite  individuality  ;  and  that  growth 
is  simply  the  conformation  of  the  germ,  operative 
through  the  all-pervading  Ether  on  the  plasma  which 
supplies  the  required  nutriment  '^ — that  the  animal 
system  is  supplied  with  an  economy  of  nerves  of  which 
vegetation  is  destitute,  and  that  the  nerve-economy 
serves  to  display  the  operation  of  bodily  sensation  as 
intimating  the  affecting  of  a  different  part,  by  the 
influence  exerted  on  another,  while  its  formation  as  a 
central  organization  of  cerebral  functions,  arouses  the 
highest  prerogative  of  the  Etherial  self-hood,  by 
developing  consciousness,  and  through  consciousness, 
the  intelligence  of  our  surroundings. 

6. — Causcdity  through  Absolute  Substance, 
That    the   great    question   of    Causality   finds   its 


i 


I 


I  'I 


22 


Introduction. 


application  and  exposition  throughout  all  the  depart- 
ments of  nature  as  well  as  in  the  more  mysterious 
categories  of  existence,  by  means  of  the  self-existent 
Ether,  as  being  the  all  connecting  link  whereby  one 
material  object  is  joined  in  sympathy  with  another, 
according  to  the  several  relationships  in  which  they 
are  made  to  stand  to  one  another.  What  then  are 
the  principles  of  Causality  as  these  are  variously 
discovered  in  the  relationship  of  cosmical  objects  ?  I 
answer  they  are  found  first  and  fundamentally  in  the 
respective  conditions  of  the  causal  elements  :  Second, 
in  the  relation  in  which  these  are  made  to  stand  to 
one  another  as  to  the  order  of  their  combination. 
Upon  these  two  considerations  depends  the  Affinity 
that  comes  to  be  displayed,  which  is  always  sub- 
servient to  the  Relationship  in  which  the  conditioned 
objects  happen  to  stand  to  one  another.  We  have  an 
illustration  of  Causality  in  the  junction  of  the  letters 
of  the  alphabet,  each  of  these  being  regarded  as 
conditioned  objects.  A  certain  junction  of  certain 
letters  forms  a  word,  as  for  example  the  word  note : 
change  the  relationship  of  the  letters,  and  we  get  the 
word  tone  :  add  an  ingredient,  for  example  the  letter 
s,  and  we  get  stone,  seton,  notes,  tones.  Take  again  the 
words  as  conditioned  objects  and  join  them  in  varied 
relationship  and  we  obtain  sentences  which  have  their 
respective  and  definite  meaning  as  the  effect.  This 
holds  good  with  respect  to  the  material  elements  with 
which  chemistry  makes  us  familiar  ;  and  it  will  be 
found  that  the  effect  is  found  to  depend  first  on  the 
particular  conditions  assembled  :  second,  on  the 
relation  in  which  they  are  made  to  stand  to  one 
another.     Then  we  have  the  precise  affinity  displayed 


Causality  and  other  Capacities. 


23 


in  exact  subserviency  to  this  relation  ;  and  out  of  this 
affinit}-  arises  the  resultant  operation  or  the  Force, 
along  with  the  qualitative  change  produced.  I  would 
sav  the  Affinity  furnishes  the  Force,  and  the  Relation 
prescribes  and  defines  the  law  of  the  Force.  Upon 
these  principles  we  have  the  expression  of  all  material 
law  in  the  universe.  But  let  it  always  be  noted,  that 
were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the  conditions  in  their 
prescribed  relationship  are  linked  together  by  the  all 
pervading  nexus  of  the  Etherial  medium,  there  could 
be  no  natural  function  of  matter  with  matter.  And 
as  Ether  is  essentially  of  the  nature  of  spirit,  it 
explains,  also,  as  will  be  noticed,  the  connexion  and 
causality  cf  matter  operating  with  mind. 

7. — Other  Capacities  of  Absolute  Substance, 

We  have  seen  what  absolute  substance  is  in  itself, 
as  an  homogeneous  whole — as  an  objective  Imperson- 
ality — as  a  generic  in  quality,  having  fundamental 
qualities,  but  without  any  expression  of  them  by  itself; 
we  have  seen  also  that  there  exists  therein  an  expres- 
sion of  fundamental  qualities,  united  in  a  primary 
Personality,  being  a  vivid  manifestation  of  all  condi- 
tions that  are  contained  in  gremio  of  the  other  ;  we 
have  seen  that  it  behoves  the  principles  of  causality 
therefore  to  reside  in  this  primary  Personality,  in  as 
far  as  it  is  by  the  junction  of  one  quality  with  another 
that  there  can  be  the  production  of  a  tertium  quid;  we 
have  seen  that  it  behoves  that  Supreme  Intelligence 
must  exist  therein  for  the  devising  of  new  conditions  in 
the  processes  of  production  ;  and  that,  when  specific 
and  specially  conditioned  objects  arc  produced,  there 


m 


24 


Introduction. 


Spirit-Forms  and  Matter- Forms. 


25 


I 


% 


w 


I 


is  in  absolute  substance  a  response  thereto  ;  and  that 
absolute  substance,  in  its  generic  character,  is  the  com- 
mon and  exhaustless  ground  on  which  the  first  great 
Cause  doth  operate.  What  we  are  first  and  presently 
familiar  with  is  the  category  of  matter  ;  and  matter  is 
known  to  us  under  what  are  called  non-metallic  and 
metallic  qualities,  and  found  in  these  states  as  solid, 
liquid,  and  gaseous  ;  and  farther,  by  the  application 
of  heat,*  the  solid  may  be  reduced  to  a  liquid,  and  the 
liquid  to  a  gas,  and  the  gas  dispersed  in  atoms. 
Hence,  much  speculation  on  the  theory  of  atoms, 
sometimes  termed  monads,  some  of  which  have  been 
supposed  to  have  subjective  characteristics,  and  some 
to  have  objective  characteristics,  and  by  a  process  of 
natural  selection  thereby  to  begin  a  scheme  of  evolu- 
tion of  which  no  account  has  been  given,  or  can  be 
given,  as  a  scheme  of  causality  guided  by  Nature.  We 
have  seen  that  the  process  of  first  introducing  certain 
particular  substances  must,  according  to  the  laws 
of    causality,   have    had    its    source    in    a    Supreme 

*  What  heat  is  it  is  «lifficult  to  describe.  It  has  been  termed 
by  Tyndall  '*  a  mode  of  motion  ;"  but  motion  in  any  mode  what- 
ever is  not  heat,  but  only  a  result  of  heat.  We  speak  of  tem- 
perature as  marking  the  gradations  of  heat  ;  and  we  find  that 
the  conditions  of  matter  are  modified  by  the  application  of  heat. 
As  regards  the  sensation  of  it  in  the  animal  system,  it  may  be 
pleasjint  to  us  or  painful,  according  to  the  intensity  with  which 
it  is  applied  :  this  arising  no  doubt  from  its  action  on  the  par- 
ticles of  the  body.  Heat  differs  from  colil  as  only  a  gradation 
of  temperature.  Whatever  we  may  describe  heat  or  cold  to  be, 
we  may  say  it  is  that  peculiar  influence  whereby  the  conditions 
of  the  qualities  of  matter  are  altered  ;  and  for  aught  we  know 
it  is  that  influence  whereby  the  conditioneil  in  spirit-substance 
is  converted  into  matter-substance. 


All-Conditioned   One,   to   whom    the   foundation    of 
particulars    is    to    be    traced  ;    and,    that    in    their 
origination,    the   first   formation   of    particular    sub- 
stance   must    be    in    spirit-substance    only,   and    not 
as    matter  ;    and    hence    the    original     conditioning 
of  the  qualities  must   have  been  in    spirit-substance 
only.      What    we    say   then,    in    order   to   the    pro- 
duction   of    material    objects    is    this,— that    spirit- 
forms  are  susceptible  of  being  thickened  ;    in  other 
words,  that  etherial  conditions  are  capable  of  being 
incrassated.     We  find,  as  a  fact,  that  there  is  a  close 
sympathy   betwixt  the    two.*     We   have    seen    that 
material  conditions  are  everywhere  invariably  attended 
by   corresponding   spirit-forms  and   qualities   in   the 
etherial  medium,  extending  according  to  a  determinate 
law,  under  which  the  representation  diminishes  as  the 
square  of  the  distance  from  the  object  increases,  and 
that   the  delineation  of  form  and    quality  is  carried 
throughout  every  part  of  this  area,  and  therein  also 
afifinities  operate.    We  find,  moreover,  that  the  forms 
and  conditions  of  external  things  thus  extended  are 
conveyed  to  our  external  senses,  and  (as  has  been 
already  noticed)  by  the  nerves  connected  with  these  to 
the  brain,  where  there  is  the  sensorium  or  centre  of 
nerve-transmission,  at  which  the  Etherial  Me  or  Ego  is 
posited.     It  is  obvious  that  the  foundation  of  this  Ego, 
or  what  we  may  call  the  raw  material  of  the  Ego,  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  etherial  representation 
of  the  bodily  economy  set  up  in  the  receptacle  natural 
to  it,  and  adjusted  to  be  the  recipient  of  impressions 

♦  We  have  the  spirit-forms  rendered  material  forms;  and 
again  material  forms  changed  into  spirit-forms  in  Scripture. — 
(>ice  Luke  xx.iv.  31  ;  John  xx.  \\)). 


s, 


26 


Introduction. 


The  Source  of  Mental  States. 


27 


I*' 


il 


coming  in  the  character  of  ideas  of  external  things  as 
objects  of  consciousness  ;  and  that  under  the  peculiar 
circumstances  in  which  it  is  operated  upon,  as  bearing 
a  reaction  upon  itself,  as  it  were  between  body  and  body 
by  means  of  afferent  and  efferent  nerves,  this  Eero. 
already  h'ghted  up  with  a  consciousness  of  self,  be- 
comes by  further  impressions  through  the  senses 
lighted  up  with  intelligence  of  the  objects  around  us  in 
the  world. 

8. — Mental  States. 

That  the  mental  Ego  is  established  as  the  etherial 
representative  of  the  animal  body  is  demonstrated  by 
a  variety  of  evidence,  the  most  important  being  the 
fact  that  the  fundamental  self-consciousness  of  the  in- 
dividual is  a  consciousness  of  its  own  bodily  states 
and  of  these  only,  and  that  its  tastes  and  tendencies 
are  those  of  the  body  ;  and  also  that  there  is  a  direct 
connection   between   the  etherial  images  objectively, 
and  the  same  received  subjectively  as  ideas  ;  that  as 
images  are  formed  in  the  spirit-substance  in  confor- 
mity to  present  material  forms,  so   it  behoves  that 
a  conscious  state  in  the  animal  economy  is  not  only 
excited,    but    must  vary,  according   to   the    kind    of 
organization  whereby  impressions  are  conveyed  to  the 
platform  of  spirit-substance,  and  hence  the  different 
mental  constitutions  attached  to  each  separate  animal 
economy,   one   rising   in   intelligence  above  another, 
according  to  the  number  and  character  of  the  inlets 
or  organs  for  the  introduction  of  ideas  ;  that  man  has 
a  cerebral  organization  in  analogy  with  that  assigned 
to  the  lower  animals,  some  of  which  in  point  of  com- 


plexity approach  to  the  intricacies  found  in  the  human 
brain  ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  human  brain  a  special  quality  such  as 
gives  to  man  a  range  of  intelligence  to  which  there  is 
no  limit  as  compared  with  the  lower  animals,  in  that 
it  enables  him  to  embrace  in  his  vision  the  relations  of 
the  not-self,  as  well  as  the  relations  of  self.  Ani- 
mals see  what  relates  to  self  but  man  in  cognizing 
the  relations  of  not-self  is  able  to  penetrate  into  the 
future  and  to  prepare  for  the  future ;  and  not  only 
this,  but  to  weigh  character,  to  draw  inferences,  to 
fulfil  purposes,  and  all  this  in  subordination  to  the 
intuitions  of  duty  and  moral  obligation. 

9. — Organization  for  Mental  States. 

That  the  external  senses  are  the  instrumentality  by 
which  the  mind  is  enabled  to  exercise  the  faculty  of 
Perception,  and  that  by  Perception  we  have  a 
cognition  of  the  external  world  -and  its  objects,  and 
that  these  in  their  respective  conditions  are  conveyed 
by  the  Ether  to  the  eyes,  and  other  senses,  according 
as  the  qualities  conveyed  are  adapted  to  them 
respectively ;  and  from  the  senses  through  the 
attached  nerve  to  the  brain  :  that  the  impressions 
received  through  the  senses  in  the  exercise  of 
Perception,  constitute  the  pabulum  from  which  the 
internal  senses  derive  their  inner  impressions,  as  these 
are  registered  in  the  cortical  and  cellular  substance, 
and  through  which,  as  material  to  work  upon,  we 
have  the  facts  of  Memory,  the  pictures  of  Imagination, 
the  creations  of  Conception,  the  conclusions  of 
Reasoning,  etc.,  all  of  which  make  up  the  sum  of  our 


>4I> 


f 


'.I 


Jl 


28 


Introduction. 


»♦!( 


m 


knowledge  as  the  ideas  come  to  and  are  appropriated 
by  Intellect  as  its  property  :  that  the  internal  senses 
operate  by  means  of  a  leading  impression,  drawing  to 
it  the  required  image  by  means  of  Affinity  through 
Association  ;  and  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  im- 
pression, it  is  ever  to  be  understood  that  the  self-same 
quality  with  all  its  characteristics  passes  as  ideas  into 
the  ethcrial  or  spirit-ground  of  the  Ego ;  that  the 
Ego  as  being  fundamentally  the  ethcrial  or  spirit 
representation  of  the  bodily  conditions,  is  in  reality 
the  Intellect  or  Soul,  which  admits  any  number  or 
amount  of  involutions  of  separate  data  given  to  it,  and 
preserves  them  intact  as  the  furniture  which  it  acquires, 
save  when  under  the  discipline  of  life,  it  has  to  yield 
up  what  it  has  been  brought  to  repudiate  as  no  longer 
its  inherent  property. 

10. —  The  Source  of  Emotions, 

That  the  inbringing  of  impressions  (and  these  in 
the  spirit-substance  constitute  ideas),  creates  emotions 
so  soon  as  the  ideas  reach  the  Me  ;  and  the  emotions 
vary  in  character  and  kind  according  to  the  condition 
of  the  ideas  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  condition  for 
the  time  being  of  the  Me  on  the  other  hand  :  that 
emotions  are  sensations  which  equally  affect  the  body 
and  the  mind,  but  the  mind  through  the  impress  on 
the  body  ;  and  this  because  the  idea  is  but  a  spirit 
representation  of  the  impression  which  is  founded  in 
the  material  organ  ;  and  the  emotion  is  felt  to  be 
mild  or  vivid,  weak  or  strong,  according  to  the  qualities 
that  are  hereby  brought  into  combination.  Tell  a 
man  that  some  one,  of  whom  he  kuows  nothing,  has 


The  Sources  of  Emotion  and  of  Morals.        29 

been  drowned,  he  is  but  little  affected  ;  but  let  him 
know  that  the  drowned  man   is  his  father,  and  you 
immediately  create   a   strong   emotion    by  the   very 
change  of  the  idea  as  one  affecting  himself.     That  the 
PLmotion  according  to  its  character  may  be  attended 
by  the  immediate  exercise  of  Will  is  obvious  in  very 
many  cases.     If  meat  is  set  before  a  hungry  man,  the 
Emotion  at  once  carries  with  it  the  Will  to  partake  of 
it.    A  counteractive  emotion  may  however  be  aroused 
in  the  very  act  of  partaking,  i.e.  if  the  idea  should  be 
introduced  into  the  mind,  that  there  is  poison  or  some 
deleterious  mixture  in  the  food.     A  similar  counter- 
action might  also  be  manifested  by  the  introduction 
of  a   moral    idea,  as    when   the    military   officer   on 
putting  a  glass  of  water  to  his  parched  lips,  on  seeing 
a   wounded   soldier    looking   wistfully   at    him   with 
craving  eye,  withdrew  it  and  gave  it  to  the  man,  say- 
ing "  thy  need  is  greater  than  mine."     It  is  obvious 
then  that  the  ought  not  introduced  by  the  moral  idea, 
may  be   sufficient  to   restrain  the   operation  of  the 
sensuous  Will. 

11.-77/^  Source  of  Morals. 

That  moral  ideas  create  moral  emotions,  and  are 
those  which  interfere  with  or  affect  the  rights  of  the 
sentient  creature  ;  and  that  these  ideas  are  found  to 
arise  at  the  very  back  of  the  sensuous  Will ;  and  that 
they  exercise  a  controlling  influence  in  either  arrest- 
ing or  permitting  the  operation  of  the  sensuous  Will, 
as  when  the  idea  intervenes  that  the  accomplishment 
of  the  sensuous  Will,  may  be  an  injury  or  not  to 
another:   that  moral  ideas   are  also  presented  when 


30 


Introduction. 


Will- Determination  and  Freedom, 


31 


! 


'\  ;i 


1'  I 


» 


i 


i  I 


we  see  a  creature  in  pain  from  which  he  can  be 
relieved,  or  in  any  need  whereby  he  can  be  properly 
benefited,  in  which  case  an  emotion  is  aroused  which 
constitutes  a  Will  to  supply  the  want.  This  emotion 
as  a  rule  will  be  greatly  modified,  i.e.  heightened  or 
lessened  accordingly  to  the  relation  in  which  the 
party  in  want  may  happen  to  stand  to  the  Me  as 
feeling  the  emotion. 

\1.—  The  Modifications  of  Will, 

While  moral  ideas  influence  the  Me,  by  introducing 
the  ought  or  the  ought  not,  as  the  case  may  be,  anent 
the  exercise  of  the  sensuous  Will,  there  are  ideas  or 
sentiments  which  come  to  us  as  having  a  peculiarly 
authoritative  aspect,  ideas  for  example,  which  are 
believed  to  come  from  Deity,  or  which,  according  to 
the  education  we  have  received,  stand  in  our  minds  as 
sentiments  which  are  not  to  be  controverted.  Such 
ideas  will  be  found  to  influence  and  engender  Will, 
even  when  moral  law,  if  left  to  itself,  would  otherwise 
prevail.  We  can  hereby  explain  such  cases  as  the 
sacrificing  of  children  to  Moloch  by  their  parents.  It 
is  thus  made  obvious  that  the  law  of  morals  can  be 
and  is  modified  in  character  and  action  according  to 
the  views  of  authority  under  which  the  mind  is  placed. 

13.-77/^  Principles  of  Will-Determination. 

That,  in  the  exercise  of  Will,  there  is  very  often  an 
alternative  placed  before  the  Me  (the  mind),  as  when 
two  or  three  separate  ideas  seem  to  contend  for 
appropriation  in  the  fulfilment  of  a  purpose,  and  one 


of  them  only  can  be  adopted :  it  may  be  illustrated 
by  the  fact  of  several  candidates  coming  forward  to 
fill  an  appointment,  and  one  only  can  be  chosen  :  it 
has  been  asked  what  moves  the  Will  in  these 
circumstances?  I  answer — In  these  circumstances 
the  Will  must  aivait  upon  ftidgment.  Judgment  pre- 
scribes ivhich  of  the  ideas  are  on  the  ivhole  the  fittest  or 
most  desirable  to  the  Me.  The  Me  becomes  then 
changed  in  its  relation  to  the  claimants  generally,  and 
through  the  exercise  of  Judgment  it  is  drawn  to  its 
choice  by  the  J  udgment.  This  sets  forth  clearly  enough 
what  is  called  the  determination  of  the  Will.  It  is  the 
determination  which  constitutes  the  Will  ;  and  the 
determination  is  simply  the  preferential  attraction 
which  the  Me  has  for  one  of  the  pleas  rather  than  the 
other,  after  fudgment  has  decided  on  their  merits, 

14. — Freedom  of  Will, 

That  in  all  cases  where  there  is  the  freedom  of 
choice,  there  may  very  likely  be  a  bias  or  predis- 
position leaning  in  some  particular  direction  ;  but 
this  fact  does  not  touch  the  question  of  one's  indi- 
vidual liberty.  P'or  what  is  really  meant  by  the 
power  of  choice  ?  Is  it  not  the  power  of  following 
one's  own  inclination,  or  at  all  events  of  serving  some 
purpose?  If  I  have  a  proclivity  or  bias  in  any 
particular  direction,  or  if  I  have  an  end  to  accomplish, 
surely  my  liberty  consists  in  adopting  that  direction 
in  preference  to  any  other ;  and  when  I  have  in 
Judgment  weighed  all  the  consequences  of  so  doing, 
and  decided  upon  the  course  I  have  resolved  to  follow, 
I  am  responsible  accordingly. 


k 


32 


Introduction. 


Mr.  Druvimofid's  Evolution. 


33 


I 


li 


N.B. — In  close  connexion  with  the  universal 
principle  of  Causality,  there  stands  forth  the  all-im- 
portant question  of  Evolution.  Since  the  fore^^oing 
principles  were  penned,  I  have  read  the  latest 
publication  on  this  subject,  viz. : — Drummond's 
"  Ascent  of  Man."  It  does  not  fall  to  me  to  express 
an  opinion  on  the  merits  of  this  work  ;  but  I  take  the 
freedom  of  saying,  that  his  plea  of  "  altruism,"  as  a 
struggle  for  others  in  the  field  of  nature,  is  not  well 
founded.  True  it  is  that,  in  the  animal  economy,  we 
see  this  instinct  well  established,  particularly  in 
mothers,  in  behalf  of  their  young,  while  the  young  are 
dependent  on  their  help  ;  but  so  soon  as  the  young 
are  able  to  provide  for  themselves,  all  care  and  con- 
cern for  their  offspring  cease.  We  say,  therefore,  the 
instinct  is  a  wise  provision  for  the  preservation  of 
life  while  in  a  state  of  helplessness  ;  but  this  case 
of  parents  nursing  their  young  cannot  properly  be 
regarded  as  at  all  a  question  of  Evolution,  but  is  an 
implanted  instinct.  We  aver  that  until  moral  law  comes 
into  play,  as  in  the  case  of  man,  we  see  very  little  of 
altruistic  struggles  for  others  in  the  world.  And 
even  then  the  selfish  element  has  for  the  most  part 
reigned  paramount,  as  seen  in  the  destructive  wars 
which  have  ever  prevailed.  Until  Christianity  came, 
altruism  has  been  at  a  discount  ;  and  even  yet  we  see 
what  a  vigorous  battle  it  has  to  fight  before  the 
struggle  in  behalf  of  others  comes  to  prevail. 

True  it  is  that  we  see  the  great  principle  of  self- 
sacrifice  in  nature  ;  and  Mr.  Drummond  makes  much 
of  this  in  corroboration  of  his  altruistic  claims.  But 
though  one  department  of  nature  is  found  to  be  made 
available  by  sacrifice  for  the  maintenance  of  another 


and  a  higher  department,  what  lesson  does  it  teach  ; 
certainly  not  the  fact  of  Evolution.  It  teaches  the  wise 
provision  of  an  omniscient  mind  in  ordaining  that  the 
lower  stages  of  being  should  give  way  for  the  support  of 
the  higher.  But  until  we  have  seen  this  law  of  altruism 
enforced  in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ,  viz.,  love  to 
our  neighbour,  as  the  great  principle  of  Christianity, 
we  can  hardly  call  the  self-sacrifice  of  nature  by  the 
name  of  altruism. 

Mr.  D.  rightly  regards  Love  as  the  perfection  of 
altruism  ;  but  he  has  a  curious  notion  of  the  origin 
and  characteristics  of  love.  "  Love  is  love  (he  says) 
and  has  always  been  love,  and  has  never  been  any- 
thing lower.  Whence  (he  asks)  came  it  ?  W^ho  be- 
stowed it  ?  a  little  child.  Till  this  appeared,  Mary's 
affection  was  non-existent  ;  woman's  was  frozen." 
Surely  everybody  knows  that  love,  like  every  other 
affection  of  the  mind,  is  produced  by  the  presentation 
of  something  which  is  agreeable  to  the  mind  and  heart. 
As  a  general  rule  love  is  an  attachment  to  what  is 
gratifying  to  us.  This  attachment  of  course  varies 
according  to  the  category  of  the  object  which  excites 
it.  There  is  the  love  of  money,  the  love  of  children, 
the  love  of  truth,  and  the  love  of  God,  as  the  highest 
of  all. 

The  principles  of  Evolution  contended  for  by  Mr. 
Drummond  cannot  I  think  be  upheld.  They  wildly  con- 
tradict all  the  laws  of  causality,  in  that  they  leap  from 
species  to  species,  without  any  real  foundation  for  the 
results  attained.  We  have  been  accustomed  to  believe 
that  whatever  is  contained  in  the  effect  is  to  be  found 
in  the  cause  ;  but  Mr.  Drummond's  effects  under 
evolution  contain  much  for  which  there  is  no  cause 


. 


84 


Introduction. 


TJie  true  nature  of  Evolution. 


:^5 


M 


M 


Ji: 


whatever.  I  need  but  mention  the  conversion  of  the 
gills  of  the  fish,  which  have  no  connexion  whatever 
with  hearing,  and  no  adaptation  for  the  sense  of 
hearing,  into  ears,  with  their  varied  nerve  organization 
for  hearing,  when  the  fish  become  a  land  animal  ! 
The  whole  is  a  burlesque  on  natural  law.  That  there 
is  such  a  principle  as  evolution  cannot  for  a  moment 
be  questioned  ;  but  evolution  has  not  only  its  limits 
but  its  laws  ;  and  for  every  expression  of  it  there 
must  be  a  satisfactory  reason  found  ;  and  in  every 
expression  of  it  also,  there  must  be  a  preservation  of 
what  may  be  termed  \.\\q ground-forjn  of  the  structure; 
that  form    which  may  be    regarded   as   the  basis   of 

species. 

In  behalf  of  an  absolute  evolution,  it  has  been 
maintained  that  a  single  cell  might  be  made  to 
involve  a  very  large  number  of  separate  characteristics. 
This  is  true,  as  we  find  in  the  case  of  the  human  germ 
and  of  others.  But  granting  this,  we  are  bound  to 
assume  the  special  interposition  of  a  Creator  of  the 
germ  in  each  distinctive  stage  of  species  ;  for  before 
man  came,  it  behoved  that  there  should  be  complete 
development  in  each  separate  case  of  the  respective 
seeds  of  animal  creaturehood.*     And  then,  if  there  is 

*  It  is  ?iffirine(l  that  the  human  cell,  in  its  development, 
troea  throuf,'h  tlie  mnge  of  animal  production,  in  its  ascent,  till 
its  final  stage  of  ascent  in  man.  The  fact  of  a  single  cell  em- 
bodying stich  an  enormous  amount  of  separate  fundamentals  for 
the  development  of  the  extraordinary  multi|)licity  that  is  ktiown 
to  exist  in  the  organization  of  man,  is  one  of  the  wonders  that 
confronts  us  ;  and  it  opens  up  to  us  this  consideration,  that  as 
the  etherial  arena  or  spirit-substance  is  known  to  embrace  in 
its  bosom  any  nund)er  of  separate  impressions  without  in  any 
way  confounding  them,  so  it  would  seem  that  a  va.st  number  of 


a  gradual  ascent  till  we  come  to  man,  as  must  be 
allowed,  how  are  we  to  account  for  the  expressive 
variety  of  collateral  types,  each  having  its  own 
evolutionary  changes?  Nature  in  her  ever-varying 
moods,  according  to  the  influences  that  happen  to 
prevail  through  climate,  food,  training,  etc.,  can  after 
all  introduce  nothing  that  is  absolutely  new.  We  may 
have  members  strengthened  by  exercise,  or  members 
weakened  by  want  of  this,  or  even  lost  by  the  want  of 
it  ;  and  we  may  have  many  changes  by  evolution  in 
what  constitutes  the  conditions  of  things  ;  but  that 
natural  law  should  of  itself  invent  de  novo,  or  create  a 
fresh  organization,  either  by  natural  selection  or  by 
any  other  process,  without  the  interposition  of  a  con- 
structive hand,  is  not  only  contrary  to  all  analogy, 
but  is  inconceivable  on  the  known  principles  of 
Causality. 

these  may  l)e  infolded  in  the  smallest  sjmce,  and  presented  under 
a  material  form.  In  the.se  circumstauces,"  it  is  most  natural  to 
tlunk  that,  in  creating  the  germs  for  future  development,  the 
Creator  began  with  the  simplest,  and  in  each  succeeding  case 
imparted  what  constitutes  the  basis  of  additional  structures, 
without  increasing  tlie  size  of  the  cell,  when  made  capable  of 
further  (hn-elopment.- 


i|kf| 


Matter  and  Spirit. 


37 


\i 


I 


l(    >.l 


I 


*  \\ 


CHAPTER    I. 


THE    PROBLEM    OF    EXISTENCE. 


Sectiofi    1 . — 


Characteristics   of  Matter   and  of  Kther 
and  the   Cosmical  Forces. 


THE  problem  of  Existence,  or  the  great  question 
-  of  Ontology,  involves  the  philosophy  of  sub- 
stance. Great  minds  have  addressed  themselves  to  the 
solution  of  this  problem,  and  have  given  it  up  in  de- 
spair. Will  any  succeeding  inquirers  be  more  fortunate? 
It  is  not  likely  that  better  brains  intrinsically  can  or 
will  be  applied  to  the  investigation  ;  and  yet  in  the 
advance  of  scientific  attainment,  an  inferior  mind, 
placed  on  a  higher  pedestal,  may  be  able  to  grasp  a 
fresh  peg  whereby  he  can  lift  himself  to  still  further 
views,  and  thereby  be  led  to  make  additional  headway 
into  the  inner  secrets  of  essential  beinghood. 

We  are  familiar  with  the  outside  world  of  matter  ; 
and  we  have  pursued  endless  speculations  on  the 
inside  world  of  mind  ;  but  how  to  connect  these  two 
great  categories,  has  baffled  our  philosophers.  That 
there  is  a  connection  betwixt  them,  and  this  of  the 
most  intimate  nature,  is  an  assured  fact  to  every  man  ; 
yet  the  modus  operandi  of  body  upon  mind,  and  of 
mind  upon  body,  remains  to  this  day  a  mystery.  We 
are  accustomed,  and   I  think  rightly,  to  regard  the 


essential   basis  of  mind  to  be  what  we  call  Spirit- 
substance,*  and  for  the  very  good  reason  that  while 
matter  is  finite  and  limited  in  its  qualities,  and  quickly 
loses  its  identity  by  the  changes  which  are  wrought 
upon  it :   mind  has  the  capacity  of  receiving  endless 
accessions,  and  with  them  all  can,  through  memory, 
point  to  its  identity,  by  bringing  up  past  experiences 
in  their  separate  occurrences.      I  may  be  assured  that 
the  tree  in  my  garden  is  the  growth  of  the  very  plant 
which  I  inserted  in  the  ground  twenty  years  ago  ;  but 
there  is  no  outward  sameness  now  betwixt  the  original 
plant  and  the  tree  as  it  presently  stands  ;  but  that  I 
am  7101V  the  individual   I  was  then,  is,  notwithstanding 
all  the  changes  I  have    undergone,  an    assurance  of 
which  I  have  no  doubt  whatever,  because  I  can  re- 
cal  the  facts  and  the  very  state  of  mind  which  existed 
at  the  date  in  question. 

The  fact  then  that  I  can  trace  backward  a  long 
.series  of  identities  that  have  been  mine,  and  still  are 
mine,  constitutes  a  feature  in  the'  category  of  mind, 
which  assuredly  does  not  belong  to  matter  as  we 
ordinarily  perceive  it.  The  fact,  moreover,  that  mind 
can  hold  in  its  grasp  a  multitude  of  items  called  ideas, 
without    confusion,    without    collision,    and    without 

*  Tht're  are  some  who  think  tliat  the  term  "substance" 
cannot  be  employed  or  embraced  in  the  term  "spirit,"  which  is 
usually  understood  as  an  abstract  characteristic,  such  as  cour- 
age, vigour,  &c.,  in  the  matter  of  disposition  or  temper.  But 
wliat  is  tiiis  but  tlie  pith  or  marrow  of  the  substance,  and  the 
term  spirit  may  be  used  not  only  as  denoting  tlie  cliaracter  of  the 
substance,  but  as  meaning  the  substance  itself,  as  something 
particularly  refined  and  subtle,  with  energy  and  resilience  for 
its  attributes. 


7 

i 


88 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


Philosophers  on  the  nature  of  Ether, 


39 


f*' 


i 


amalgamation,  constitute  qualities  which  cannot  be 
predicated  of  matter;  while  the  attribute  of  conscious- 
ness has  no  manifestation  whatever  in  the  arena  of 
matter  as  such.  We  have  good  grounds  then  for 
concluding,  that  the  basis  of  mind  must  be  regarded 
as  spirit-substance. 

Here  inquirers  have  been  led  to  .stop  .short  ;  and 
they  have  hence  concluded  that  spirit-substance  must 
be  regarded  as  exclusively  ''  mind-stuff,"  and  therefore 
not  to  be  .sought  for  in  the  category  of  mere  physics. 
Physical  philosophers  in  this  respect  have  sadly  over- 
looked the  great  fact,  that  spirit-substance  may  be 
found  operating  (and  in  contrary  directions  at  the 
same  time)  *  in  the  field  of  pure-matter.  We  are 
acquainted  with  the  great  forces  which  constantly 
play  their  parts  in  fulfilling  the  phenomena  of  the 
world,  and  with  the  ultimate  common  ground  in  which 
they  all  rest.  VV^e  are  indebted  to  Sir  George  Grove 
for  the  assurance  that  Electricity  and  Magnetism. 
Chemical  and  Electric  Affinity  and  Gravitation  are 
not  only  convertible  into  one  another  ;  but  thit  for 
this  very  rea.son,  these  forces  are  but  different 
affections  of  one  and  the  same  invisible  medium. 
Physical  philosophers  indeed  are  fully  cogni.sant  of 
this  medium  which  is  known  by  the  name  of  Ether ; 
but    though    they   speak    of    it  as  "a    highly  elastic 


*  Hence  the  (IcKtrine  which  has  |>revaile«l  aiuoijcr  philoso- 
phers, ami  is  still  believed  in  by  many,  of  two  tiui.js  (positive 
and  ne^rative)  ;  but  two  fluids  in  point  of  fact  would  not  suffice; 
for  it  can  be  proved  that  a  score  of  different  lines  of  action  niav 
be  found  operatin«;  in  the  .same  plane,  that  is  in  the  same  local 
compartment,  and  in  all  possible  directions  without  interruption. 


medium,"  they  have  been  unwilling  to  regard  it  as  in 
itself  other  than  matter  ;  and  even  to  speak  of  its 
atomic  character,  though  they  nevertheless  find 
that    "nature    abhors    a    vacuum."*     If    it    were    a 

*  Sir  William  Thomson  asks  the  question  "  What  is  Ether ^" 
and  answers,  "  It  is  matter  prodigiously  less  dense  than   air- 
millions  and  millions  and  millions  of  times  less  dense  than  air. 
We  can  form  some  sort  of  idea  of  its  limitations.     We  believe  it 
is  a   real   thing,  with  great  rigidity   in  comparison  with   its 
density  ;  it  mav  be  made  to  vibrate  400  million  million  times 
per  second,  and*  yet  be  of  such  density  as  not  to  produce  the 
sli<dite.st  rtisistance  toany  body  going  through  it."— (Constitution 
of  Matter,  p.  347.)    Tyndall   says  "Space  is  occupied  by  a  sub- 
stance almost  inHnitely   elastic,  through   which  the  pulses  of 
light  make  their  way."     And  he  goes  on  to  say     "  it  is  just  as 
e^sy  to  c(.nceive  of  a  vibrating  atom,  as  to  conceive  of  a  vibrat- 
incr  cannon  ball  ;  and  there  is  no  more  difficulty  of  conceiving 
this  Ether,  as  it  is  called,  which  Hlls  space,  than  in  imagining  all 
space  to  be  filled  with  jelly.    You  can  imagine  the  atoms  vibrat- 
in<r,  and  their  vibrations  communicated  to  Ether  in  which  they 
swimr,  to  be  propagated  through  it  in  wa>^s.  These  waves  enter 
the  pupil,  cross  the  ball  of  the  eye,  and  break  upon  the  retina 
at  the  back  of  the  eye.     Their  motions  are  communicated  to  the 
retina,  transmitted  thence  along  the  optic  nerve  to  the  brain, 
and  then  announce  themselves  to  consciousness  as  sight."   (Lec- 
tures on  Heat,  p.  250.)  Sir  J.  Herschel  on  the  undulating  theory, 
says  "an  excessively  rare,  subtle,  and  elastic  medium,  or  Ether, 
fills  all  space,  and  pervades  all   material  bodies,  occupying  the 
intervals   between   their    molecules;   and  that   the    molecules 
of  Ether  are  susceptible  of  being  set  in  motion  by  the  agitation 
of  the  particles  of  ponderable  matter."     Faraday  says-"  I  sup- 
pose we  mav  compare  the  matter  of  Ether  and  ordinary  matter, 
and  conside'r  them  in.  their  essential  constitution,  either  or  both 
comi)osed  of  little  nuclei  considere^l  in  the  abstract  as  matter, 
and  as  force  or  power,  associated  with  these  nuclei  ;  or  else  as 
both  consisting  of   mere  centres  of  force,  according  to  Bosco- 
viU'h's  theory."   It  is  very  obvious  that  the  view  of  Ether  given 


II 


40 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


The  Prerogatives  of  Ether 


41 


it 


medium  composed  of  atoms,  then  assuredly  the 
atoms,  as  finite  particles,  could  be  displaced  ;  but 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  displacement  for  a  moment, 
or  by  the  thousandth  part  of  a  hair's  breadth  of  the 
Etherial  medium  :  it  must  be  regarded,  as  we  shall 
see,  as  an  endless  continuity,  or  absolute  uniformity, 
without  the  possibility  of  a  break  therein.  I  lence  it  has 
been  compared  to  a  compact  jelly,  or  being  one 
continued  persistent  unity.  And  moreover  its 
elasticity  is  such  that  however  occupied  in  connexion 
with  any  representation,  or  set  of  representations,  it 
has  always  a  fresh  side  for  the  representation  of 
additional  objects  that  may  be  brought  into  the  arena 
of  manifestation. 


by  tliese  distinguished  Hutiiors  be«(s  a  i-oiuliticiu  of  this  primitive 
substance  very  ilitferent  from  that  set  forth  in  the  text,  and 
very  unphilosophical,  because  it  is  fouml  to  be  in  many  respects 
unlike  to  matter,  and  because  it  fails  to  account  for  tlie  |»resent 
con<lition  of  thini,'s  on  any  feasible  principles.  The  autln.rs  of 
''The  Unseen  Universe"  (p.  148)  s;4y-*'the  principal  properties 
of  Ether  are  at  first  sinrht  at  least  of  an  inconirruous  character  ; 
for  from  one  point  of  view,  it  appears  as  a  tiuid,  from  another  a.s 
an  elastic  solid.  There  is  no  appieciable  resistance  offered  bv 
Ether  to  planetary  motions  even  wiien  the  veh)citv,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  earth  is  10(),rX)0  feet  per  .second.  On  the  otiier  hand, 
light  transmitted  with  a  veU»city  188,000  n.iles  per  second,  de- 
pends upon  transverse  disturlmnces  of  some  kind,  while  several 
optical  phenomena  indicate  a  velocity  almost  infinitely  great,  in 
compari.son  with  this  enormous  velocity.  Regard  the  Ether  as 
we  please,  tliere  can  be  no  doubt  that  its  properties  are  of  a 
mui;h  higher  onler  in  the  arcana  of  nature  than  those  of  tan- 
gible matter  ;  for  we  know  from  what  it  (h)es  that  it  is  capable 
of  vastly  more  than  any  one  has  yet  ventured  to  guess."  See 
this  subject  (Ether)  further  disrussed  in  Appendix  I. 


And  here  it  is  needful  to  point  to  the  first  and  most 
important  ofifice  accomplished  by  Ether.     Obviously 
it  is  not    intercepted    by   matter-substance.     This  is 
made  known  to  us  by  the   fact  that   in  day-light   it 
readily  passes    through   transparent    matter  such   as 
glass  ;  and  not  only  so,  but  by  the  fact  that  it  carries 
with  it  the  forms  of  which  it  happens  to  be  the  bearer. 
And    this    opens    up    one    of    the    most    important 
features  of  this  remarkable  medium,  which  is  this  : — 
that    the    matter    of    outward    objects    is    not    only 
penetrable  by,  and  pervious  to  the   Ether,  but  that 
from  the  material  object  there  is  projected  a  corres- 
ponding  etherial    representation    or    form,   etherially 
bearing  the  qualitative  properties  of  the  object  ;  and 
extending  by  a  certain  definite  and  determinate  law, 
according  to  its  mass,  while  decreasing  inversely  as 
the  .square  of  the  distance  increases.   This  great  law — 
the  Etherial  projection  of  the  material  object — has  not 
been  taken  into  account  by  our  physical  philosophers, 
as  it  ought  to  have  been.     But  it  is  in  the  first  place 
proved  to  be  a  fact  ;  and   in  the  second  place  it  is 
found    to   explain   the    whole  phenomena   of  nature, 
which  stand  before  us    as  facts  which  are  otherwise 
utterly  mysterious — facts  which  are  patent  to  us,  but 
of  which  we  can  ordinarily  give  no  explanation. 

As  to  the  fact  that  the  representation  of  the 
material  object  is  projected  or  radiated  over  the 
plane  of  the  object  :  this  is  made  known  to  us  by 
holding  up  a  mirror  before  the  object.  Hereby  it  is 
shewn  as  decreasing  in  size  inversely  as  is  the  square 
of  the  distance  of  the  mirror  from  the  object  ;  and 
here  also,  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  whole 
surrounding    medium    in    every    part    takes   on    the 


42 


The  Problem  of  Existence, 


Matter-Fonns  and  Spirit-Forms. 


48 


image — not  by  threads,  but  by  continuity.  And 
accordingly,  we  find  that  in  day-light  the  objects  of 
the  outer  world  are  depicted  on  our  eyes,  as  so  many 
mirrors  receiving  the  images  of  them.  And  in  their 
case  the  image  is  carried  by  the  optic  nerve  to  the 
brain,  where,  as  we  shall  afterwards  see,  there  is  a 
reception  of  them,  and  consequently  a  cognition  and 
consciousness  of  them,  by  the  mind. 

But  we  have  reason  to  know  that  it  is  not  merely 
in  the  luminifcrous  condition  of  the  Kther  that  there 
is  a  radiation  of  the  material  object,  but  at  all  times, 
in  the  darkness  as  well  as  in  the  light.  It  is  thereby 
that  heat  is  radiated  ;  and  it  is  thereby  that  the 
formless  protoplast  takes  on  the  characteristics  of  the 
existing  germ-forms,  whereby  growth  is  promoted. 
In  the  merely  physical  economy  we  can  produce  the 
representation  of  an  object,  as  by  electrical  agency,  in 
a  plasma  adapted  for  receiving  it.  And  it  seems 
natural  enough  to  suppose  that,  if  the  etherial  me- 
dium, as  the  most  fundamental  and  the  most  all- 
penetrating  medium  in  existence,  takes  on  the  speci- 
alty of  the  form  and  character  of  an  object,  the  plastic 
medium,  which  is  provided  as  a  material  basis,  through 
the  action  of  the  etherial  medium,  takes  on  the  same 
form  and  characteristics  as  that  belonging  to  the 
germ.* 


This  leads  us  to  speak  of  the  Forces  of  nature  gene- 
rally. \\'e  have  become  familiar  enough  with  the 
phenomena  of  Electricity,  and  more  particularly  with 
its  use  in  telegraphy.  We  ask — what  is  telegraphy  ? 
The  answer  is — it  is  the  transmission  of  material  con- 
ditions, or  .shall  we  not  rather  say,  of ///^  representation 
of  material  conditions,  through  a  medium  found  adapted 
for  this  end.  What  arc  material  conditions  ?  I  ans- 
wer, such  as  are  manifest  to  our  senses — they  are 
forms  which  can  be  seen  by  the  eyes,  or  heard  by  the 
ears,  or  felt  by  the  hands  ;  or  they  are  savours  ascer- 
tained by  the  taste,  or  odours  made  known  by  means 
of  the  nostrils  ;  there  are  al.so  physiological  conditions 
which  are  determined  only  by  their  chemical  consti- 
tution. What  is  here  affirmed  is,  that  all  those  con- 
ditions of  matter  seem  to  plant  their  essential  quali- 
ties in  the  surrounding  etherial  medium,  and  therefore 
they  exert  their  affinities  in  the  etherial  medium  as 
effectually  as  when  we  see  these  affinities  fulfilled 
before  our  eyes  in  the  sphere  of  matter. 

In  this  view  we  come  to  have  a  fresh  aspect  as  to 
the  foundations  of  matter.  The  difference  betwixt 
spirit-formations  and  matter-formations  appears  to  be 
this,  that  by  some  process  (we  may  call  ic  attempering) 
a  change  of  thickening  takes  place,  whereby  the  spirit- 
form^  which  of  course  is  finite,  comes  to  be  represented 


*  It  may  be  regarde<l  as  still  a  myatery  in  the  process  of 
"growth,  how  to  account  for  the  new  developments  of  blossom  and 
of  fruit,  witli  all  the  many  s|)ecialities  of  form  nnd  quality  dis- 
played! in  the  world  of  vegetation  ;  and  for  the  variety  of  organs 
and  filaments  that  are  manifested  in  the  animal  btnly  as  it 
comes  to  maturity,  none  of  which  can  be  detected  in  the  germ 
or  seed  fn»m  which  all  is  developeil.    Here  we  are  iuitiate<l  into 


the  wonderful  capacities  of  substance,  which  is  not  only  able  to 
bear  within  the  bosom  of  the  germ  the  initiatory  form  of  body 
in  its  more  immediate  developnient,  but  those  posterior 
itnpre.ssions  which  shew  themselves  at  the  back  of  certain 
expansions.  It  would  s^^em  that  the  enornious  number  of 
involvements  which  spirit-substance  may  embrace  in  the 
smallest  conjpass  may  be  folded  up  in  matter. 


'I 


44 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


The  Source  of  Cosmical  Forces. 


45 


as  a  matter-form.  In  both  cases  there  is  the  finite 
constitution  made  up  of  its  respective  quahties,  the 
material  representation  being  simply  a  grosser  mani- 
festation of  the  more  refined  deh'neation  in  Ether  that 
is  unseen  *  Of  these  refined  delineations  in  the  spirit 
world,  we  must  distinguish  those  which  arc  fixed  and 
determinate,  as  having  their  natural  sphere  therein, 
from  those  which  are  temporary,  as  being  the  evanes- 
cent shadows  of  material  objects  reflected  therein,  and 
dependent  on  the  presence  of  the  material  objects. 

We  see,  however,  the  value  and  importance  of  these 
shadows,  in  as  far  as  the  forces  of  nature  are  carried 
on  thereby.  For  example,  the  etherial  representation 
of  the  sun  meets  the  etherial  representation  of  the 
earth,  and  that  of  the  other  planets  of  our  solar  sys- 
tem, and  thereby  maintaining  the  centripetal  relation 
of  each  to  the  sun,  while  their  movement  given  to 
each  centrifugally  balances  this  relation  into  a  definite 
circumambience  ;  and  again,  the  great  mass  of  our 
earth  attracts  to  its  surface  the  material  objects  which 
are  separated  from  its  own  compact  body,  thereby 
constituting  what  is  called  gravitation.  In  other 
words,  the  maxim  holds  good  universally  that  what- 
ever happens  to  be  the  affinity  of  the  substances  which 
constitutes  the   globes  of  space,  that  same  affinity  is 


♦  What  are  we  to  un<lerstaii<l  as  to  those  jipjjearauces  of 
anj/els,  as  beings  beloiiginif  to  the  spirit-world,  wlioin  the 
Scriptures  represent  as  at  times  appearing  in  material  forms  \ 
Wiiat  but  to  suppose  the  |K)ssibility  of  their  s))irit-forms  being 
manifeste«l  in  tlie  garb  of  matter.  Wliat  also,  about  tiie  spirit- 
form  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  after  his  resiUTection,  wlueli  was 
yet  made  to  j)ut  on  the  material  form  and  handled  as  sucli  by 
hiH  disciples  { 


expressed   by  the  interplanetary  ether,  and  through 
this  reacts  on  the  material  objects  themselves.* 

Section  2. —  The  Cosmical  Forces  dependent  for  their 
characteristics  on  the  Affinity  of  the  Conditions 
brought  into  operative  relationship. 

I  have  said  that  the  Ether  penetrates  material  sub- 
stances, and  in  so  doing  according  tc  its  universal  law, 
it  partakes  of  the  quality  and  therefore  the  affinity 
which  the   particles  of  matter  have  for  one  another  ; 
and  it  confirms  that  affinity,  according  as  it  is  strong 
or  weak.    Hence  the  tenacity  with  which  the  particles 
of  the  diamond  cleave  to  one  another,  while  that  of 
ice,  water,  and  steam  are  quite  different.     This  con- 
stitution of  matter  moreover  explains  what  may  be 
called  the  transmissibility  of  force  through  any  mate- 
rial medium.     The  particles  may  be  so  loosely  joined 
that  the  body  of  matter  is  thereby  less  fitly  adapted 
for  an  electric  current  ;  or  they  may'be  so  compactly 
joined  as  to  be  little  susceptible  of  motion  ;  or  they 
may  be  constitutionally  unfitted  for  receiving  impres- 
sions, and  therefore  to  be  regarded  as  bad  conductors 
so  called.     We  find  the  required  quality  and   consis- 
tency in  the  particles  of  a  copper  wire  which  carry  out 
the  impressions  imported.     And  as  confirmatory  of 
the  doctrine  that  the  junction  of  distinctive  qualities 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  force,  and  that  forms  which 

♦  Here  it  is  obvious  that  the  Ether  manifests  itself  as  at 
once  a  soli<l  and  a  flui«l.  It  behaves  in  the  character  of  a  solid 
wlien  it  grips  the  heavenly  bodies  together,  as  if  in  one  mass, 
and  at  the  same  time  as  a  fluid,  when  it  permits  their  respective 
movements  within  its  bosom. 


I 


40 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


Matter-Forces  manifested  in  Ether, 


47 


i 


may  be  conjoined  with  the  force,  when  not  violent,  are 
conveyed  through  a. suitable  medium,  we  find  not  only 
certain  configurations,  but  the  very  sound,  as  the 
quality  whereby  these  configurations  are  accompanied, 
can  be  conveyed,  and  may  be  detailed,  if  there  be  but 
a  proper  receptacle  for  the  reception  of  the  same  at 
the  opposite  terminal. 

The  force  here  spoken  of  is  commonly  called  by  the 
name  of   Electricity.     But  Electricity  opens  up  to  us 
another  force   which  is  created   thereby,  viz.,  the  force 
of  Magnetism.     Electricity  during  the  process  of  its 
operation   creates  what  has  been   called  a  transverse 
position  of  the  particles  of  matter  to  one  another  ;  and 
this  it  is  found  changes  their  affinity  in  a  transverse 
direction.     This  transverse  direction  of  the  particles 
creates  what  is  called  the  magnetic  force,  of  which 
the  etherial  medium  is  partaker  ;  and  when  this  trans- 
verse attitude  of  the  particles  becomes  static,  we  have 
what  is  called  a  magnet.     The  power  of  a  magnet  is 
seen  in  the  particular  polaric  attraction  which  is  here- 
by constituted.     It  is  particularly  illustrated  by  plac- 
ing a  magnet  into  a  bag  of  nails,  when  as  exemplify- 
ing the  magnet  influencing  the  ether,  and  the  ether  the 
nails,  the  nails  with  their  polarity  hereby  changed,  are 
found   not  only  to  cleave  to  the  magnet  but  to  one 
another.     And  what  is  the  explanation   of  all  this  ? 
It  is  simply  this,  that  the  etherial  condition  created  in 
the  ether  by  the  vicinity  of  the  magnet,  communicates 
itself  to  the  particles  of  the  nails  according  to  the  law 
of    inverse  distances.     And  here  we  could  have  no 
better  example  of  matter  having  its  condition  repre- 
sented, first  in  the  spirit-substance,  which  everywhere 
envelopes  matter,  and  by  means  of  the  spirit-substance 


«»U 


again  carrying  this  condition  into  other  matter,  so  as 
to  condition  it  accordingly. 

The  force  known  as  Elective  Affinity,  and  indeed 
all  other  affinities,  are  explained  upon  the  self  same 
principles.  Each  substance  has,  of  course,  its  own 
special  qualities,  and  whatever  these  may  be,  they  are 
projected  in  the  universal  medium  of  ether  as  spirit- 
substance,  according  to  the  law  of  inverse  proportions, 
and  therefore  when  two  substances,  having  an  attrac- 
tion for  one  another  come  within  the  sphere  of  their 
mutual  range,  they  are  drawn  towards  one  another  by 
means  of  the  interposing  conditioned  ether.  This  may 
be  seen  by  placing  two  corks  floating  in  a  basin  of  water. 
Placed  at  a  certain  contiguity,  they  will  be  gradually 
drawn  to  each  other,  and  as  they  approach  nearer 
they  will  rapidly  run  together,  thereby  showing  that 
the  spirit-medium  is  the  operative  agent  as  having  its 
initiative  from  the  material  substances  themselves. 

We  come  then  to  understand  that,  in  the  first  place 
there  is  a  universal  spirit-medium,  Which  we  call  by 
the  name  of  Ether — that  all  matter  of  necessity  sub- 
sists therein,  and  gives  forth  its  qualities  thereto, 
thereby  constituting  a  spirit-form,  as  the  efflux  of  the 
material  form  ;  and  that  in  virtue  of  the  kind  of  con- 
ditions imparted,  and  the  circumstances  attending  it, 
so  will  be  the  forms  attending  the  operation  of  these 
forces.  In  this  way  we  come  to  explain,  as  already 
noticed,  what  has  been  regarded  as  a  profound  mys- 
tery, the  operation  of  growth,  where  there  is  the  forma- 
tion of  special  lineaments  in  the  prepared  protoplasm, 
according  to  the  fashion  of  the  germ,  as  the  type  in 
question  of  which  grow^th  is  constituted.* 

*  Tyndall  sliowa  clearly  that  crystals  are  built  by  the  ftlay 
of  polar  force  (  see  liis  Lectures  on  Sight,  pp.  101,  259,  &c.)    In 


If 


I 


II 


» 


I  ^ 


II 


48 


T/ie  Problem  of  Existence. 
Section  X —  The  Origin  of  Affinities. 


Having  then  so  far  ascertained  under  what 
circumstances  the  forces  of  nature  in  the  physical 
economy  have  their  operation,  and  each  with  its  own 
pecuhar  characteristics— having  ascertained  moreover 
that  the  laws  of  Affinity  in  material  objects  arc 
imparted  to  the  spirit-form  in  the  medium  surround- 
ing these  objects,  and  that  corresponding  operations 
ensue,  we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  still 
deeper  questions,  whence  come  the  Affinities  which  in 
the  states  of  attraction  or  repulsion,  characterize  the 
different  kinds  of  matter ;  and  whence  comes  the 
Energy  which  gives  rise  to  various  kinds  of  Forces 
with  which  we  are  cognisant?*     It  is  a  remarkable 


his  Fiagiiients  of  Science,  p.  8G,  he  asks  "  Wliat  is  the  ve«,'etable 
world  itself  Imt  the  result  of  the  complex  play  of  these  molecular 
forces  i  Here,  as  elsewhere  throu^jhout  nature,  if  matter  moves, 
it  u  force  that  moves  it,  ami  if  a  certain  structure  (ve«,'etable  or 
mineral)  is  pnxluced,  it  is  throu<rh  the  oj)eration  of  "the  forces 
exerted  between  the  atoms  and  the  molecules.  In  ve«;etable  as 
well  as  mineral  forms  are  the  final  expression  of  this  com j)licated 
molecular  action."  Tyn<iall  siiw  the  great  fact  of  their 
operation  in  the  question  of  growth  ;  but  he  has  failed  to  point 
out  what  constitutes  the  guiding  rule  in  each  separate  case. 

*  In  one  of  the  very  latest  publicatir.ns  whicli  has  to  deal 
with  the  Forces  of  Nature,  we  have  the  following:— "In  reality 
neither  here  nor  anywhere  else,  have  we  any  knowledge  what- 
ever of  what  is  actually  meant  by  attraction  :  nor  in°the  one 
sphere  nor  in  the  other,  have  we  seen  the  means  of  api)roxi- 
mating  to  such  knowledge.  To  Newton  himself,  the  verv 
conception  of  one  atom  or  one  mass  attracting  through  emi>ty 
space  another  atom,  or  another  mass,  ])ut  his  mental  jmwers  to 


Two  Departments  of  the  Absolute, 


49 


fact  that,  whatever  happens  to  be  the  kind  of  matter 
in  the  universe,  the  etherial  medium  sympathizes 
therewith  :  there  is  no  exception  to  this  law  ;  and 
here  we  fairly  infer  that  there  is,  and  must  be,  an 
intrinsic  connexion  betwixt  the  matter  of  the  universe 
in  all  its  states,  and  the  etherial  medium,  as  the 
universal  substance  throughout  all  space.  We  inquire 
what  is  the  source  and  nature  of  that  connexion  ;  in 
other  words,  whence  come  the  affinities  that  exist  in 
the  varied  matter  of  the  universe  ?  This  is  a  question 
that  can  be  answered  in  such  a  way  as  first  to  account 
for  the  facts  of  affinity,  and  second  to  explain  the 
facts  as  they  present  themselves. 

I  have  laid  it  down  that  first  and  fundamentally, 
there  is  but  one  absolute  substance  —  that  said 
absolute  substance  exists  under  two  distinct  categories, 
depicted  as  positive  and  negative — that  the  positive 
department  sets  forth  the  absolute  expression  of  funda- 
mental Form,  or  what  we  may  term  plenary  and 
primary  Individuality,  as  the  source  out  of  which  all 
secondary  or  derived  individuality  can  proceed,  and 
that  the  negative  department  sets  forth  the  platform 
whereon  all  derived  individuality  can  alone  have  its 

confusion.  And  as  to  the  term  Affinity,  the  most  recent 
chemistry  finding  it  utterly  unfathomable  in  itself,  confines  its  re- 
searches at  present  to  the  investigation  of  its  mode  of  action. 
Science  does  not  know  indeed  what  forces  are  :  it  only  classifies 
them  here  as  in  every  deep  recess  of  physical  nature,  we  are  in 
the  presencti  of  that  which  is  not  physical.  That  whicli  bars  the 
way  iniperiously  at  every  turn  to  a  materialistic  interpretation 
of  the  world." — (Drmnmonds  Ascent  of  Man,  p.  433^.  The 
author  of  the  present  little  treatise  humbly  hopes  that  the 
door  may  be  by  and  by  opened  which  shall  conduct  to  a  fresh 
illumination  of  the  dark  passages  which  conceal  nature's  secrets. 


WW 


'\ 


«    . 


II 


f 


50 


T/ie  Problem  of  Existence. 


validity  established,  the  difference  between  the  two 
being  that  the  one  is  the  self-existing  Source  of  all 
positive  conditions  having  causality  in  Himself;  and 
that  the  other  is  the  self-existing  Ground  in  which 
fresh  conditions  are  impressed:  the  former  being  the 
primordial  Conditioned  in  its  essential  manifestation 
and  unity,  with  its  endless  scope  for  manipulation  : 
the  latter  being  the  primordial  Unconditioned,  with 
endless  capacity  for  receiving  and  displaying  con- 
ditions, the  former  being  Personality  in  its  necessary 
existence,  and  the  latter  being  Impersonality  in  its 
necessary  existence.  It  is  obvious  that  without  both 
there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  the  origination  and  the 
propagation  of  positive  beinghood.  I  shall  have 
something  further  to  say  about  the  primitive /^rj^/z^/ 
substance  ;  but  in  the  meantime,  I  call  attention  to 
the  primitive  impersonal  substance. 

Primitive  or  primordial  substance  in  its  im- 
personality is  regarded  as  one  and  infinite  throughout, 
without  parts,  without  atoms,  a  continued  uniformity, 
embracing  in  its  bosom  the  capacity  of  allness  of 
qualities  with  its  conditions,  in  some  such  fashion 
as  day-light  embraces  all  the  colours,  though  it  has 
none  of  its  own,  and  with  the  capacity  of  manifesting 
all  positive  conditions  when  a  pattern  is  exhibited.  It 
may  therefore  be  asked  how  the  primitive  forms  of 
matter  are  deduced  from  homogenious  substance? 
The  only  answer  which  can  be  given  comes  to  be  this, 
viz.,  the  introduction  of  primitive  and  specially 
qualitative  substances  as  originals :  in  which  case 
they  could  be  propagated  to  any  extent.  Hence,  then, 
we  readily  can  conceive  under  the  production  of  finite 
qualities,  not  only  the  affinity  of  qualities  as  being  all 


The  Origin  of  Affinity. 


51 


derived  from  one  and  the  same  mother-substance,  but 
likewise  the  multiplication  of  atoms,  as  the  measure 
of  their  respective  combination  to  form  compressed 
qualities  in  the  great  spirit-medium.  But  how,  it  may 
be  asked,  do  these  become  the  foundations  of  matter? 
I  have  only  one  answer,  and  that  is  by  the  process  of 
thickening.  What  is  the  key  to  this  process  we  know 
not  ;  but  there  can  be  given  no  other  answer  so  far  as 
appears.  How  the  spirit-form  is  converted  into  a 
material  form  we  have  no  means  of  showing  further 
than  this,  that  there  is  a  process  of  incrassation, 
probably  by  a  depression  of  what  we  call  temperature 
— we  think  this  can  hardly  admit  of  doubt — a  process 
whereby  spirit-forms  can  be  shown  as  material  bodies. 
But  now,  what  we  say  is  this,  that  the  fact  of  all 
the  varied  qualities  of  substance  being  ultimately 
drawn  from  one  and  the  self  same  general  mother- 
S2ibstance^  it  behoves  that  there  must  be  an  affinity  of 
qualities  among  them,  that  is  a  near  relationship  of 
filiation,  as  being  the  offspring  of  one  and  the  same 
parent.  It  is  of  enormous  moment  therefore,  that, 
while  we  can  point  to  the  great  facts  of  Affinity,  we 
can  also  set  forth  the  rationale  of  these  facts.  In 
other  words,  we  can  say  why  it  is  that  certain 
ingredients  exhibit  an  intense  sympathy  for  alliance 
with  one  another,  and  why  it  is  on  a  reversion  of 
circumstances  that  certain  others  have  an  antipathy 
to  one  another.     We  can  also  show  a  reason  why  we 


♦  I  find  that  Brewster,  in  endeavouring  to  explain  "the 
persistent  acjtivity  "  of  light,  remarks  that  "Ether  itself  may  be 
a  compound  body,  consisting  of,  or  containing,  all  the  elements 
of  matter," 


52 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


must  regard  the  various  qualities  of  derived  sub- 
stance as  atomic  in  their  constitution  *  while  pure 
Ether,  as  such,  in  its  own  essential  and  primordial 
condition  is  destitute  of  any  such  characteristic. 

Section  4. —  The  Cosmical  Forces  dependant  on  Energy 

for  their  dynamic  origin. 

There  is,  also,  another  attribute  of  primitive  Ether. 
There  is  not  only  the  Qualitative  attribute  just  referred 
to,  out  of  which  all  special  qualities  of  substance  are 
drawn,  but  there  is  also,  the  Dynamic  attribute 
known  as  Energy,  out  of  which  come  all  the  particular 
Forces  which  are  to  be  found  in  our  experience.  It  is 
of  great  importance  that  we  should  understand  under 
what  circumstances  the  various  Forces  which  exist  in 
the  world  as  forces  have  their  outcome.     Energy   is 

*  The  very  fact  of  separation  into  determinate  qualities  im- 
plies the  great  fact  of  limitation.  It  is  obvious  therefore  that 
Quantity  is  a  dependent  on  Quality.  And  as  rej^ards  the 
question  of  Quantity  it  is  perhaps  not  easy  to  say  where  limi- 
tation ends.  Sir  Wm.  Thomson  (Lord  Kelvin)  says  *'  it  used  to 
be  a  favourite  subject  for  metaphysical  argument  amongst  the 
scholars,  whether  matter  is  infinitely  divisible,  or  whether  space 
is  infinitely  divisible,  which  some  maintained  ;  while  others 
maintaine<l  that  matter  only  is  not  infinitely  divisible,  and 
demonstrated  that  there  is  nothing  inconceivable  in  the  infinite 
sub-division  of  space."  An»l  he  goes  on  to  say  that  it  is  simply 
an  incmiceivable  absurdity  to  suppose  a  limit  to  smallness 
whether  of  time  or  space  ;  and  here  we  find  him  lecturing  on 
the  millionth  of  a  millimetre  of  Oxygen.  (Lectures  on  the 
Construction  of  Matter,  p.  151).  Practically  there  is  no  such 
division  ;  but  it  is  demonstrated  that  Ether  c;in  hold  no  end  of 
separate  elements  in  the  same  area. 


Energy  the  Basis  of  Force. 


53 


the  foundation  of  them  all.*  The  particular  affinity 
manifested  by  the  quality  or  qualities  of  substances  in- 
each  special  case  exemplifies  its  own  corresponding 
force.  We  have  the  force  of  Electricity  dependent  on 
the  readiness  with  which  a  certain  condition  imposed  on 
matter  affects  the  matter  adjacent  to  it ;  or  rather  the 
readiness  wherewith  the  particles  of  matter  (say  in  a 
copper  wire)  are  affected  by  the  key-note  imparted  at 
the  terminus,  and  prescribed  to  and  adopted  by  the 
Etherial  medium.     We  have  the  force  of  Gunpowder 

*  It  is  obvious  that  Energy,  being  a  fundamentiil  attribute 
of  primitive  substance,  is  so  to  speak  measured  by  the  quali- 
tative character  given  to  created  substance,  when  converted 
into  Force.  We  speak  of  a  conservation  of  energy  and  a 
dissipation  (►f  energy  ;  and  most  unphilusophically,  as  if  energy 
couhl  either  be  increased  or  diminished.  If  we  could  rightly 
consider  the  matter,  we  wouUl  recognize  tliat  energy  could  not 
anteceilently  be  measured,  because  its  measurement  is  squared 
simply  by  the  qualities  of  things  existing  and  the  relation  in 
which  these  are  made  to  stand  to  one  another. 

On  this  subject  of  Energy  it  is  proper  to  take  notice  of  "the 
kinetic  theory  of  matter"  as  hitherto  prevailing.  It  is  painful 
to  read  the  elaborate  ingenuity  of  Sir  Wm.  Thomson  and  others 
in  accounting  for  the  operations  of  matter.  He  says,  "if  we 
could  be  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  kinetic  theory  of  gases 
founded  on  the  collisions  of  elastic  solid  molecules,  there  would 
still  be  beyond  it  a  grander  theory,  which  lieed  not  be  considered 
a  chimerical  object  of  scientific  ambition  to  explain  the 
electricity  (»f  solids."  He  is  in  ditticulty  as  to  an  explanation  of 
"the  properties  of  matter,"  and  says  "though  this  consum- 
mation may  never  be  reached  by  man,  the  progress  of  science  may 
l)e— I  believe,  step  by  step,  will  be— towards  it,  on  many  different 
roads,  con>'erging  towards  it  on  all  sides."  I  have  n(»  hesitation 
in  saying  that  the  proi)erties  of  matter  are  the  specific  qualities 
which  are  orginated  by  Deity  from  the  etherial  substance,  each 
of  these  qualities  l)eing  modifie<l  by  conditions  which  are  the  sub- 


54 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


indicating  the  suddenness  of  the  repulsion  which  takes 
place  in  its  particles,  by  the  change  of  condition  which 
is  effected  by  the  application  of  fire.  And  so  with 
respect  to  all  other  forces  which  arise  naturally,  accord- 
ing as  one  condition  of  matter  is  affected  by  another : 
the  law  being,  that  according  to  the  prevailing  affinity 
in  the  particles  of  matter,  so  is  Energy  displayed  in 
the  character  of  the  Force  attending  these  actions. 

We  shall  have  more  to  say  respecting  the  attributes 
of  Ether.  Here  it  is  necessary  simply  to  call  to  mind 
the  great  fact  that  Energy  is  one  of  the  inherent  and 
inalienable  attributes,  and  hence  that  wherever  there 
is  substance,  there  also  there  must  be  energy.  In  pri- 
mitive or  pure  ether  there  can  by  itself  be  no  force  of 
any  kind  indicated,  for  the  reason  that  the  ether  is  ab- 
solutely generic,  and  perfectly  balanced,  having  no 
particular  bias  in  any  one  direction  more  than  in  an- 
other ;  and  this  from  the  fact  that  it  has  no  express 
particular  or  particulars  in  regard  to  a  qualitative  cha- 


qualities  or  accidents  .to  which  the  category  of  any  quality  may 
be  subjected  ;  and  while  the  more  generic  qualities  have  their 
necessary  affinity,  the  conditions  of  these  qualities  which 
constitute  particular  modifications  of  these  must  of  course  alter 
the  affinities  accordingly.  It  is  obvious  that  in  these  circum- 
stances the  affinities  of  gases,  and  the  affinities  of  solid  matter, 
must  all  be  referred  to  the  same  general  law  of  o|)eration.  But 
we  do  not  believe  in  "  elastic  solid  molecules,"  and  Sir  William 
(I  mean  Lord  Kelvin)  allows  that  the  kinetic  theory  of  gases  is 
an  unsolved  problem  (see  his  Constitution  of  Matter— Lecture — 
Steps  towards  a  Kinetic  Constitution  of  Matter).  The  whole 
prc^blem  of  kinetics  must  be  held  to  lie  in  the  relationship 
in  which  the  properties  stand  to  one  another,  and  out  of  that 
^  relationship  therefore  the  exposition  of  kinetics  is  not  to  1^ 
found. 


Force  Graduated  by  Condition. 


55 


racter,  the  energy  which  is  inherent  has  therefore  no 
impulse  to  express  itself  one  way  or  another.     But 
the  moment  a  special  quality  is  introduced,  the  energy 
must  give  expression   to    the  characteristic  of    that 
quality  ;  and  the  atoms,  of  which  the  quality  is  com- 
posed, arc  held  together  by  said  energy ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  energjy   gives  expression  to  the  affinity    whereby 
they  are  held  together.    And  here,  again,  wc  find  ope- 
ration or  force  as  the  result    of  the   inherent  energy, 
when  two  substances  (that  is  two  distinctive  qualities) 
arc  brought  within  the  sphere  of  each  others  influence, 
then  the  affinity  is  found  which  gives  specialty  to  the 
force,  an   affinity  carried   by  ether  from  the   material 
objects,  which  hereby    affect  each  other  by  way  of 
attraction.     And  what  is  the  operation  but  a  force, 
varying  according  to  the  mutual  affection  which  be- 
longs to  the  separate   ingredients.     And  this  display 
of  force  is  illustrated  in  gravitation,  in  chemical  affi- 
nity, in  elective  affinity,  in  electricity,  in  magnetism, 
in  the  growth  of  plants,  and  the  like.    Without  energy 
there  could  be   no  force,  and  without   quality  there 
could  be  no  particuiar  force. 

Section  b.—  The  last  and  highest  attribute  of  Ether. 

There  is  still  another  attribute  of  the  Etherial  sub- 
stance to  be  considered,  which  has  not  heretofore 
been  observed  ;  but  it  is  one  of  enormous  moment,  in 
as  far  as  it  not  only  explains  what  has  hitherto  been 
a  very  great  mystery,  and  utterly  baffling  human 
sagacit)',  but  one  which  applies  throughout  to  the 
exposition  of  Mind  in  all  its  stages,  in  the  animal 
vvoVld  as  well  as  in  man.     We  have  found  Ether  to  be 


56 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


Consciousness  Developed  by  Ether. 


57 


first  of  all  a  non-material    substance,  yet  in  such  a 
world  as  ours  constantly  engaged  with  material  sub- 
stance, supplying  representatives  of  the  conditions  of 
material   substance  in   all   its  qualities,  save   in   the 
grossness   or    crassness   which   characterizes    matter. 
We  have  moreover  found  Ether  to  be  the  generic  sub- 
stance  which  is  at  the  foundation  of  all  substances,  and 
which    comprehends    within    itself    all    the    derived 
qualities  of  material  substance,  which  we  must  regard 
as   specialties    which   characterize    material  qualities, 
and  that  all  of  them  are  primarily  derived  from  the 
primitive  Ether,  and  this  explains  to  us  two  important 
facts :  first,  the  fact  that  Ether  sympathizes  with  all 
matter  of  whatever  sort,  and  secondly,  the  fact  that 
there  is  an  Affinity  betwixt  the  various  qualities  of 
matter  as  linked  together  by  Ether.     And  we  have 
also  found  that  besides  a  fundamentally  Qualitative 
character  out  of  which    we  have   positive  substance, 
Ether  has  also   an    essentially  Dynamic  character  to 
which  we  give  the  name  of  Energy,  out  of  which  we 
have  positive  Force.     Hence  Forces  cannot  be  illus- 
trated   but    by    the   combined    employment   of  both 
these  ;   for  whatever   happens  to   be  the   quah'tative 
characteristics  of  various  kinds  of  matter,  it  is   the 
same  which  manifests  the  kind  of  Affinity  in  matter, 
and  which  gives  significance  to  Energy,  and  hence  a 
special  kind  of  force  is  expressed.     Such  are  the  attri- 
butes of  Ether  as  displayed  in  i\\Q  physical  world. 

I  have  just  said  we  have  still  another  attribute  of 
Ether— an  attribute  which  can  have  no  manifestation  in 
the  merely  physical  world,  but  which  shows  itself 
abundantly  in  the  animal  world,  where  there  is  the 
establishment  of  a  nervous  system,  and  a  centre  of 


brain-work  for  its  operation.  First  of  all,  inquirers 
have  been  puzzled  beyond  measure  and  perplexed  as 
to  the  source  cf  mental  states.  They  have  obtained 
some  knowledge  of  all  objective  substances,  but  they 
have  not  seen,  nor  otherwise  knowrt,  any  such  pheno- 
menon as  Ether  emitting  consciousness :  whence 
consciousness  comes  has  been  an  utter  mystery  to 
man.  It  displays  itself  in  one  set  of  circumstances 
only,  viz.,  in  the  animal  frame,  wherein,  there  is  the 
establishment  of  a  nervous  system.  There  is  much, 
very  very  much,  to  lead  us  to  believe  that  the 
operation  of  mind  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  our 
old  friend  in  a  new  position — the  Ether,  found  as 
the  spirit-medium  in  physics,  and  always  working  in 
and  along  with  matter.  In  the  first  place  we  have 
the  knowledge  of  this  medium  being  constantly 
illustrated,  and  inexhaustively  as  spirit-substance 
in  the  world  of  matter  ;  and  what  other  medium  can 
we  conceive  as  spirit-substance  operating  with  matter 
in  the  territory  of  the  brain  ?  In  the  second  place,  it  is 
most  natural  to  suppose  that,  as  an  offshoot  from  the 
nervous  system,  there  must  be  an  etherial  representa- 
tion and  concentration  of  the  bodily  frame  inwardly ; 
that  is,  it  is  in  correspondence  with  all  analogy  that  a 
radiated  or  projected  representation  of  bodily  states 
posited  in  Ether,  at  what  we  must  call  the  central 
station,  which  spiritously  denotes  the  me.  Thirdly, 
we  say — here  is  developed  the  new  attribute  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  in  these 
circumstances  such  an  attribute  should  be  brought 
into  manifestation,  which  is  impossible  in  the  merely 
physical  economy,  on  the  ground  of  there  being  in 
that  economy  no   subjective  reaction.     In  subjective 


/ 


5S 


Thp.  Problem  of  Existence. 


reaction  there  arises  the  display  of  a  conscious  self- 
hood, which  ensues  from  the  fact  that  the  etherial  de- 
velopment of  the  bodily  me  is  not  lost  in  vacancy  as 
in  physics,  but  is  reflected  so  to  speak  as  its  own  self- 
hood, and  hence  the  expression  of  its  self-hood  men- 
tally is  manifested  therein.  We  are  hereby  enabled 
to  say  what  are  the  very  foundations  of  mind  in  the 
animal  economy.  The  expansion  of  mind  and  its 
various  faculties  arc  of  course  necessarily  dependent 
on  the  varied  instrumentality  by  which  mental  states 
are  revealed.  But  all  this  will  be  more  particularly 
dwelt  upon  hereafter. 


Section  6. —  The  Laiv  by  ivhich  Propagation  is  effected 
as  compared  ivith  Creative  effort. 

In  treating  of  the  phenomena  of  substance,  it  has 
been  noted  that  Quality  and  Form  lie  in  two  distinct 
categories.  Quality  we  have  .seen  is  an  indispensable 
essential  of  substance.  If  it  were  not  so,  if  there 
were  primarily  a  substratum  without  quality,  or  apart 
from  quality,  whence,  we  might  fairly  ask,  is  quality  to 
be  obtained  ?  Could  quality  have  any  being  apart 
from  the  substance  in  which  it  inheres?  Substance 
then,  as  developed  in  some  particular  quality,  is  the 
basis  on  which  Form  hath  its  foundation.  As  quality 
may  be  indefinitely  modified  and  varied  in  its 
conditions,  so  form  may  be  endlessly  changed  in  its 
configurations.  Now,  reverting  to  the  fact,  that  the 
Conditions  and  Forms  which  constitute  the  character- 
istics of  any  material  object,  are  radiated  or  projected 
therefrom  in  the  etherial  medium,  according  to  a 
definite  and  intelligible  law,  we  are  in  a  position  to 


I 


The  Propagation  of  the  Seed-form. 


59 


consider  the  all  important  problem  which  deals  with 
the  forms  and  conditions  of  objects,  their  propagation, 
their  multiplication,  and  their  diversification.  We 
cannot  look  outward  without  seeing  some  illustration 
of  the  great  facts  which  nature  shews.  The  outward 
scene,  as  depicted  on  the  eye  proves  it :  the  forms 
pictured  on  the  mirror  prove  it:  the  photographic 
picture  proves  it :  the  forms  that  are  constituted  by 
the  law  of  growth  prove  it :  the  messages  through  the 
telegraphic  wire  prove  it:  the  changes  created  by 
magnetic  influence  prove  it.  Hence  it  is  made 
apparent  to  us,  that  growth  as  a  law  of  nature  where- 
by plants  are  raised  from  seed  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  the  primary  initiation  or  introduction  of  new 
forms  by  the  creating  hand  of  a  purposing  Intelligence. 
The  work  of  creation  is  the  special  conception  of  a 
rational  mind,  which  devises  an  object  with  its 
separate  characteristics  in  harmonious  adaptation  to 
one  another,  and  all  as  a  compact  individuality  to 
serve  some  purpose  connected  vvith  its  environment  : 
the  process  of  propagation  is  the  slow  formation  of  an 
individual  from  a  pattern  already  constituted,  all  that 
is  wanted  being  the  lodgment  of  the  pattern  or  seed- 
form  in  soil  congenial  to  the  expression  and  expansion 
of  it  in  a  sympathetic  protoplasm. 

Under  the  operations  of  nature,  there  may  be 
changes  from  the  pattern  form  ;  for  where 
intermediate  influences  interpone,  there  must  be 
correspondent  changes  in  the  product.  These  changes 
constitute  what  we  called  Evolution,  and  there  may 
be  an  endless  variety  of  these  changes,  which  are 
modifications  of  conditions  and  of  forms ;  yet  it 
would  seem  confined  within  the  circle  of  the  general 


60 


The  Problem  of  Existence, 


basis,  which  we  may  term  the  type  of  species.     It  is 
within  the  range  of  experience  indeed  to  understand, 
that  very  considerable  changes  must  of  necessity  take 
place  by  means  of  speciality  in  training,  in  feeding,  in 
breeding    and     in     climatic     influences     (and     these 
agencies  only  confirm  the  accuracy  of  the  great  law 
of  causality)  while  the  species  as  a  rule  is  preserved 
with    tolerable    distinctness.      There    may    be    cases 
where  uncertainty    prevails  as  to  whether  there  is  a 
line  of  clear  demarcation,  especially  in   tribes  which 
have  gone  wild  as  compared  with  those  which  have 
had  a  long  history  of  domestic  treatment.     But  one 
thing  we  may  rest  tolerably  sure  of  is  that,  under  the 
processes  of   pure  propagation,  there    cannot  be  the 
introduction  de  novo  of  forms  and  conditions  which 
have  not  entered   into  the  causal  circle  of  elements. 
There  is  much  said  about  *'  natural  selection  ;  "  and 
to  it  is  given  a  wide  range  of  association.     We  hardly 
see  how  this  should  prevail  to  a  great  extent,  seeing 
artificial  processes  can  do  so  little.     But  granting  all 
that  can  be  demanded  in  this  category,  we  ask,  in  the 
name  of  wonder,  how  can  a  complex   adaptation  of 
parts    appear    by    nature,  which    ingenuity    can    ex- 
plain   not    otherwise    than    as    the    construction    of 
a  creating  and  purposing  intelligence?     There  is  no 
analogy  in  nature  for  the  first  introduction  of  such  a 
phenomenon.     Time,  however  prolonged,  cannot  help 
in  a  question  of  this  sort ;  what  we  call  the  operations 
of  nature  must  be  regarded  as  the  results  of  a  created 
original,    with    its    concatenation    of    appointments, 
shedding   the   seed    of    its   own    conformation    as   a 
pattern  for  its    propagation  in  an  amalgam  adapted 
for    its    nourishment.       And    as    we    have    already 


I) 


The  Circumstances  of  Mind-development.        61 


noted,  the  sympathetic  Ether  operates  in  extending 
the  causal  germs. 

We  should  naturally  come  now  to  inquire  under 
what  circumstances  we  may  readily  grasp  the  idea  of 
a  Creator.*  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  notion  we 
have  acquired  of  a  primordial  Ether,  as  the  absolute 
infinity  of  primitive  and  essential  substance,  should  be 
preliminarily  grasped  ;  for  it  by  itself  cannot  corres- 
pond to  our  idea  of  a  formal  and  personal  Intelligence. 
There  is  not  only  no  personality  in  any  of  the 
attributes  wc  have  discovered  in  Ether — not  only  no 
source  whereby  the  origination  of  new  conditions  and 
new  forms  of  things  might  be  introduced,  but  nothing 
on  which  to  ground  or  to  express  the  limitations  of  a 
conceiving  mind.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  we 
should  first  have  exhausted  our  inquiry  into  all  the 
attributes  of  Ether,  as  essential  and  underived 
substance,  before  seeking  those  which  constitute 
the  positive  and  particular  expression  of  them 
in  the  concrete  form,  of  a  personal  and  perfect 
Intelligence.  That  inquiry,  like  others,  must  pro- 
ceed on  observing  the  lines  of  phenomena  brought 
before  us  in  connexion  with  our  present  ex- 
periences. And  one  of  these  experiences  is  the  gradual 
and  almost  imperceptible  indications  of  mind  as  we 
advance  into  the  more  complex  productions  in  the  world 
of  matter.  We  trace  no  appearance  of  mind  in  in- 
organic nature  ;  moreover,  we  trace  none  in  the  vege- 
table economy :  it  is  only  when  we  enter  into  the  field 
of  the  animal  world  that  we  discover  not  only  sensa- 
tion, but  obviously  what  gives  the  subjective  assurance 
of  sensation,  the  consciousness  of  it  ;  and  this  only  by 
very  gradual  stages — each  stage  increasing  in  intel- 

*  See  Appendix  II, 


? 


If 


'I 


()2 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


) 


lectual  power  till  we  reach  its  highest  manifestation  in 
man.     The  question  therefore  arises— If  Ether  is  the 
absolute  substance  which  has  essential  and  eternal  exis- 
tence, and  therefore  the  substance  out  of  which  all 
f)henomenal  existences  are  derived,  whence  have  we 
mind  ?     Whence  have  we  consciousness  ?      Whence 
have  we  intelligence  ?  These  three  terms  all  lie  within 
the  same  category,  and  consciousness  is  the  basis  of 
the  others  ;  without  consciousness  we  could  have  no 
intelligence,   for  intelligence    marks   a  connected   or 
combined  consciousness  as  applicable  to   a   general 
knowledge  of  a  subject  ;  and  mind  is  a  still  more  ge- 
neral term  as  applicable  to  the  exercise  of  cognition 
as   a  whole.     Whence  then  have  we  consciousness? 
Consciousness  does  not  appear  in  the  clods  of  the 
earth,  in  the  stones  of  the  ground,  in  the  trees  of  the 
forest,  or  in  any  plants  of  the  garden,  but  it  is  observ- 
able when    and  only  when  we   come   to   the  animal 
economy  ;  and  it  is  seen  in  its  highest  manifestations 
in    man.     Whence   comes  consciousness  ?     We  have 
seen  that  the  attributes  of  external  things  are  those  of 
visible  quality  and  form,  that  the  world  of  matter  is 
objective  condition  and  form — what  we  call  inanimate 
things— things  primarily  derived  from  ether,  and  in  all 
their  changes  sympathised   with  by  ether,  and  having 
their  functions  carried  on   through  ether.     We  have 
found  no  other  substance   in  absolute  existence,  but 
this  ether :  whence  then  comes  consciousness  ?    What 
alternative  have  we  left  but  to  have  recourse  to  ether? 
And  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  that  there  is  in  the 
animal  economy,  especially  as  it  advances  in  the  pos- 
session of  many  inlets,  a  representation  of  the  bodily 
constitution  in  ether,  and  that  from  the  very  fact  of  its 


The  Subjectivity  of  Animal  Selfhood. 


63 


being  peculiarly  acted  upon  and  reacted  upon  itself, 
it  gives  forth  a  subjective  realization  of  the  impres- 
sions conveyed  to  it.  There  is  a  reason  why  there  is 
no  subjectivity  in  the  material  objects  of  the  world. 
We  have  seen,  indeed,  that  they  are  attended  by  an 
ectype  of  themselves  in  the  etherial  medium  ;  but 
that  expression  cither  falls  on  vacancy  or  on  other 
objects,  so  as  to  affect  them  in  some  more  outward 
relation  ;  but  in  the  case  of  the  animal  subject  this 
etherial  representation  is  not  spent  on  a  vacant  field, 
nor  on  something  external  to  itself,  but  is  confined  to 
the  operations  of  its  own  bodily  self-hood,  which  it  re- 
presents and  is  accordingly  lighted  up  in  these  circum- 
stances with  the  consciousness  first  of  all  of  its  own 
self-hood.  And  when  the  basis  of  this  is  sufficiently 
laid,  it  is  from  its  spirit-nature  equipped  to  express 
the  consciousness  of  all  the  communications  which 
come  through  the  various  inlets  which  are  opened  up 
with  the  external  world.  And  not  only  this,  but  to 
express  all  the  modifications  of 'consciousness  which 
arise  by  means  of  the  varied  organization  with  which 
the  brain  happens  to  be  supplied. 

But  the  question  may  be  asked — Can  we  be  thus 
dependant  on  material  things  for  consciousness  with- 
out falling  into  materialism  ?  Those  who  ask  such  a 
question  do  not  understand  the  economy  of  things, 
and  it  is  for  want  of  this  understanding  that  material- 
ism is  misapprehended  and  has  become  a  great  bugbear 
to  many.  It  ought  to  be  known  at  once,  that  it  is  not 
matter  that  gives  forth  consciousness,  but  the  etherial, 
or  spirit  representative,  when  formed  into  an  Ego. 
It  alone  gives  forth  consciousness,  and  it  gives  forth 
the  consciousness  of  the  material  object.     It  cannot 


'  ii 


64 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


be  disputed  (it  stands  as  a  fact),  that  the  material 
object  is  accompanied  with  its  spiritual  representation  ; 
and  if  we  are  able  to  show  how  this  spiritual 
representation  of  the  external  object  is  carried  to  the 
Ego,  we  show  not  only  the  sources  of  consciousness, 
but  the  connexion  betwixt  matter  and  mind. 

Section  7. —  The  circumstances  under  which  Mind  is 

developed. 

We  see,  then,  what  are  the  circumstances  under 
which  mind  is  developed.  A  stone  for  example  can- 
not develop  consciousness  ;  and  the  reason  is  because 
there  is  nothing  in  such  an  object,  i.e.  no  means  of 
concentrating  its  self-hood  on  itself,  so  that  this  self- 
hood might  re-act  in  any  one  part  of  its  body.  Its 
self-hood  is  its  own  objective  corpus  or  mass  :  it  has 
no  other :  it  has  no  subjectivity  in  itself :  it  can  have 
none,  because  the  very  conditions  which  create  sub- 
jectivity are  wanting.  But  these  conditions  are  found 
in  the  presence  of  an  apparatus  whereby  the  etherial 
representation  is  played  upon  within  itself;  and  not 
only  this,  but  whereby  also  there  is  the  capacity  s^{ 
response  for  re-action  being  made  within  itself, 
according  to  the  kind  of  intimations  made.  A  stone 
has  no  means  of  self-representation  within  itself,  and 
no  power  of  self-movement  within  itself,  and  therefore, 
of  course,  can  have  no  consciousness  of  self.  Nor  can 
a  plant  develop  consciousness  for  the  same  reason. 
True  it  is  that  a  plant  has  several  characteristics 
which  are  utterly  wanting  in  a  stone.  It  is  organized 
by  a  cellular  structure  :  it  is  characterized  by  variety 
of  condition  in  the  separate  parts  of  its  structure,  such 


The  Nature  of  Life. 


65 


as  woody  fibre,  bark,  leaves,  blossom,  and  fruit.  It 
draws  the  sap  of  its  life  from  the  substance  of  the  soil, 
and  passes  it  on  converted  by  assimilation  into  its 
own  nutrient  qualities  between  the  bark  and  the 
wood  to  supply  subsistence  to  the  leaves,  and  fresh 
nourishment  for  the  development  of  the  fruit,  and  as 
it  passes,  it  undergoes  a  formative  process  in  accord- 
ance with  the  cellular  character  of  the  plant.  There 
may  be  also  the  manifestation,  as  perceived  by  us 
outwardly,  of  sensation  in  the  plant,  that  is  of  dis- 
turbance of  parts  by  the  action  of  an  adjacent  object. 
For  what  is  sensation,  fundamentally  ?  It  is 
stimulation  ab  extra  ;  and  stimulation  may  be  created 
on  one  part  of  an  object  by  external  influence  on 
another  part ;  but  in  the  plant  there  can  be  no 
consciousness  of  sensation.  And  for  the  reason  that, 
while  there  is  what  is  called  life*  in  the  plant,  by 
reason  of  the  ministering  of  nutrition  to  all  its  parts, 
and  by  the  chemical  conversion  of  that  nutrition  into 
the  separate  conditions,  and  fOrms  belonging  to 
its  different  parts  ;  yet  there  is  nothing  in  the  plant 
to  set  forth,  and  to  concentrate  an  etherial  self- 
hood of  its  own,  that  is  a  spirit- representation 
of    the     plants'    bodily    economy    within    itself    to 


*  Much  mystery  has  been  ascribed  to  the  term  life,  as  if  it 
iiidicateil  some  invisible  causative  |X)wer  whereby  each  creature 
in  the  ^'egetable  antl  animal  world  grows  and  propagates  its 
kind.  Tliere  never  was  a  greater  mistake.  There  is  no  invisible 
cau.sative  power  so  endowed.  Life  is  but  the  activity  of  a 
causal  arrangement  in  organic  structures.  And  we  say  this 
from  tht;  fact  that  the  process  whereby  tlie  creatures  live  and 
move  and  propagate  their  kind,  can  readily  be  accounted  for 
and  expounded  iu  the  process  of  natural  law. 

F 


66 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


re-act  upon  itself  as  the  attitude  under  which  alone  a 
subjective  consciousness  of  its  beinghood  could  be 
manifested.  The  tree,  of  course,  like  everything  else 
material  in  the  world,  hath  its  own  external  re- 
presentation in  the  etherial  spirit-substance  ;  but  all 
this  is  mere  objectivity  ;  and  an  objectivity  too, 
which  as  I  have  noted  serves  a  very  important  end  ; 
for  were  not  the  projection  outwardly  expressed,  we 
should  not  be  able  to  see  the  object,  nor  any  objects  ; 
nor  would  the  affinities,  which  are  constantly  playing 
throughout  all  nature,  have  their  validity  asserted  as 
phenomena  everywhere  prevailing.  What  is  demand- 
ed then  in  order  to  the  subjective  development  of 
consciousness  is  the  etherial  representation  of  the 
bodily  self  within  itself,  and  concentrated  at  a  pole  or 
centre  of  action  in  order  to  the  development  of  the 
intellectual  attribute. 

The  apparatus  whereby  alone  this  wonderful  phe- 
nomenon can  be  brought  about,  exists  in  the  animal 
economy  only.  This  apparatus  is  found  in  the  ner- 
vous system  of  the  creature.  And  when  we  pass  into 
the  category  of  the  animal  world,  we  find  a  very  gra- 
dual and  almost  insensible  approach  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  a  nervous  system,  such,  that  the  line  of  demar- 
cation betwixt  the  vegetable  and  the  animal  depart- 
ments can  scarcely  be  drawn.  While,  therefore,  sen- 
sation becomes  more  marked  in  the  animal  than  in  the 
vegetable,  by  reason  of  the  connexion  in  which  one 
part  with  another  is  established  through  the  agency  of 
nerves,  as  connected  with  muscles,  yet  there  can 
scarcely  be  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  that,  in  the  case  of 
many  creatures,  such  as  e.g.  the  worm  and  a  host  of 
others,  it  is  in  their  case  a  process  of  reflex  action,  or 


The  Initiation  of  Consciousness. 


67 


what  we  may  call  sensation  without  the  consciousness 
of  sensation.*  Under  what  circumstances,  we  may 
ask,  is  it  possible  to  have  the  consciousness  of  sensa- 
tion developed  ?  We  may  answer,  by  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  brain  ;  and  this  development  is  manifested 
in  proportion  as  that  organization  has  its  validity  built 
up  from  the  smallest  possible  beginnings  to  the  high- 
est possible  complexity  as  in  man. 

It  may  be  generally  stated  then  that  the  foundation 
of  self-consciousness  lies  in  this,  that  there  must  be  a 
nerve-system  from  the  body  carried  to  a  centre,  as 
the  nucleus  of  a  brain.  There  the  glimmer  ot  con- 
sciousness may  be  developed,  but  so  feeble  as  to 
demand  little  or  no  response  beyond  what  is  required 
in  vegetable  life.  We  find  that  such  a  state  of  things 
prevails  in  point  of  fact.  True  it  is  that  it  might  be 
regarded  as  a  diflficult  question  for  solution,  whether 
certain  movements,  in  the  initiatory  stages  of  the  ani- 
mal world  are  not  the  tokens  of  reflexive  sensational 
disturbances  rather  than  of  conscious  operations  ;  but 
one  can  have  no  hesitation  in  concluding  for  the  exis- 
tence of  consciousness  in  cases  when  to  the  creature 
is  given  an  additional  sense,  such  as  eyes,  in  virtue  of 
which  it  is  able  to  turn  aside  from  obstacles  which 
are  observed  to  stand  in  its  way.  The  fact  stands 
(which  nobody  doubts)  that  the  more  the  animal  is 
endowed  with  external  senses,  beyond  that  of  touch, 
as  the  first  natural  sense  of  the  creature,  the  more  it 


*  The  facts  of  reflex  action,  or  the  manifestation  of 
sensation  without  the  consciousness  of  sensation,  lias  been  well 
illustrated  by  the  decapitation  of  a  frocr.  Stimulation  of  a  limb, 
by  pinching  or  by  a  drop  of  acid,  is  followed  by  the  withdrawal 
of  the  limb. 


68 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


has  its  consciousness  enlarged.  And  still  further, 
when  we  take  into  account  the  gradual  increase  of 
brain  formation,  whereby  new  ideas  are  manufactured 
out  of  those  that  have  been  registered,  as  first  brought 
to  the  mind  by  the  external  senses — ideas  such  as  the 
relation  of  one  thing  to  another  ;  or  the  consciousness 
of  the  me  itself,  as  distinct  from  that  of  the  object  en- 
visaged ;  or  the  discovery  of  inferences  drawn  from  the 
comparison  of  objects  which  have  some  relation  to  one 
another  ;  or  the  power  of  recalling  ideas  which  had 
formerly  a  place  in  the  mind ;  or  the  power  of  evolving 
new  pictures  out  of  those  we  have  once  apprehended ; 
or  the  power  of  imparting  or  implanting  new  ideas  in 
addition  to  an  assemblage  of  present  ones  as  when 
we  have  before  us  a  purpose  to  fulfil,  and  have  diffi- 
culty in  knowing  how  to  accomplish  the  purpose :  I 
say,  when  we  take  into  account  the  increased  com- 
plexity of  the  brain  apparatus  whereby  our  faculties 
of  thinking  are  augmented  and  varied,  we  see  at  once 
the  close  connexion  which  is  made  to  subsist  betwixt 
the  material  instrumentality  of  thought  which  initiates 
the  movement,  and  the  etherial  representation  wherein 
is  the  actual  consciousness  of  self,  and  which  must  be 
regarded  as  the  receptacle  of  ideas  and  therefore 
constituting  the  general  ground  of  the  intelligence  of 
the  Me. 

So  dependant  are  we  as  living  creatures  on  the 
prepared  and  specific  instrumentality  of  thought  for 
our  particular  thinking,  that  many  have  felt  themselves 
forced  to  conclude  that  consciousness  must  somehow 
be  regarded  as  itself  an  attribute  of  a  certain  kind  of 
matter;  but  without  doubt  this  conclusion  is  a  grievous 
mistake ;  and  the  sound  analysis  of  physical  phenomena 


Organs  generate   Thought. 


69 


proves  it  to  be  a  mistake.  We  have  in  the  physical 
world,  as  has  been  noticed,  the  operation  constantly  of 
pure  spirit-substance  in  connexion  and  along  with 
material  objects.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  physical 
world,  there  is  not  one  object  but  has  its  spirit 
representation  in  the  universal  Ether,  as  spirit-sub- 
stance essentially  ;  and  the  proof  of  this  among  other 
things  is  the  wonderful  privilege  that  pertains  to  said 
spirit-substance  in  that  it  can  never  be  so  crowded 
with  representations  of  things,  but  that  by  reason  of 
its  elasticity,  and  consequent  expansion  for  a  fresh 
surface,  it  has  always  still  an  open  receptivity  for 
admitting  additional  representations  ;  and  this  with- 
out the  confounding  of  one  thing  with  another;  shew- 
ing therefore  a  capacity  wholly  beyond  the  prero- 
gative of  matter  as  such.  What  then  ?  Why  we  are 
constrained  to  see  that  the  particular  organs  which  in 
the  brain  stand  as  initiating  new  spiritual  forms,  do, 
through  these,  initiate  fresh  forms  of  thought— organs 
which,  as  creating  new  spirit-forms,  constitute  therefore 
special  facilities  for  the  generation  of  the  definite 
classes  of  ideas,  carried  into  the  mental  field,  and 
which  therein  co-exist  in  mutual  relation  to  one  an- 
other, and  have  each  its  own  etherial  characteristic. 
There  is  the  impression  laid  up  in  the  cellular  condi- 
tions of  the  cortical  substance  of  the  brain,  and  there 
is  the  ideal  counterpart  which  is  carried  to  the  etherial 
platform  which  constitutes  the  Ego.  The  former 
serves  for  the  purposes,  first  of  all,  of  memory,  in 
which  case  the  Ego  has  not  what  is  simply  called  cog- 
nition, but  r^-cognition  of  that  of  which  it  is  already 
in  possession,  while  the  vast  multitude  of  stored  up 
impressions,  as  gathered   not  only  by  observation   of 


I 


70 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


external  thinrrs,  but  gathered  in  the  course  of  reading 
and  study,  constitute  a  field  for  the  exercise  of  Imagi- 
nation, Conception,  and  other  processes  in  the  analysis 
and  synthesis  of  thought.     We  thus  apprehend,  then, 
a  constant  and  close  connexion   betwixt   mind    and 
matter,  which  is  perfectly  analagous  to  the  connection 
betwixt   spirit  and    matter   in    the  objective  sphere. 
This  fact  cannot  be  too  minutely  considered.     While 
the    initiation    of   each    separate    mental    movement 
takes    place    through    the    association    by    separate 
members     of     the     cerebral     organization     carrying 
their     respective     impressions,    it    always,    and     in- 
variably in   each   case,  is   accompanied    by  its   own 
etherial  response,  which  in  that  case  is  an  idea  which 
enters  the  territory  of  the  Ego  ;  and  herein  we  have 
what  IS  called  Mind.     That  the   brain   is  the  instru- 
mentality of  mind  cannot  be  questioned,  on  the  sure 
ground  that   not  only  does  disease  of  the  brain  pro- 
duce disease  of  the  mind,  and  softening  of  the  brain 
produces  want  of  the  memory,  and  brings  on  mental 
imbecility,  or  amentia,  but  that  aught  which  produces 
inactivity  or  immobility  of  brain   induces  coma,  or  a 
state  of  unconsciousness.  Had  we  ere  now  understood 
the  precise  circumstantials  which  attend  all  physical 
phenomena,  we  should  have  been  able  to  master  the 
great  secret  which  explains  the  fact  of  matter  being 
caught  by,  and  received  into,  the  intelligential  sphere 
as  acquired  knowledge. 

I    have  observed   that,  in    the  world   of  objective 
matter,  we  are  everywhere  surrounded  by  spirit  and 
that  to  spirit  we  are  indebted  for  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented by  matter.     We  see  this  illustrated  in  the  tele 
graphic  wire.     There  we  find  that  the  conditions  and 


The  Mind  Passive  in  Cognition. 


71 


forms  attending  the  vibration  introduced  at  one  termi- 
nal of  the  wire  where  initiation  takes  place,  are  carried 
to  the  other  terminal,  and  are  there  revealed  in  all  their 
accuracy,  not  only  in  the  fact  that  the  sound  as  a 
quality  in   that  vibration,   is  maintained,  but  in  the 
convection  of  the  very  words  as  uttered.     1  ask,  what 
are  the  nerves  in  the   animal  body  but  telegraphic 
wires  which  reveal   the  conditions  of  the  body  as  the 
basis  of  the  me  to  a  local  terminus  within  ?  And  what 
are  the  external  senses  but  termini  with  attached  nerves 
of  various  qualities,  fitted  for  the  reception  and  trans- 
mission of  separately  conditioned  ingredients,  such  as 
savours  for  taste,  odours  for  smell,  sounds  for  hearing, 
colours  for  sight,  as  well   as  modifications  of  touch,  of 
which  in  each  separate  cisc  a  consciousness  is  excited. 
Nor  is  it  the  mere  vibration  that  is  transmitted,  but  in 
each  case   the  vibration   is  so  to  speak   loaded  with  a 
quality  emphatically  its  own,  and  the  quality  accord- 
ingly is  transmitted  along  with  the  vibration.      There 
are  mental  philosophers  who  will-tell  us  that  the  vibra- 
tion which  is  communicated  to  our  ears  when  a  piano 
is  being  played,  has  supplied  to  it  by  the  mind  the 
various  qualities  of  sound  :  but  this  is  a  doctrine  which 
cannot  be  maintained.     The    mind   supplies    nothing 
whatever  from  itself,  but  is  emphatically  and   purely 
receptive  of  all  that  is  communicated  to  it,  and  has 
the  consciousness  of  it  accordingly.     The  mental  part 
is  simply  receptive  (so  far  as  regards  cognition)  of  the 
ideas  carried  to  it ;   and  these  ideas  are  either   the 
forms  as  they  exist  in  the  external  world,  or  as  they 
are  manipulated  by  the  analytic  and  synthetic  proces- 
ses of  what  we  must  call  the  internal  senses. 


I 


72  The  Problem  of  Existence. 

Section  8. —  What  constitutes  Intelligence. 

Here  let  me  notice  how  the  Etherial  spirit,  which 
we  call  the  Soul,  has  not  only  the  experience  of  single 
acts  of  consciousness  as  ideas  are  carried  thereto,  but 
has,  as  it  may  be  called,  a  conjunct  expression  of  this 
final  and  lofty  attribute  of  what  may  be  called  a  com- 
bined consciousness  which  we  denominate  Intelligence. 
I  ask,  what  is  Intelligence?  and  I  answer  it  is  a  mul- 
tiplied Consciousness,  or  an  intuition  of  what  stands  as 
a  series  of  conscious  acts  in  one  general  focus.  An 
insulated  act  of  Consciousness  cannot  be  called  Intel- 
ligence. At  all  events,  before  we  can  be  said  to  have 
Intelligence,  we  must  have  the  exercise  of  Judgment 
therewith.  An  insulated  Consciousness  cannot  dis- 
cern truth  from  error.  It  is  constrained  to  receive 
things  as  represented,  however  false  or  absurd  they 
may  be.  This  is  illustrated  in  dreams  and  mesmeric 
states  ;  and  it  is  only  when  we  come  to  be  fully  awake, 
and  when  we  are  able  to  apply  Judgment  to  these 
states,  that  we  can  see  the  absurdity  of  them.  What 
we  say  is,  that  in  the  me  there  is  a  collected  assem- 
blage of  individual  cases  of  Consciousness  ;  and  this 
we  call  Intelligence  ;  but  as  noticed,  the  foundation  of 
correct  intelligence  lies  in  the  exercise  of  Judgment, 
which  attends  all  acts  of  normal  cognition.  The 
intelligence  of  man  begins  with  representations  from 
the  external  world,  and  is  added  to  by  the  inner 
workings,  which  give  what  may  be  called  Imaginings, 
Memories,  Inferences,  and  other  sentimentality  which 
are  thought  out,  and  become  the  experiences  of  the 
me.  Out  of  all  these  separate  cases  of  consciousness 
combined,  we  have  that  which  constitutes  the  human 


Intelligence  developed  in  Ether, 


73 


intelligence  ;  and  that  this  intelligence  is  not  the  de- 
velopment of  mere  matter  is  obvious  enough,  from  the 
fact  that  on  the  central  platform  of  thought  is  lodged 
an  endless  number  of  distinct  ideas,  each  and  all  held 
in  its  individuality,  so  to  speak,  in  the  self-same  locale, 
without  collision  and  without  confusion.  This  is  one 
of  the  remarkable  prerogatives  of  spirit-substance. 

And  that  spirit-substance  should  in  these  circum- 
stances manifest  this  subjective  prerogative  is  most 
natural  : — first,  because  we  know  of  no  other  primi- 
tive substance  that  is  assuredly  made  known  to  us,  as 
the  fundamental  entity  of  existence  :  second,  because 
universal  substance  having  an  objective  outlet  in 
respect  of  its  physical  qualities,  may  well  be  regarded 
as  having  also  a  subjective  outlet,  when  circumstances 
are  favourable  for  its  manifestation  :  third,  because  we 
have  no  right  to  assume  another  and  unconnected 
substance,  insulated,  and  separated  intrinsically  there- 
from :  fourth,  because  it  is  demonstrable  that  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  a're  closely  connected 
with,  and  inherently  an  offshoot  from,  the  self  same 
substance,  with  which  matter  itself  stands  connected  : 
fifth,  because  the  fact  of  one  and  the  same  primary 
substance  being  in  all  circumstances  represented  by 
the  material  instrumentality  (each  organ  yielding  its 
own  spiritous  images),  offer  a  satisfactory  explanation 
that  intelligence  emanates  from  the  etherial  spirit,  and 
this  is  the  only  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  vast 
variety  of  intelligences  which  are  marked  out  and 
defined  by  the  respective  cerebral  organs  which 
prescribe  their  particular  ideas. 


74 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


Section  9. — Mind  i^i  its  highest  expression  operates  in 

conjunction  zvith  Matter. 

There  has  been  brought  into  view,  as  already 
noticed,  the  high  prerogative  of  the  all-pervading 
spirit-substance  as  made  to  play  in  physical  conditions, 
a  prerogative  which  as  we  have  seen  comes  into  mani- 
festation under  particular  circumstances,  an  attribute 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  lays  in  the  whole  animal 
kingdom  the  foundation  of  a  mind,  differing  in  each 
case  according  to  the  diversity  of  organization.  I  have 
endeavoured  to  point  out  under  what  circnmstanccs 
matter  is  produced  from  said  primary  substance,  and 
what  therefore,  gives  rise  to  the  laws  of  affinity  which 
prevail  among  the  constituents  of  matter,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  matter  functions  in  the 
play  of  cosmical  forces  ;  it  now  falls  to  be  considered, 
not  simply  under  what  circumstances  mind  is 
devcloi.ed  from  the  self  same  source,  but  how  mind 
operates  in  connection  with  matter,  and  is  dependent 
on  the  organization  of  the  cerebral  system,  and  is 
expanded  according  to  copious  variety  in  that  system, 
for  the  different  faculties  or  powers  by  which  any  and 
all  gradations  of  mind  happen  to  be  characterized. 
It  may  be  repeated,  in  addition  to  what  has  been 
stated,  that  the  all  pervading  etherial  spirit-substance, 
which  we  have  found  to  be  constantly  operative  in 
the  great  physical  arena,  is  operative  also,  in  the 
development  of  mind  : — first,  we  know  of  no  more 
fundamental  substance,  as  an  actually  all-pervading 
element,  than  Ether ;  and  as  we  have  found  that 
Ether  is  essentially  of  a  spirit-nature,  in  that,  unlike 
to  matter,  it  is  receptive  of  any  amount  of  epigraphs  at 


The  basis  of  Mind. 


75 


the  same  time  and  on  the  same  area  ;  and  there  is  no 
antecedent  reason  why  said  substance  should  not  give 
forth  the  characteristic  of  consciousness  when  circum- 
stances favour  that  an  object  should  attain  to  a 
sensible  subjectivity  of  its  own.  Second,  we  know 
this,  that  in  the  arena  of  mind,  as  a  foundation  of 
mind,  there  is  and  must  be  a  basis  of  what  has  been 
called  "mind-stuff,"  out  of  which  consciousness  arises; 
and  if  it  be  a  question  whether  we  shall  start  the 
hypothesis  of  an  alien  essence — of  which  we  practically 
know  nothing — nothing  abstractly  of  its  relation  to,  or 
connexion  with,  other  matter  or  other  substance  of 
any  sort,  and  therefore  of  being  of  necessity  in  a  maze 
of  mystery  respecting  it;  or  whether  we  adopt  that  sub- 
stance which  is  of  necessity  always  in  connexion  with 
matter  and  representative  of  the  conditions  of  matter, 
and  which  is  perfectly  analogous  in  its  capacities  of 
holding  and  of  setting  forth  within  one  area,  a  vast 
combination  of  forms,  there  can  surely  be  no  doubt 
for  a  moment  as  to  which  alternative  one  must  choose. 
I  have  already  set  forth  the  grounds  on  which  this 
spirit-substance  must  be  regarded  as  representing 
fundamentally  at  the  basis  of  the  brain,  the  spirit- 
personality  of  the  bodily  system,  and  how  and  why 
this  spirit-personality  should  be  endowed  with 
consciousness. 

But  there  is  another — an  abundant  and  abiding 
reason  why  we  must  regard  the  spirit-substance  in 
question  as  inherently  endowed  with  the  attribute  of 
consciousness.  We  have  spoken  of  the  etherial 
medium,  as  that  generic  medium  which  contains  in 
gremio,  and  therefore  negatively,  all  the  qualities  which 
are     manifested    positively    in     the     all-conditioned 


7f) 


The  Problem  of  Existence 


Personality.       Wc    have,    I    think,    the    complctest 
evidence  of  an   absolute    Personality,  based  on    the 
platform  of  an  infinite  Impersonality — a  personality 
which,  as    I  have  said,  is  the  positive   and  inherent 
manifestation  of  all  that  is  hidden  in  the  Imperson- 
ality :  the  one  the  supplement  of  the  other,  in  as  far 
as  the  Impersonal  without  the  Personal  would  be  the 
susceptibility  of  endless  conditions  and  forms,  with- 
out the  possibility  of  initiating  any,  and  the  Personal 
without   the    Impersonal    would    be   the    positive    in 
thought  without  the  positive  in  action,  or  the  capacity 
of  action  :  it  wc  uld  be  a  Framer  without  the  material 
and  the  platform  to  work  upon,  and  therefore  without 
the    means    of    exercising    it.     Both,   therefore,   are 
essential  in  order  to  the  production  of  the  objects  of 
creation.    What  I  say  then  is  this,  that  if  the  absolute 
Personality    is    endowed    with    the    foundations    of 
positive  being-hood,  of  which  intelligence  is  the  con- 
summation, the  infinite  Impersonality  must  have  the 
susceptibility  of  shewing  these  foundations  developed 
into  reality,  and  therefore  of  manifesting  intelligence 
as  its  consummation,  when  animal  creatures  arc  made 
capable  of  displaying  this  attribute.     We  may  thus  in 
some  measure  approach  to  the  characteristics  o{  the 
Personal  through  a  knowledge  of  those  belonging  to 
the  Impersonal.* 

Having  then  good  reason  for  concluding  that  the 
etherial  medium,  as  essentially  a  spirit-entity, 
carries  within  itself  the  capacity  of  developing  con- 
sciousness, and  of  being  manifested  as  intelligence,  it 
should  now  be  our  business  to  show  under  what  cir- 

*  JSee   A|j|>einli\    11. 


TJic  Expansion  of  Intelligence. 


77 


cumstances  mind  is  manifested  in  the  animal  frame 
and  how  mind  is  expanded  according  to  the  number 
and  variety  of  the  organs  with  which  the  animal  crea- 
ture happens  to  be  endowed.  If  I  were  asked  to  say 
what  are  the  conditions  of  intelligence,  I  would  answer 
an  accumulation  of  separate  and  varied  acts  of  con- 
sciousness. Intelligence  barely  begins  with  simple 
naked  consciousness  ;  and  in  many  of  the  humblest  of 
the  animal  race  it  can  amount  to  nothing  more  than 
mere  insulated  consciousness,  that  is,  it  can  be  re- 
garded as  little  more  than  the  expression  of  animal 
sensation.  If  a  creature  has  simply  and  .solely  but 
one  sense  or  inlet  as  the  channel  of  its  consciousness, 
as  for  example  that  of  touch,  it  has  of  necessity  not 
even  the  incipience  of  mind,  and  its  instinct  is  to  be 
guided  by  that  of  sensation  alone  ;  and  in  a  sense  we 
see  this  exemplified  as  a  stage  but  a  little  beyond  that 
of  the  vegetable  economy.  Give  to  the  creature  the 
sensation  of  smell  in  addition  to  that  of  touch,  and 
you  light  up  this  twofold  sensation  to  become  a  mi- 
nim of  consciousness.  Let  it  have  a  mouth  with  the 
capacity  of  distinguishing  one  quality  of  food  from 
another,  and  you  raise  it  to  a  still  higher  platform  in 
the  range  of  animal  life.  In  order  to  receive  this 
threefold  order  of  impressions  there  must  be  the 
nucleus  within,  of  an  organ  of  receptivity  for  this  more 
expanded  experience.  Let  it  still  further  have  the 
organ  of  hearing,  and  its  con.sciousness  will  become 
developed  into  something  like  incipient  mind,  in  as 
far  as  it  has  thus  a  series  of  spheres  in  which  it  can 
play  its  part.  Endow  it  now  with  the  sense  of  sight, 
in  addition  to  those  already  named,  and  you  very  con- 
siderably expand  the  domain  of  its  range  ;  and  such 


78 


The  Problem  of  Existence, 


an  equipment  of  necessity  characterises  a  large  num- 
ber of  creatures  on  land  and  in  water  as  well  as  among 
the  feathered  tribes  that  lodge  in  the  branches  of  trees, 
and  so  disport  themselves  in  their  respective  spheres.' 
But  these  inlets  are  after  all  but  the  foundation  of 
mind.     Besides  the   avenues  of  the  external  senses, 
each  supplying  its  own  department  of  consciousness] 
there  is  in   some  of  the  lower  animals  not  only  an 
organ  for  the  exercise  of  memory  but  an  approach  to 
some  of  the  higher  attributes  of  thought.     But  it  is 
emphatically  in  man  that  the  internal  instrumentality 
is  developed,  and  varied  to  the  highest  possible  extent. 
For  example,  there  is  in   man  not  only  a  repository 
wherein  impressions  are  registered,  and  an  instrumen- 
tality whereby  these  can  be  recalled  in  the  exercise  of 
memory  ;  but  there  is  further  an  agency  for  bringing 
up  not  simply  insulated   facts  as  matter  of  menujry, 
but  a    number  of  associated    impressions  which  are 
curiously  collected  and  united   in  one  pictorial  repre- 
sentation ;    and    this  process    is  called    Imagination. 
It  is  to  be  noted,  then,  that  the  facts  of  remembering 
and  of  imagining  are  each  separate  acts  of  conscious- 
ness, and  of  course  add  to  one's  intelligence.     And  it 
is  remarkable  how   Intelligence  comes  to  be  enlarged 
in  the  case  of  man.    There  is  the  great  faculty  of  Con- 
ception with  which  he  is  endowed— the  faculty  where- 
by genius  is  displayed— the  faculty  which  gives  to  man 
a  creative  power  of  thought— the  faculty  which  is  ex- 
ercised when  a  difficulty  presents  itself,  and  which  has 
to  overcome  some  difficulty  when  a  purpose  has  to 
be  fulfilled,  which   demands  the  employment  of  re- 
condite resources  for  its  accomplishment.  This  process, 
like  all  other  processes  of  thought,  is  dependant  on  a 


Expanded  Human  Consciousness. 


79 


special  organ  adapted  for  such  uses  ;  and  by  a  refined 
exercise  of  association,  it  carries  its  representative 
spirit-ideal  to  the  central  area  of  the  personal  con- 
sciousness. Here,  also,  of  course,  an  important  acces- 
sion is  made  to  Intelligence  by  such  conscious  concep- 
tion. Besides,  throughout  man's  waking  thoughts 
there  is  the  constant  exercise  of  the  faculty  of 
Judgment — that  faculty  whereby  he  is  enabled  to  see 
truth  as  distinguished  from  error,  and  whereby  he  is 
preserved  from  falling  under  delusions  as  in  dreaming, 
when  the  Judgment  is  shutout  from  exercise. 

In  this  way,  man's  area  of  a  multiple  consciousness 
as  constituting  the  great  field  of  his  Intelligence  is 
much  enlarged  beyond  what  it  can  be  in  mere  animal 
nature,  in  as  far  as  many  of  these  separate  states  of 
consciousness  are  wanting  in  them  ;  and  as  has  been 
noted,  they  are  all  brought  to  have  their  proper  rest- 
ing place  in  the  central  platform  of  the  conscious  Me. 

But  this  is  not  all  :  it  is  far  from  being  all  in  the 
long  list  of  departments  in  whicK  the  consciousness  of 
man  revels.  Man  has  also,  by  means  of  other  special 
qualities  given  to  his  cerebral  apparatus  the  great 
prerogative  of  seeing  the  relations  of  the  not-me  in 
virtue  of  which  there  is  a  capacity  of  an  endless  ex- 
tension of  his  knowledge.  The  creature  that  is 
confined  to  a  cognition  of  the  relations  of  self  merely, 
has  in  him  the  little  narrow  world  of  his  own  self-hood 
only,  and  his  own  wants.  He  may  see  the  varied 
world  outside  of  him,  but  the  relations  of  each  and  all 
are  shut  out  from  his  consideration.  It  is  different 
with  man — different  as  regards  the  wider  arena  of 
knowledge — different  in  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
cognition  of  the   relationships  which   belong   to  ex- 


80 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


ternal  objects  generally,  as  compared  with  those  which 
can  see  the  relations  only  which  pertain  to  self ;  and 
is  different  as  regards  his  concern  for  the  wants  and 
requirements  of  others.  And  here  particularly  it  is, 
that  the  whole  field  of  morals  is  opened  up  to  him — a 
field  which,  lying  in  the  fundamental  idea  that  every 
creature,  endowed  with  the  capacity  of  pleasure  and 
of  pain,  has  its  God-given  rights  as  its  own  native  pro- 
perty shews  that  any  infringement  of  these  constitutes 
an  offence  against  the  law  of  morals — a  law  by  the 
way  which  is  graduated  in  force  according  to  the 
elevation  of  the  creature  to  which  the  rights  belong. 

Section  10. —  The  Foundation  of  Morals. 

The  question  as  to  the  foundation  of  morals  and  of 
the  law  of  morals  is  a  very  important  one.  It  is  ac- 
knowledged to  be  so  ;  and  many  a  struggle  has  there 
been  for  its  reconciliation  with  this,  that,  and  the  other 
theory,  which  has  been  propounded  as  adequate  foun- 
dations. Satisfaction  has  not  been  found  with  any  of 
the  pleas  which  have  been  advanced  ;*  but  that  there 
is  a  basis  which  stands  in  consistency  with  the  de- 
velopment of  this  great  principle,  as  seen  in  the  various 

*  It  would  be  out  of  place  here  to  fjive  an  account  of  the 
various  theories  which  have  been  advanced  as  foundations  for 
the  ethical  principle  of  morals.  Some  have  pronounced  it  to  be 
God-given  in  the  sense  of  being  an  impress  from  GckI,  and 
therefore  that  morals  is  an  argument  or  proof  of  the  being  of  (iml : 
some  ascribe  it  to  a  certain  fitness  or  suitability  of  actions:  some 
hold  that  morals  is  a  new  instinct  in  the  human  mind  .  some 
hold  that  its  foundation  lies  in  self-interest,  others  in  utility  or 
happiness.    But  while  all  of  these  are  objectionable,  there  is  one 


The  Source  of  the  Moral  Idea. 


81 


conditions  of  social  life,  can  hardly  be  doubted  :  and 
I  offer  that  just  propounded  as  the  true  ground  which 
operates  variously  in  this  great  department  according 
to  the  enlightenment  which  the  mind  has  received. 

I  believe  that  moral  states  are  as  thoroughly  depen- 
dent on  cerebral  action  as  any  other  manifestation  of 
mind,  not  (be  it  carefully  noted)  that  any  cerebral  or 
material  operations,  which  are  adapted  simply  to  carry 
or  convey  a  particular  class  of  impressions,  can  for  a 
moment  be  regarded  (being  physical  states  in  them- 
selves) as  concerned  with  moral  ideas  any  more  than 
with  the  ideas  of  physical  things  ;  for  moral  ideas  (as 
we  shall  more  fully  notice  hereafter)  arise  from  a  cog- 
nition of  a  particular  class  of  creature-objects  which 
come  before  the  mind.  If  the  object  of  our  thought 
be  purely  a  thing  without  life  and  unassociated  with  a 
personal  creature  having  conscious  sensation,  there 
can  be  no  moral  characteristic  therein.  There  must 
alwa)'s  be,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  a  sentient  per- 
sonality, not  only  having  life,  but  also  susceptible  of 
pleasure  and  of  pain,  before  the  element  of  morals  can 
intervene.  That  creature  may  be  one's  own  self,  or 
any  other  person,  or  it  may  be  any  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals :  hence,  I  define  a  moral  idea  to  be  that  which 
represents  the  affecting  of  a  creature  sjisceptible  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  such  an 
idea  is  ascribed  not  to  any  subjective  virtue  vested  in 
the  human   intelligence  as  such  ;   but  that  it  arises 


important  preliminary  which  all  of  them  have  left  unconsidered, 
and  that  is  the  moral  Idea  out  of  which  the  principle  of  right 
and  wrong  flows.  This  subject  will  be  more  fully  considered 
when  I  come  to  the  questicm  of  Will. 


82 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


from  the  kind  of  object  that  is  apprehended,  and  is 
attributable  therefore  to  the  apprehension  of  injury 
or  of  benefit  done  to  an  animal  creature.  Brute 
creatures  can  see  the  injury  done  to  another,  and  they 
can  see  the  help  rendered  to  other  creatures  in  their 
need  ;  but  as  a  rule,  they  (io  not  apprehend  the  relation 
which  one  creature  bears  to  another.  It  is  therefore 
the  peculiar  capacity  which  man  has  in  cognising  the 
relations  of  not-self— the  relations  of  things  to  one 
another,  that  gives  to  him  the  great  prerogative  of 
moral  discernment.  This  may  be  called  intellectual 
altruism.  And  in  what  does  this  prerogative  consist  ? 
I  answer,  it  consists  in  his  ability  to  see  the  fitness  of 
things.  In  other  words  it  lies  in  his  ability  to  see  the 
relations  of  the  not-me,  and  the  harmony  or  want  of 
harmony  existing  in  these  relations.  It  is  for  want 
of  seeing  the  relations  of  the  not-me,  that  the  lower 
animals,  as  they  are  called,  arc  incapable  of  such  ideas 
as  are  common  to  man — are  incapable  of  looking  into 
the  future,  and  are  so  narrow  and  contracted  in 
their  sphere  of  existence  compared  with  man. 

The  lower  animals,  indeed,  can  apprehend  the 
relation  of  things,  so  far  as  things  affect  themselves. 
They  know  what  food  is  adapted  for  them,  and  they 
repair  thereto  to  obtain  it.  They  know  what  things 
will  injure  themselves,  and  these  they  avoid  ;  but  their 
apprehension  does  not  extend  to  the  cognition  of 
what  have  been  called  altruistic  relations — the  re- 
lations of  the  not-me  or  the  connexion  in  which  one 
thing  stands  abstractly  to  another.  Hence,  unless  it 
be  in  the  case  of  that  instinct,  which  is  given  to  a 
creature  when  rearing  and  nourishing  and  protecting 
its  young,  the  lower  animals  want  moral  intuitions. 


The  Basis  of  Human  Reason. 


83 


Hence,  also,  the  tremendous  extension  of  mental 
vision  to  man,  or  his  altruistic  ability  to  cognize  the 
relation  of  one  thing  to  another  in  the  vast  outer 
world. 

This  prerogative  of  apprehending  the  relations  of 
the  not-me  is  properly  the  foundation  of  human 
Reason.'^  The  question  then  for  us  to  solve  is  this  : — 
What  gives  to  man  this  expansive  power  of  discern- 
ment ?  What  gives  to  man  the  prerogative  of  seeing 
more  than  is  patent  strictly  to  the  outward  vision  ? 
If  I  see  a  boy  in  some  one's  garden  robbing  apples, 
what  gives  to  me  the  idea  that  he  is  stealing?  It  can- 
not be  the  bare  fact  of  his  plucking  apples  from  a  tree, 
but  it  is  the  apprehension  of  the  non-relationship  of 
the  boy  to  the  owner  of  the  garden,  and  hence  the 
inference  that  this  fact  is  an  injury  done  to  the  pro- 
prietor of  the  garden. 

Section  10. — Mental  states  are^  reflective  of  Material 

conditions. 

There  can  be  no  question  as  to  the  distinctive  quali- 
ties of  separate  nerves  as  adapted  for  the  reception, 
the  association,  and  the  conveyance  of  special  charac- 
teristics of  impressions.  Among  the  outward  senses 
we  find  that  the  nerve  in  the  nostrils  will  take  on  the 


*  Reason  is  a  term  indicating  a  cognition  of  harmony  or 
fitness  in  the  relation  of  things.  The  lower  animals  have  this 
in  what  pertains  to  their  own  personal  condition.  But  this  is  so 
very  small  a  portion  of  the  cognition  which  pertains  to  the  re- 
lationship of  things  generally  in  the  world,  that  we  apply  the 
tern»  Reason  to  man  only  as  observant  of  the  fitness  of  things 
as  connected  with  one  another  in  the  world. 


84 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


quality  of  flavour,  and  hence  we  have  the  sensation  of 
smell ;  another  will  take  on  the  quality  of  savour,  and 
hence  we  have  the  sensation  of  taste  ;  another  will 
admit  only  the  impressions  contained  in  the  light,  and 
hence  we  have  the  sensation  of  sight ;  another  set  of 
nerves  again  are  affected  by  bodily  contact,  hence  we 
have  the  sensation  of  touch  ;  and  still  another  is 
affected  by  the  vibration  of  the  air,  carrying  certain 
characteristics  of  sound,  whence  we  have  the  sense  of 
hearing.  Each  of  these  sensations  may  carry  ideas  in 
them.  With  the  sense  of  smell  we  may  have  the  idea 
of  a  certain  plant  or  flower ;  with  the  sense  of  taste 
a  certain  kind  of  food  ;  with  the  sense  of  sight  the 
idea  of  an  object  seen,  and  so  with  the  other  senses. 

There  is  obviously  a  still  more  remarkable  refine- 
ment in  the  distinct  individualities  of  nerve  which 
pertain  to  the  various  instrumentality  which  con- 
stitutes the  complex  organization  of  the  brain.  There 
we  have  not  only  the  reservoir  of  vesicles  of  gray 
matter  which  form  the  repertory  of  Memory  ;  but  we 
have  those  nerves  of  white  matter  which  associate 
thence  impressions  of  all  kinds  that  are  laid  up  therein, 
and  which  convey  them  to  the  central  Ego,  wherein 
they  are  lighted  up  as  ideas  of  the  mind— the  centre 
where,  as  I  have  noticed,  the  bodily  representation  is 
fundamentally  converted  into  the  conscious  Mc,  and 
where  all  ideas  brought  thereto  become  the  cognitions 
of  the  Me.  And  this  apparatus,  which  serves  the  pro- 
cesses of  memory,  serves  also  those  of  Imagination, 
in  which  an  impression  draws  to  itself  by  association 
a  number  of  other  impressions,  which  are  constructed 
into  what  is  called  an  ideal  picture — a  picture  not  of 
one  idea  only,  as  is  an  act  of  memory,  but  of  other 


Brain  essential  for  Mental  Faculties, 


85 


associated  ideas,  or  properties  of  ideas,  which  when 
joined,  constitute  a  picture  of  Imagination,  all  the 
parts  of  which  are  drawn  from  the  same  reservoir  of 
impressions.  From  the  same  reservoir  are  drawn  also 
by  association  another  set  of  impressions  under  what 
we  call  Conception  ;  and  this  takes  place  when  we  have 
before  the  mind  what  has  been  called  a  schema  of 
thought  to  be  completed,  a  schema  void  oi  some  ele- 
ment sought  for,  which  requires  some  accessions  in 
order  to  its  empty  part  being  filled  up  ;  that  is  a  pur- 
pose demanding  fulfilment.  The  process  of  nerve  ope- 
ration here  is  remarkable,  in  that  the  quality  and  form 
of  the  element  wanted  is,  so  to  speak,  searched  for  ; 
and  if  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  area  of  laid  up  impres- 
sions, it  will  be  seized  and  appropriated  to  fill,  up  the 
blank.  And  here  it  is  that  genius  is  illustrated  and 
manifested ;  under  Conception  we  have  creations 
which  display  forms  and  their  relations  which  arc 
new  and  fresh  presentations  before  the  mind. 

I  might  go  on,  and  point  to 'that  peculiar  building 
up  of  nerves  whereby  we  are  enabled  to  draw  infer- 
ences, first,  as  to  the  character  of  things  ;  second,  as  to 
the  uses  and  applications  of  things  ;  and  third,  as  to 
the  causes  of  things.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  all  in- 
ferences are  to  be  obtained  by  means  of  comparing  one 
thing  witli  another,  that  is,  of  comparing  the  subject 
for  which  an  inference  is  desired,  with  a  cognate  sub- 
ject in  the  mind  to  zuhich  the  inference  desired  is 
already  attained  and  attached.  When  we  judge  as  to 
character,  it  behoves  us  to  have  already  before  us  a 
standard  (the  major  term  in  logic)  to  which  the  object 
to  be  judged  (the  minor  term)  is  carried,  and  that 
standard  the  best  of  kind  in  our  estimation  ;  and  thus 


86 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


by  means  of  the  comparison,  the  discernment  of  cha- 
racter is  ascertained.  In  plain  terms,  the  nearer  the 
object  comes  to  the  standard,  the  higher  in  character 
is  the  judgment  pronounced  on  the  object.  Again  : 
when  we  judge  as  to  the  consequences  of  an  action,  we 
require  to  have  already  before  the  mind  an  analagous 
or  cognate  case  as  a  standard  in  our  experience,  in 
which  a  corresponding  action  with  its  consequence  is 
before  the  mind,  and  by  means  of  the  comparison, 
we  can  lay  hold  of  and  apply  the  corresponding  con- 
sequence. And,  in  like  manner,  when  we  inquire  into 
the  catise  of  any  denoument  or  upshot,  we  require  to 
have  before  us  a  correlative  case,  to  which  the  cause  is 
attached,  with  which  to  compare  it,  when  we  are  able 
to  lay  hold  of  the  cause  as  matter  of  our  experience 
in  an  analogous  case  ;  and  thus  we  apply  this  cause,  as 
the  cause  which  we  seek  for  in  order  to  account  for 
the  consequence  in  question.  This  latter  is  called 
Induction,  as  the  other  is  called  Deduction,  but  the 
mental  process  in  both  is  the  same.  And  in  this  light 
how  simple  does  the  doctrine  of  Reasoning  appear, 
whether  in  the  exercise  of  Judgment,  or  in  that  of 
Induction  and  Deduction  on  which  so  much  has  been 
written  in  the  field  of  Logic.  What  the  precise 
organs  in  the  Brain  are  by  which  these  important 
results  are  accomplished  has  not  yet  been  discovered; 
but  that  the  functions  now  referred  to  are  accom- 
plished by  cerebral  instrumentality  there  can  be  no 
doubt. 

We  find  then  that  every  process  of  operation  in  the 
human  mind  is  carried  on  by  means  of  brain  instru- 
mentality, and  in  every  case  it  is  accounted  for  by 
means  of  the  refined  and  delicate  qualities  ascribable 


Brain  essential  for   Will, 


87 


to  the  brain  organization,  that  is  to  the  peculiar 
qualities  of  the  nerve  apparatus  in  its  several  parts, 
and  to  the  structure  of  this  apparatus  in  its  confor- 
mation of  parts.  And  what  fundamentally  lays  the 
province  of  Reason  in  man  is  the  capacity  of 
associating  the  relations  of  the  not-me.  Without  this 
capacity  there  could  be  no  process  of  adapting  one 
thing  to  another  in  the  economy  of  human  action. 

The  same  thing  has  to  be  said  in  regard  to  the 
more  active  properties  of  human  thought  in  the 
exercise  of  Will.  This  is  the  more  evident  because 
in  this  department  of  thought,  as  we  shall  see,  Will  is 
always  stimulated  by  motive,  and  motive  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  the  emotion  created  by  the 
contact  of  an  idea  introduced  upon  the  me  ;*  that  is 
fundamentally,  the  contact  of  a  particularly  condition- 
ed impression  upon  another  condition  in  the  repertory 
or  storehouse  of  impressions  which  constitute  the  fur- 
nishings on  the  material  side,  creates  an  emotion  in 
the  material  which  in  spirit  is  conveyed  to  the  Me. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  direct  connexion  with 
the  bodily  economy  there  is  a  cerebral  centre  of  resort, 
to  which  all  nerve  operation  conducts,  and  whereon 
the  ideal  forms  which  come  to  the  Me  are  founded  ; 
and  as  the  common  depository  of  impressions  from 
which  the  accumulation  of  ideas  in  the  creature's  ex- 
perience is  conducted.  Whether  this  repertorium  of 
ideas    called    the    Me    or    Ego   be    at    the    medulla 

*  All  idea  implies  preliminarily  an  impression.  The  impres- 
sion has  respect  to  the  material  side  in  virtue  of  which  we  have 
bodily  sensation  :  the  idea  is  the  counterpart  of  the  impression, 
but  on  the  spirit  side.  The  sensation  under  emotion  constitutes 
what  we  call  Feeling. 


88 


The  Problem  of  Existence. 


M 


oblongata  *  as  I  am  much  disposed  to  believe,  I  will 
not  pretend  to  say  ;  but  I  unquestionably  conclude 
for  such  a  foundation  of  the  intellectual  me  in  this 
material  economy  to  which  we  belong. 

What  would  at  first  startle  some  in  coming  to  such 
conclusion  would  be,  that  we  seem  to  make  too  much 
of  gross    materialism.      It    is   quite   otherwise.      We 
work  through  and  by  means  of  material  organs,  but 
the  production  of  ideas  and  of  thought  is  exclusively 
in    the    spirit-substance:    without    a    foundation    of 
materiilism  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  at  the  spirit- 
nature  of  soul,  which  in  this  constitution  of  ours  is  by 
means  of  the  material  organization.    No  scheme  could 
be  more  spiritualistic  than  that  which  I  seek  to  pro- 
claim; for  I  strive  to  shew  how  it  comes  to  pass  that 
in  strict  connexion  with  a  material  instrumentality  in 
every  department  of  mind,  the  great    fact  of  mind 
itself,  as  a  grand  combination  of  separate  con.scious 
states,  is  unequivocally  and  purely  the  phenomenon  of 
an  essentially  immaterial  or  spirit-substance,  and  this 
phenomenon    of    consciousness    I     wish    to   shew    is 
not  only  the  effulgence  of  spirit-substance,  but    the 
final    and    ultimate    attribute   of    said    substance    as 
brought  into  practical  manifestation  in    the  peculiar 
circumstances  under   which  brain  organization  gives 
scope  for  its  expression. 

*  "  This  bulb  is  a  crowded  collection  of  active  nerve  centres, 
—a  thoroughfare,  ever  crowde<I  with  nerve  injjHilses  from  and' 
to  the  higher  centres  "-(Dr.  McKenzie,  in  Kiin  on  the  Senses) 
When  we  consider  what  a  multitude  of  future  developments 
are  bound  up  in  a  single  cell  (the  human  germ  cell  for  example) 
we  need  not  wonder  at  the  endless  multitude  of  impressions 
that  may  be  lodged  in  the  material  side  of  tlve  Me. 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  FOUNDATION  OF  SOUL-ECONOMY, 
AND  THE  GROUNDS  OF  VARIED 
MENTAL    OPERATION. 


-s^. 


Section  1. — Dilemmas  of  Philosophers. 

npHE  all-absorbing  question  of  mind  has  been  end- 
*  lessly  debated,  may  we  not  say  in  all  manner 
of  ways  distorted,  by  two  different  schools  of  philo- 
sophy ;  yet  neither  of  these  schools  have  been  able  to 
indicate  any  possible  or  natural  scheme  to  account  for 
the  origin  of  souls,  nor  even  to  vindicate  all  that  has 
been  allowed  as  to  the  operation  of  souls.  We  have 
what  is  known  as  the  a  priori  school  presented  under 
various  hues,  which  on  the  whole  founds  upon  an  inde- 
pendent mental  equipment,  mysteriously  operating 
apart  from  the  body,  and  cognizing  some  sort  of 
objectivity  which  is  not  regarded  as  reality,  and  this  on 
rules  not  easily  understood,  and  less  easily  analyzed, 
and  certainly  not  consistent  with  the  common  convic- 
tions of  mankind  ;  and  again,  we  have  what  is  known 
as  the  a  posteriori  school,  which  does  not  question  the 
fact  of  a  subjective  consciousness :  which  accounts 
in    some    way    not   only   for   a    material   objectivity, 


90 


Soul  Mechanistn. 


but  which  directly  craves  it,  by  making  consciousness 
a  characteristic  of  matter,  or  leaving  it  otherwise  as  a 
blank  mystery,  not  admitting  of  solution  This  scheme 
is  equally  unable  to  indicate,  and  certainly  fails  to 
explain,  in  what  way  we  obtain  cognition  :  it  fails  to 
show  in  what  the  philosophy  of  consciousness  consists, 
or  how  it  comes  to  be  displayed. 

There  is  an  obvious  reason  for  this  dilemma.     It 
arises  from  the  fact  that  little  or  no  serious  attempt 
has  been   made  to  discuss  and  make  manifest  what  is 
properly  the  philosophy  of  substance.     We  have  no 
doubt  heard  much  of  the  question  of  Ontology  ;  but 
it  would  seem  as  if  there  was  a  tie  plus  ultra  in  that 
direction— a  beyond  into  which  it  is  not  permitted  for 
philosophers  to  venture  to  find  their  way  as  being  ab- 
solutely a  terra  incognita.     We  have  no  end  of  sur- 
mises, and  some  of  these  not  very  definite  or  consis- 
tent, as  to  the  ultimate  atoms  of  matter,  what  they  are 
and  of  vvhat  they  consist,  and  an   equally  indefinite 
supposition    as  to   the  source  and  ground  of  intelli- 
gence.*     I   have  endeavoured   to  grapple    with    this 
profound  subject,  and  (as   I   believe)  upon  the  prin- 

♦  Philosophers  in  seeking  for  the  ultimate  constitution  of 
matter  have  generally  taken  for  gi-anted  that  the  principle  of 
Atomism    is  an  established  fact ;  l.ut  no  sooner  have  they  so 
concluded  than  their  difficulty   began.     Were  there  originally 
many   ultimate   kinds  of  them,  or  only  one  i    Were  they  all 
material  atoms  to  be  regarded  as  centres  of  Force  and  Motion  I 
or  were   there  also  centres  of  consciousness  which   have  been 
termed   monads  ?     Were   the   material   atoms   vortex   rings  of 
Ether,  as  Lord  Kelvin  has  suggested  ?  and  iuilestructible  and 
indivisible  as  Helmholtz  has  averred  i      Were  thev  originallv 
simple  or  complex  bwlies  ?     And  if  thev  were  atoms  of  Ether 
how  came  they  to  be  matter  with  force  and  motion  in  a  con' 


A  general  want  of  Insight. 


91 


ciples  of  a  sound  induction.  The  value  of  any  dis- 
covery depends  upon  its  practical  utility ;  and  the 
soundness  of  any  discovery  depends  on  its  consistency 
in  all  its  applications.  The  value,  indeed,  of  any 
fundamental  principle  may  be  said  to  lie  in  its  gene- 
ral applicability  to  the  natural  and  needful  exposition 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  world.  We  are  conscious 
of  the  great  fact  of  a  material  world,  and  we  are  con- 
scious also  of  the  equally  great  fact  of  affinities,  as 
pertaining  to  the  separate  qualities  of  matter;  but  where 
have  we  an  ascertainment  of  the  ground  which  gives 
birth  to  this  consciousness  ?  We  see  the  operation  of 
ca?^se  constantly  at  work  in  every  department  of  the 
great  arena  of  nature  ;  but  have  we  as  yet  obtain- 
ed a  definite  idea  of  what  strictly  constitutes  Cause  ? 
We  see  the  operation  of  an  endless  multitude  of  forces 
in  the  economy  of  the  world  ;  but  have  we  ascertained 
the  source  of  them,  and  can  we  give  a  clear  and  dis- 
tinct rationale  of  their  respective  functions,  whether 
on  the  arena  of  matter  or  on  that  of  mind  ?  Many  of 
us  believe  in  the  existence  of  spirit-substance,  as  dis- 
tinct from  matter-substance  ;  but  who  has  expounded 
the  precise  connexion  and  communion  of  the  one  with 
the  other  ?  or  who,  indeed,  has  appropriately  defined 
the  one  and  the  other  ?     We  speak  very  naturally  of 

scions  world  ?  How  do  we  get  a  universe  of  thinking  beings 
from  the  theory  of  atoms  ?  What  is  the  starting  point  under 
the  original  distribution  of  atoms  ?  How  are  these  enormous 
problems  to  be  satisfied  by  the  theory  of  a  primary  atomism  ? 
Talk  of  Evolution  I  What  in  this  light  is  Evolution  ?  It  is  a 
name  :  what  else  ?  The  marvel  is  that  man  will  avoid  a  con- 
clusion which  meets  him  at  all  points,  and  plunge  into  an  area 
of  darkness  and  of  difficulty  from  which  there  is  no  escape. 


\\ 


02 


Soui  Mechanism. 


the  me,  with   its  self-consciousness  and  its  supposed 
independent  power  of  self-determination  ;    but   who 
hath  set  forth  a  plausible  account  of  the  origin  of  the 
me\  or  have  we  even  yet  any  satisfactory  exposition 
of  its  self-movement,  if  it  be  self-movement,  or  of  its 
position  and  relation  to   our    material  constitutional 
framework  ?     Again  :  we  are  all  agreed  that  there  is 
the  attribute  of  Morals  pertaining  to  the  rational  un- 
derstanding, but  we  are  still  waiting  for  the  discovery 
not  only  of  what  constitutes  the  source  of  moral  sanc- 
tions, but    for  a  valid    foundation  to  all  varieties  of 
matter  and  of  mind  which  will  bear  the  test  of  univer- 
sal application.    It  is  allowed  that  in  the  animal  world 
up  to  man,  there  is  a  gradation  of  mental  states  from 
a  narrow  consciousness  to  a  wide  intelligence  ;  and, 
moreover,  it  is  supposed  that  these  mental  states  arc 
graduated  or  defined   by  varied    cerebral    conditions  ; 
but  hitherto  we  know  little  of  the  modus  opcramii,  and 
still  less  of  the  modus  efficiendi,  in  accomplishing  the 
separate  results.      We  have  in  man  the  highest  condi- 
tions of  mind  known  in  the  world  ;  but  we  are  still  in 
the  dark   as   to  the  sources  of  our  varied   reasoning 
powers,  either  as  to  the  fountain   and    foundation  of 
morals,  or  as  to  the  laws  of  human  freedom   in  the 
exercise  of  Will. 

A  deeper  insight  into  these  and  similar  questions  is 
surely  very  desirable,  if  it  were  only  to  set  at  rest  the 
heaving  strivings  of  the  many  in  their  constant  and 
tantalizing  attempts  to  solve  the  enigmas  of  existence; 
but  it  is  specially  desirable,  if  it  would  serve  to  explain 
many  of  the  secrets  of  life,  and  serve  also  to  harmo- 
nize the  great  scientific  problems  which  lie  for  classi- 
fication in  one  great  unity,  and   thereby  open  up  to 


A  deeper  InsigJit  desirable. 


98 


view  not  only  the  endless  capacities  of  the  grand  field 
of  nature,  but  to  connaturalize  the  whole  economy  of 
the  world,  and  thus  exhibit  more  truly  what  the 
genuine  aspects  of  religion  are ;  and,  farther,  show 
what  are  the  well  grounded  hopes  we  may  entertain 
with  respect  to  the  future,  and  how  mankind  may 
ultimately  be  solidified  in  our  common  mind  and 
judgment. 

We  find  distinguished  philosophers  not  only  still 
debating  whether  there  be  such  a  thing  as  natural 
realism,  but  giving  forth  the  dictum  that,  apart  from 
the  thinking  mind,  we  can  have  no  assurance  of  an  ob- 
jective world.*     It  is  granted,  of  course,  that  apart 


*  "  Natural  realism  (says  Professor  Pfleiderer  in  his  GifFord 
Lectures,  p.  83)  is  the  popular  opiniou  that  our  knowledge  of 
things  is  given  to  us  simply  through  the  perception  of  the  senses. 
In  this  view  the  soul  is  represented  as  like  an  unwritten  sheet 
of  ])aper  or  as  a  photographic  plate,  on  which  things  make  copies 
of  themselves,  so  that  they  come  kito  our  consciousness  exactly 
as  they  are  in  themselves.  But  Physics,  Physiology,  and  Psy- 
chology have  irrefutably  shewn  how  erroneous  this  popular 
realism  is.  Sounds  do  not  lie  in  the  vibrating  bodies  or  in  the 
waves  of  air  which  proceed  from  them,  but  they  arise,  first,  in 
our  hearing  ear :  colours  do  not  lie  in  vibrations  of  the  Ether, 
but  arise  only  in  our  seeing  eye  ;  and  the  same  holds  true  of  the 
sensations  <»f  smell,  taste,  and  touch.  But  even  extension  and 
motion  depeinl  for  our  consciousness  on  the  perception  of  space, 
by  which  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  they  cannot  be  given  to  us 
from  without.  Just  as  little  as  the  nerves  of  the  eye,  can  those 
of  the  sense  of  touch  convey  into  our  consciousness  spacial  copies 
of  bo<lie8  :  on  the  contrary  the  spacial  image  or  perception  can 
only  be  sketched  by  the  self-activity  of  the  soul,  and  on  the 
ground  it  is  true  of  certain  signs  given  in  sensation.  But  if 
s]3acial  extension  and  form  are  just  as  subjective  as  colour, 
sound,  and  sm«rll,  what  remains  of  the  material  world  of  bodies  ? 


94 


Soiti  Mechanism, 


from  our  own  personal  thinking,  we  can  have  no  assu- 
rance of  anything  whatever  ;  but  to  entertain  the 
thought  that  the  realities  of  objective  existence  are  de- 

And  what  right  have  we  then  still  to  hold  our  perceptions  to  be 
simple  copies  of  things  themselves  ?  Nay  more,  what  guarantee 
have  we  for  holding  that  there  are  any  things  outside  of  us 
which  correspond  to  them  ?  What  ground  have  we  for  deter- 
mining whether  our  representations  are  not  merely  subjective  .' 
And  whether  our  assumption  of  an  existence  of  external  things 
IS  not  a  pure  prejudice  sprung  from  the  conceptions  of  substanti- 
ality and  of  causality  which  have  been  arbitrarily  fashioned  by 
us?  With  this  conclusion  (which  was  drawn  in  Hume's 
Scepticism),  the  world  of  the  senses  which  empirical  realism  had 
held  to  be  the  comjilete  or  even  the  only  reality,  became  an  un- 
substantial appearance  or  phantasm,  a  chaos  of  impressions  and 
representations  of  our  consciousness,  to  which  we  are  not  entitled 
to  ascribe  either  reality  or  substantiality,  or  causality,  or 
regulated  order  according  to  law,  and  which  therefore  hardly 
signify  more  than  do  the  illusion  of  a  confused  dream.  This 
was  the  natural  and  inevitable  en<l  of  the  empirical  realism 
which  made  the  knowing  mind  the  passive  receiver  of  a  truth 
given  from  without." 

It  is  to  us  matter  of  wonder  how  this  author,  like  others 
before  him,  advocating  views  so  doubly  contrary  to  the  spon- 
taneous sentiment  and  feeling  of  mankind  in  every  age,  couhl 
reconcile  to  himself  the  fact  so  remarkable  that  amid  all  the 
accidents  and  changes  of  life,  all  parties  should  have  the  self- 
same forms  of  histijrial  representation  in  their  subjective  con- 
sciousness, if  there  were  no  outward  forms  as  the  one  foundation 
of  them.  If  thinking  of  outward  objects  were  like  a  **  confused 
dream,"  it  must  be  the  marvel  of  marvels  how  it  comes  to  pass 
that,  when  reference  is  made  to  objective  things,  all  men  should 
dream  the  sanie  things.  Our  author  allows  that  this  form  of 
idealism  had  its  rise  from  objections  urged  by  Hume  ;  but  we 
are  in  a  position  fairly  to  meet,  and  fully  to  answer,  and  obviate 
the  difficulty  urged  by  Hume,  who  challenged  a  connecting  link 
betwixt  the  external  object  and  the  subjective  mind.  It  is 
remarkable  that  the  example  of  the  photographic  plate  hat» 


Popular  Convictions  the  Sound  Ones. 


95 


pendent  on  our  thinking,  or  that  our  thinking  is  not 
dependent  on  the  world  to  which  we  are  introduced, 
seems  to  us  at  once  irrational  and  absurd.  To  be  sure, 
when  the  plea  of  all  popular  conviction  is  set  forth  as 
a  truism,  which  has  secured,  and  secures,  the  common 
consent  of  mankind,  viz.,  that  we  see  a  tree  in  one's 
garden   because  it  is  there,  Hume  met  the  question 


not  shewn  such  philosophers  that,  as  there  is  a  connexion 
formed  between  the  object  and  the  photographic  plate,  so  there 
must  correspondingly  be  a  connexion  formed  betwixt  the  object 
and  the  eye  of  the  observer.  One  cannot  help  asking  Professor 
PHeiderer,  what  the  use  can  be  of  the  nerve  attached  to  each  of 
our  sense-organs,  as  so  many  electric  wires,  if  not  to  carry 
messages  of  things  as  they  are  from  the  external  world  ?  He 
regards  s[)ace  as  a  purely  subjective  form  of  thought.  I  hold 
that  we  couM  have  no  idea  of  space,  but  as  gathered  from  the 
objects  of  the  world.  Surely  it  is  a  matter  of  common  experi- 
ence that  a  material  object  occupies  so  much  room.  What  is 
this  room  or  space  but  the  extension  that  is  measured  by  certain 
boundary  lines.  The  same  reasoning  applies  to  the  conception 
of  time.  As  space  has  regard  to  extension,  so  time  has  refernce  to 
duration.  If  space  be  a  boundary  line  to  extension,  so  time  is  a 
boundary  line  to  duration  ;  and  for  this  latter  therefore  we 
must  have  experience  of  movement.  Both  space  and  time  there- 
fore are  forms  of  thought  gathered  exclusively  from  the  data 
carried  to  us  froiu  the  external  world.  It  is  equally  absurd  to 
suppose  that  sounds  are  not  in  the  vibration  of  material  things, 
but  in  the  hearing  of  the  ear,  or  that  colours  are  not  in 
object*  of  the  world  but  in  visions  of  the  eye.  How  can  the  ear 
hear  apart  from  the  sounds  that  are  uttered  ?  And  how  can  the 
eye  see  colours  apart  from  the  presentation  of  them  ?  And  if 
til  ere  be  no  external  presentation  of  them,  how  can  two  or  three 
separate  minds  agree  as  to  the  facts  simultaneously  set  before 
them  ?  Physics  and  Physiology  and  Psychology  cry  out  against 
the  doctrines  propounded  by  this  philosopher  and  the  school  of 
thought  to  which  he  belongs  1 


96 


Sou/  Mechanism. 


Tlie  necessity  of  a  Causal  Nexus 


97 


not  only  with  a  caveat,  by  pointing  out  that  the  per- 
cept (the  tree)  was  after  all  a  subjective  or  mental 
phenomenon  in  our  consciousness  ;  and  by  question- 
ing (if  the  idea  were  originated  by  the  external  object), 
where  is  the  nexus  or  chain  which  links  on  to  the  mind 
the  object  seen  as  external,  so  as  to  make  it  the  sub- 
ject of  thought  in  the  mind,  he  started  a  puzzler. 
This  enquiry  involves  an  exposition  of  the  origin  of 
Ideas.     Let  us  give  attention  to  this  question. 

Section  2. —  There  is  a  nexus  betzcixt  ^ fatter  and  Mind. 

It  will  be  allowed  on  all  hands  that  the  first  set  of  ideas 
which  enter  into  the  mind  from  the  days  of  infancy. 
are  the  ideas  of  external  things  ;  it  will  be  allowed 
also,  that  the  ideas  of  external  things  are  momentarily 
present  to  our  waking  minds,  in  as  far  as  the  external 
senses  are  present  to  our  minds  as  the  channels 
through  which  they  come  :  farther,  it  will  be  allowed 
as  a  universal  sentiment,  that  in  cognizing  such  ideas, 
we  do  so,  as  consciously  receiving  them,  ab  externo,  and 
though  we  do  not  .see  the  link  of  connexion  whereby 
mind  and  matter  are  conjoined,  yet  we  have  the  com- 
mon assurance  that  the  real  objects  exist  as  repre- 
sented by  our  ideas.*  On  this  question  there  is  abso- 
lute harmony  of  thought — a  harmony  which,  amid  all 
the  changes  of  human  .sentiment,  stands  forth  as  the 
universal  corroboration  of  this  one  conviction,  as  to 
the  source  of  what  are  known  as  our  percepts.  Persons 


*  The  author  feels  that  he  is  liere  occupvin*?  <Troun(!  whirli 
has  been  already  traverse<l  ;  but  there  is  an  expHn.sioij  of  view 
now  given  which  ha.s  not  been  previously  detSiiled. 


will  differ  in  describing  the  particulars  of  an  object, 
which  has  been  submitted  to  their  observation  ;  (and 
we  can  account  for  this  through  the  differences  in  the 
observation),  but  however  they  may  differ  as  to  an 
observation  of  details,  and  therefore  as  to  a  descrip- 
tion of  details,  there  is  under  no  circumstances,  any 
difference  as  to  the  fact,  that  the  ideas  which  we  have 
of  external  things  come  into  the  mind  ab  externo  ;  and 
further,  that  the  object  is  in  reality  what  it  is  repre- 
sented in  the  mind  to  be,  a  substantial  outside  object, 
distinguished  and  known  by  certain  specific  qualities. 
Now,  on  the  plea  that  after  all,  the  cognition  of  the 
object  is  a  universal  subjectivity,  we  are  apt  to  forget 
the  conscious  fact,  that  this  subjectivity,  as  a  universal 
conviction,  has  its  .source  outside  of  us,  i.e.y  comes  into 
the  mind  from  a  realism  external  to  us.  Apart  then 
from  the  discovery  of  the  "  causal  nexus "  whereby 
this  conviction  is  constituted  and  established  in  our 
minds,  we  are  entitled  to  say  that  whether  we  see  it  or 
not,  there  is  and  must  be  a  causal  nexus,  in  as  far  as 
we  see  and  act  upon  this  conviction  as  founded  in 
truth  ;  and  this,  on  the  ground  that  if  this  conviction 
were  fal.se,  then  all  our  convictions  must  be  false  ;  and 
because  the  whole  structure  of  human  thought  is 
built,  as  we  shall  see,  upon  the  foundation  of  our  per- 
cepts. In  these  circumstances,  were  it  otherwise,  it 
would  follow  that  our  whole  life  must  be  a  lie — a  con- 
clusion which  bears  absurdity  in  its  very  complexion. 
We  are  warranted,  therefore,  in  supposing,  nay  we 
are  bound  to  believe,  that  there  must  be  a  chain  of 
connexion  betwixt  the  external  object  and  the  mind, 
as  conscious  of  the  object  ;  and  the  question  is.  What 
can  that  chain  be  ?  and  then,  In  what  way  are  its  ope- 


H 


98 


Soul  Mechanism, 


rations  carried  on  as  a  go-bettveen,  in  conveying  the 
facts  of  matter  into  the  territory  of  mind  ?  Here, 
then,  we  have  recourse  to  a  great  fact — a  fact  which 
heretofore  has  not  been  sufficiently  regarded — which 
has  indeed  been  quite  overlooked,  viz.  this,  that  proof 
exists,  not  only  that  there  is  everywhere  an  all-per- 
vading medium  invisible  to  our  eyes,  and  indeed 
directly  insensible  to  our  senses  generally,  but  yet  from 
its  effects  unmistakably  existent  and  prevalent,  in  as  far 
as  we  have  warrant  that  said  medium  bears  on  its  bosom 
a  representation  of  the  external  object — an  ectype  of 
the  object,  delineated  from  the  object,  and  presenting 
the  characteristics  of  the  object,  according  to  a  deter- 
minate law,  whereby  the  representation  of  the  object 
is  proportionally  diminished  as  the  square  of  the  dis- 
tance from  the  object  increases.  And  what  we  say  is 
that  this  etherial  medium  must  be  regarded  as  essen- 
tially spirit-substance,  for  reasons  already  described,  as 
being  the  endless  and  simultaneous  servitor  of  all  con- 
ditions— the  servitor  not  only  of  those  conditions 
whereby  one  body  of  matter  is  represented  in  loco,  and 
whereby  another  body  and  another  is  also  represented 
in  codem  loco,  but  also  whereby  one  body  is  connected 
with  another,  and  consequently  also  whereby  all  varie- 
ties of  matter  are  connected  with  mind. 

We  proclaim,  then,  what  constitutes  the  connecting 
link  whereby  the  facts  of  the  external  world  are 
apprehended  by  our  mind  :  yet  this  will  not  easily 
satisfy  all  that  constitutes  for  us  what  Hume  called 
a  causal  nexus  between  the  material  object  and  the 
thinking  mind,  unless  we  are  able  also  to  show  that 
there  is  a  naturalness  and  harmony  of  junction 
betwixt  this  connecting  ectype,  as  I  have  called  it, 


r- 

J 


f 


The  Origin  of  the  Ego, 


99 


which  represents  the  material  object,  and  the  mental 
substance  which  in  us  is  conscious  of  apprehending  it. 
In  fact,  there  are  two  important  essentials  wanted  to 
be  made  obvious,  in  order  to  set  this  hitherto  knotty 
question  at  rest.  One  is  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
establish  a  sameness  in  character,  betwixt  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  external  object,  as  projected  from  it 
in  nature,  and  the  receptive  subject  as  acquiring 
possession  of  it,  and  therefore  as  having  a  cognisance 
of  it  ;  and  the  other  is  that  we  shall  be  able  to  trace 
the  channel  throughout  whereby  this  representation 
is  conveyed  from  the  real  object  to  the  conscious  mind. 

Section  8. — Hoiv  the  Mental  Ego  is  Constituted. 

There  arises  here  a  three-fold  consideration,  first, 
the  fact  of  there  being  a  representation  of  the  material 
object,  in  the  etherial  medium  carried  to  the  mind  : 
and  second,  what  is  it  that  constitutes  the  mental  Ego 
and  its  relation  to  said  representation  :  and  third,  by 
what  circumstances  are  the  two  connected  ?  The  first 
consideration  then  is,  what  is  it  that  constitutes  the 
niental  Ego,  and  under  what  circumstances  is  its 
foundation  laid  ?  Then,  it  will  be  our  business  to  see 
how  it  operates,  and  this  in  its  active  as  well  as 
passive  states. 

In  discovering  the  origin  of  the  Ego,  I  have  once 
more  to  call  attention  to  what  I  hold  is  a  universal 
laiv  attending  all  material  existences.*    It  is  this,  that 

•'•  I  feel,  in  prosecuting  the  exposition  of  this  chapter,  par- 
ticularly as  regards  the  intellectual  side  of  the  mind,  the  neces- 
sity so  far  of  treading  on  ground  already  gone  over  ;  but  it  is 
hoped  the  investigation  will  be  made  more  complete. 


f 


100 


Sou/  Mechanism. 


wheresoever  there  is  a  material  object,  thete  is  a  counter- 
part or  similitude  of  that  object  adumbrated  therefrom 
by  a  regular  law  in  the  Etherial  medium,  and  con- 
sequently a  similitude  of  corresponding  qualities, 
spiritous  in  their  consistency  and  nature.  There  is,  of 
course,  the  outward  form  radiated  from  the  mass  or 
body,  but  over  and  above,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  there 
is  spiritously  the  essential  quality  ;  and  it  is  to  be 
noted  also  that  one  purpose  of  a  nervous  system 
throughout  the  animal  economy  is  hereby  to  arouse  a 
consciousness  of  the  essential  conditions  of  the  body, 
as  a  constitutional  personality,  in  a  concentrated  form 
at  a  pole  of  centralisation  ;  and  we  know  that  at  the 
base  of  the  skull  in  man  the  nervous  centres  of  the 
bodily  system  have  generally  their  termini.  For 
example,  the  spinal  cord  and  axis,  the  sympathetic 
nerves,  as  well  as  the  nerves  of  the  five  senses,  and 
many  others,  meet  in  or  near  the  medulla  oblongata* 

*  Dr.  Foster,  in  his  text-lnwk  on  Physiology,  says,  "  the 
medulla  oblongata  is  the  link  between  the  brain  and  the  spinal 
cord,  and  the  majority  of  the  centres  for  various  organic 
functions  are  situated  in  it.  Of  the  whole  brain  (he  says)  certain 
parts  respond  easily  to  stimuli  such  as  the  corpora  qxtadrigeviinay 
the  crura  cerebri,  the  pons  Varollii"  Carpenter  (Mental  Physi- 
ology, p.  119,  4th  edu.,)  says,  "the  sensory  ganglia  comprehend 
that  assemblage  of  ganglionic  masses  at  the  base  of  the  skull  in 
man,  and  partly  included  in  the  medulla  oblongata  in  which  the 
nerves  of  the  special  senses  (taste,  hearing,  sight,  smell)  have 
their  central  terminations.  With  these  may  be  associated  the 
two  pairs  of  ganglionic  bodies  known  as  the  Corpora  Striata  and 
the  Thalami  Optici  into  which  may  be  traced  the  greater  pro- 
portion of  the  fibres  that  constitute  the  various  strands  of  the 
medulla,  and  which  seem  to  stand  in  the  same  kind  of  relation  to 
the  nerves  of  Touch  or  common  sensation  that  the  Olefactory, 
Optic,  Auditory,  and   Gustative  ganglia  bear  to  their  several 


i 


The  Sensorium. 


101 


and  the  sensorial  ganglia  attached  thereto  have 
their  termini  there — what,  then,  we  say  is  this, 
that  here,  at  what  is  generally  called  the  sensorium, 


nerve  trunks."  Dr.  Ferrier  (Functions  of  the  Brain)  says,  "with 
tlie  e.xception  of  the  paths  of  volitional  motor  impulse,  compa- 
r.Ltively  little  is  as  yet  definitely  known  regarding  the  functional 
si<'nificance  of  the  numerous  afferent  and  efferent  tracts  which 
connect  the  medulla  with  the  cerebellum  and  cerebral  ganglia,  or 
of  the  specific  functions  of  the  various  grey  centres  of  the  medulla 
itself.  Direct  experiment  on  the  medulla  is  full  of  difficulties, 
and  the  results  full  of  complications.  We  know  much  more  of 
the  medulla  oblongata  as  an  independent  centre.  Should  all  the 
encephalic  centres  above  the  medulla  be  removed,  the  mutilated 
organism  will  continue  to  live  and  breathe.  The  functions 
depending  on  the  spinal  centres  will  go  on  automatically,  and 
reflex  actions  will  be  called  forth  in  regions  inervated  by  the 
medulla  itself.  The  eyelids  will  close  if  the  conjunctiva  be 
touched  :  the  tongue,  oral  and  facial  muscles,  will  contract,  and 
the  ear  twitch  in  irritation  of  the  sensory  nerves,  in  reflex  re- 
lation with  the  movements  in  question.  Occasionally,  human 
infants  are  born  entirely  without  any  cerebral  centres  above  the 
medulla.  Yet  such  ancephalous  infants  suck  and  swallow  as 
well  as  the  perfectly  developed  child  when  put  to  the  mother's 
breast.  The  medulla  is  thus  a  co-ordinating  centre  of  reflex 
actions  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  life.  The  destruction  of 
the  medidla  causes  their  instant  and  permanent  annihilation." 

It  cannot  be  urged  that  physiology  gives  us  very  definite 
instruction  as  to  the  formation  of  the  intellectual  Me.  Yet  we 
find  some  interesting  facts.  There  is  the  fact  that  a  basis  of 
niin«l  exists  even  if  the  whole  eucephalon  should  be  destroyed, 
provided  the  medulla  oblongata  be  left  entire  ;  and  there  is  the 
fact  that  the  links  of  union  between  the  outer  senses  an<l 
intellect  are  those  which  terminate  in  the  medulla.  Those 
which  refer  to  Touch  are  at  the  base  of  the  brain,  but  lie  within 
the  ranjre  of  what  is  called  the  commune  sensorium,  which  is 
supposed  to  cover  the  corpora  striata  and  the  thalami  optici  as 
well  as  part  of  the  medulla  oblongata. 


102 


Soul  Mechanisvi. 


there  is  a  transcript  or  efflux  of  bodily  states  funda- 
mentally reflected  in  spirit-substance,  on  spirit-sub- 
stance as  now  constituted  to  the  soul ;  and  this  forms 
the  etherial  or  spiritous  representative  of  the  bodily 
constitution,  with  of  course  the  bias  or  proclivity 
which  characterizes  the  material  nature;  which  nature 
gives  birth  to  what  we  call  disposition  in  the  animal 
economy.  Here,  I  say,  is  laid  the  very  foundation  of 
soul,  as  founded  on,  derived  from,  and  specially  con- 
formed to  its  own  animal  character  ;  and  hereby  is 
formed  the  basis  of  a  mental  self-hood,  capable  of 
being  enlarged  according  to  the  number  and  variety 
of  inlets  with  which  it  happens  to  be  organically 
supplied  by  means  of  the  senses  and  other  springs  for 
lodging  impressions. 

But  the  question  is  naturally  asked  :  How  comes 
this  subjective  Ego,  thus  derived,  to  be  furnished  with 
the  attribute  of  consciousness — the  consciousness  of  a 
multiplicity  and  variety  of  forms  in  the  one  Ego,  and 
developed  into  Intelligence?  If  the  foundation  of  this 
Ego  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  a  spirit-conformation 
of  bodily  states  in  the  Etherial  medium,  according  to 
the  analogy  of  which  we  have  experience  in  the 
objective  material  sphere,  how  comes  it  to  pass,  that, 
in  this  case,  we  find  it  displaying  an  attribute  so  very 
remarkable  as  that  of  consciousness,  of  which  we  have 
no  intimation  in  the  merely  physical  world  ?  The 
brief  answer  to  this  question  is,  that  in  the  arrange- 
ments of  the  outer  or  mere  physical  world,  there  is  no 
scope  and  no  possible  outlet  for  the  display  of  subjec- 
tivity. In  the  outer  world  we  have  in  ether  simply 
the  ectype  of  the  material  object  as  a  phenomenon, 
and  it  either  alights  or  terminates  on  nothing,  or  it 


Development  of  ConscioHsness. 


103 


comes   in  contact   with  the   representation  of  some 
adjacent  object  ;   and   thereby  manifests   its  affinity 
therewith,  or  it  carries  the  form  of  the  object  into 
some  plasma  that  is  receptive  of  the  form,  and  so  ful- 
fils  an    important    purpose,   as    in    the   processes   of 
growth  ;  but  its  end  is  there  fulfilled— fulfilled,  in  that 
its  capacities  are  only  called  to  the  extent  of  engender- 
ing fresh  forms  or  of  carrying  its  conditions  to  other 
conditions.     It  is   different   under  the   cerebral  pro- 
cesses, in  which  it  is  made  to  re-act  in  itself^  as  a 
constituted  self.     Here,  for  the  first  time  in  the  econ- 
omy of   its   various   sympathetic  action,  it   has   the 
prerogative    for    itself,   of    receiving    and    delivering 
impressions;    AND    UNDER    THESE    CIRCUMSTANCES, 
there    is    developed    the    ultimate   and    the   highest 
attribute  of  its  nature.    This  phenomenon  of  conscious- 
ness is  universal  in  the  animal  economy,*  and  it  opens 

*  We   should   have   scarcely  anticipated   that   what  takes 
])lace  ill  the  constitution  of  the  niental  })art  of  man  by  natural 
law,  would  by  f)hilost>phers  be  generally  disallowed  as  corres- 
pondingly taking  place  among  the  lower  animals,  in  constituting 
their  mental  part,  the  distinction  being  that  the  consciousness 
created  in  man  is  an  extended  consciousness  in  response  to  the 
many  inlets  supplied  by  the  superior  organization  of  his  brain, 
while  the  consciousness  created  in  the  inferior  animal  is  pro- 
portionally narrowed  because  of  its  inferior  organization.     But 
what  do  we  find  I     In  the  '"Relations  of  Mind  and  Brain,"  by 
Professor    Calderwood,    we    have   statements   to   the   contrary 
passifn.     In  page  268,  he  says,  "  Consciousness  is  illustrated  in 
the  kn(»wledge  of  a  sensation,  as  a  present  experience  in  our  own 
life  ;  it  involves  knowledge  of   our   own  existence,  and  of  the 
state  of  that  existence  at  the  moment.     Further,  consciousness 
belon<Ts  so  much  to  the  verv  nature  of  intelligence,  as  to  imply 
knowledge  that  the  present  experience  is  not  the  result  of  our 
own  effort.     It  thus  supplies  the  test  on  which  we  seek  for  an 


i 


!1 


104 


Soul  MecJianisni. 


up  to  us  a  new  philosophy— a  philosophy  of  substance 
hitherto  hidden  from  us  ;  a  new  psychology  therefore 
which  expounds  for  us  not  only  the  facts  of  the 
physical  world,  but  their  connection  with  the  facts  of 
the  mental  world  as  developed  from  its  indistinct 
beginnings  up  to  the  highest  capacities  displayed  (as 
we  should  see)  in  the  intelligence  of  man  :  all  this 

external  explanation  of  present  experience.     This  explanation 
we  find  in  external  excitation,  which  physiolocry  represents  as 
the   conditions   of   sensori-raotor  action.*  Apart  from  the  dis- 
tinction in  consciousness  between  self  and  not  self,  an  explanation 
of  sensori-niotor  activity  could  not  be  attempted.    The  power  of 
comparing?  things  is  essential  for  the  interpretation  of  sensori- 
motor action,  and  tliis  power  of  comparing  is  the  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  mind.     We  may  therefore  say  that  conscious- 
ness IS  a  function  essential  to  mind.     If  therefore  it  is  doubtful 
whether  animals  possess  consciousness,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
they  possess  mind."     Professor  Calderwood  wants  to  distinguish 
betwixt  what  he  calls  «  the  action  of  mind''  and  "  the  action  of 
mechanism."     Why  !  what  is  consciousness  ?     Is  it  not  the  fact 
of  being   aware]    And   does   not   this  fact  apply  to  animals? 
How  could  there  be  fear,  courage,  joy,  sorrow,  or  any  feeling 
without  consciousness  ?     Wherever  there  is  sensation,  animals 
have  the  consciousness  of  their  sensation.     There  is,  of  course, 
such  a  thing  as  reflex  action  in  which  we  may  have  no  conscious- 
ness, because  that  action  is  not  carried  through  the  brain.     We 
have  no  consciousness  of  the  flowing  of  the  blood  nor  ordinarily 
of   the   beating   of   the   heart.       These   come   not   within   our 
observation.      But   how   there   could    be   sensori-motor  action 
without   the   consciousness  of  it  is  unaccountable,  or  how  the 
sensori-motor  action  can  be  expressed  as  absent  from  conscious- 
ness we  know  not.    We  might  quote  many  passages  to  the  same 
effect  from  the  volume  referred  to. 

I  give  but  one  more,  as  follows,  from  page  307,  "on  the  evi- 
dence now  adduced,  we  reach  the  conclusion  that  the  intelligence 
of  man,  as  known  in  personal  consciousness,  is  of  a  nature 
entirely  distinct  from  the  seusor.v  api^ratus,  its  functions  bein.^ 


f» 


The  Faculty  of  Perception. 


105 


however,  depending  on  the  wonderfully  structured 
conditions  and  forms  of  the  varied  brain -work  with 
which  man  is  endowed — a  brain-work,  the  organization 
of  which  in  all  its  parts  shows  a  remarkable  adap- 
tation for  the  fulfilment  of  its  very  refined  functions. 

We  shall  now  come  to  perceive  that  there  is  but 
one  true  method  of  philosophizing,  and  that  is  to  base 
our  procedure  on  facts,  by  a  strict  process  of  induction ; 
and  if  we  find  a  natural  and  feasible  explanation  of 
phenomena  hereby,  we  may  rest  tolerably  certain  that 
we  have  found  the  key  to  open  the  gates  of  psychology. 


Section  4. —  The  Faculty  of  Perception. 

It  will  have  been  seen  ere  now,  how  we  come  to 

iiuaipable  of  explanation  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  sensory 
activity.  Mind  is  not  a  product  of  cerebral  evolution,  and  could 
not  be  so,  inasnmch  as  even  in  its  lowest  function  it  is  incapable 
of  being  performed  by  sensory  apparatus."  If  the  author  means 
that  the  material  organs  of  Brain  cannot,  as  from  themselves, 
give  forth  consciousness,  we  quite  agree  with  him  ;  but  if  he 
means  that  there  is  any  outcome  in  the  animal  economy  between 
sensation  and  consciousness,  we  tell  him  he  mistakes.  We  have 
define<l  sensation  to  be  an  affection  of  the  bodily  system  ;  and 
whatever  results  might  appear  as  the  effects  of  reflex  action,  yet 
the  animal  creature  would  be  insensible  of  it  without  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  sensation  :  he  would  be  anaesthetic,  and  in  that 
case  we  could  not  speak  of  the  creature  as  an  object  of  pleasure 
or  of  pain.  Moreover,  the  idea  of  mind  operating  in  man  apart 
from  the  exercise  of  Brain  is  introducing  needlessly  a  difficulty 
from  which  there  is  no  outlet,  and  contrary  to  the  facts  of  ex- 
p(;rience.  We  have  seen  that  the  analogy  betwixt  man  and  the 
lower  animals  is  complete,  and  that  consciousness  is  the  pheno- 
menon of  the  spirit  with  which  the  creature  comes  to  be 
endowed,  and  according  as  it  is  endowed,  in  virtue  of  its  brain 
instrumentality. 


I! 


> 


106 


Sou/  MechanisJH. 


have  a  full  and  (as  I  thinkj  a  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  great  problem  of  Perception:  First  of  all,  we  have 
to  remember  that  there  is  fundamentally  formed  in  or 
near  the  medulla  the  conscious  Me,  by  the  birth  of  a 
living  animal  body,  and  that  said  conscious  Me  is  but 
fundamentally  the  etherial,  and  therefore  spiritous, 
reflex  of  the  characteristics  of  the  living  body.  In  the 
second  place,  we  have  to  remember  that  the  several 


■■'  As  Perception  is  tlie  ci>^iution  of  outwArcl  objects  by 
means  of  the  external  senses,  it  must  be  easier  umler  its  exercise 
to  find  out  the  locale  of  intellect  than  in  the  deeper  departments 
of  mind,  where  the  internal  senses  are  employed,  and  con- 
sequently in  which  the  organization  of  the  cerebrum  is  engaged. 
What  takes  place  in  visual  impressions,  for  exam})le,  is  carried 
direct  to  intellect  by  means  of  the  optic  nerve  which  terminates 
in  the  medulla.  The  medulla  liowever  is  so  closely  connected  with 
the  optic  thalami  and  corpora  striata  that  these  may  be  regarded 
as  the  sensorium.  Now  the  sensorial  ganglia  are  the  seat  of  all 
consciousness  (see  Carpenter's  Unman  Physiology,  pp.  786,  799, 
etc.,  4th  edition).  "The  sensory  ganglia,  he  says,  collectively 
constitute  the  sensorium,  and  may  be  regarded  as  the  most 
essential  part  of  the  encephalon.  They  directly  receive  tlie 
nerves  proceeding  from  the  organs  of  special  sense,  each  pair  of 
which  has  its  own  distinct  ganglionic  centre.  The  sensory 
irauirlia  form  the  organ  through  whose  instrumentalitv  the  mind 
is  rendered  conscious  of  impressions  made  on  the  organs  of  sense. 
There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the  sensorium  has  in  itself  any 
higher  function  than  that  of  impressing  the  consciousness  of  the 
individual,  and  constituting  i<lealism."  Again,  lie  says  (p.  727) 
"  We  may  fairly  regard  the  Thalami  optici  as  the  chief  focus  of 
the  sensory  nerves,  and  more  especially  as  the  ganglionic  centre 
of  the  nerves  of  common  sensation,  which  ascend  to  it  from  the 
medulla  oblongata.  On  the  other  hand,  the  corpora  striata,  which 
are  closely  connected  with  the  Thalami  optici  by  comisussural 
fibres  are  implanted  in  the  motor  tract  of  tlie  crura  cerebri" 
whereby  impressions  fmni  the  rurt'hrtrin  are  delivered  to  intellect. 


T/ie  Operation  of  Perception. 


107 


senses  of  the  living  body,  eyes,  ears,  palate,  nostrils, 
and  bodily  surface,  have  separate  nerve  conduits 
attached  to  them,  all  of  which  are  carried  to  the  self- 
same spiritous  receptaculum  corporis.  Hence  (to  take 
the  sense  of  sight  as  an  example),  when  the  impres- 
sion of  a  dog,  a  tree,  a  house,  &c.  is  carried  from  the 
object  to  the  eye,  and  from  the  eye  to  the  brain,  and 
as  an  etherial  impression,  enters  the  etherial  Me  as  an 
idea,  we  have  the  cognition  of  it.  Similarly,  if  it  be  a 
sound  passing  through  the  ear,  we  have  a  cognition  of 
it  ;*  and  so  also  of  impressions  in  taste,  smell,  and 

*  It  is  said  that  "  the  tremor  which  accompanies  sound  is  a 
sensible  impression,  and  the  difficulty  is  to  understand  how  the 
feeling  or   consciousness   called    sound    is   connected    with    the 
sensible  impression  perceived  as  a  tremor  of  the  auditory  nerve." 
The   interpretation   of  this  difficulty  seems  to  me  to  be  this: 
The   tremor  conveys  sound  as  an   impression  on  the  auditory 
nerve,   precisely   according    to   the   quality   of    the   organ    or 
instrument    in    which    the    tremor     is    originated  ;    and    the 
sound,    whatever    may    be    its    kind,    falling    on   the   ear,    is 
Ciirried   silently    as    a    quality   along    the   nerve    attached    to 
tiie  ear,  and  as  a  quality  is  thereby  presentei^l   to  the  etherial 
personality,   where    the    consciousness  of    the   presentation  is 
evoked.     Certainly  the  sound  is  not  given  by  the  mind  to  itself. 
We  have  the  analogous  case  of  the  telephone.     One  may  speak 
to  another,  who  is  miles  <listant,  by  means  of  this  agency,  and 
while  the  quality  of  sound  is  carried  silently  along  the  wire,  it 
is  developed  at  the  other  terminal  in  all  its  accuracy.     What  is 
the  lesson  here  I     It  is  this  ;  that  the  qualities  that  are  devel- 
o|)ed   in  matter  may  yet  be,  and  are,  mysteriously  hidden  in 
Ether,    It  is  out  of  all  reason  to  suppose  that  while  the  auditory 
nerve  feels  the  vibration,  the  music  is  supplied  by  the  mind. 
The  same  sort  of  argument  has  been  used  for  vision,  and  assertion 
is  made  that  the  impression  of  the  object  on  the  eye  is  one  thing, 
but  that  the  nerve  cannot  convey  colour,  and  hence  that  colour 
must  be  the  contribution  of  the  mind.     This  doctrine  is  full  of 


Ill 


lOS 


Soul  Mechanisui. 


touch.  Whatever  happens  to  be  the  characteristic  of 
the  impression  externally,  that  self  same  characteristic 
is  carried  by  the  nerve  to  the  brain,  and  as  an  idea,  it 
is  accordingly  received  by  the  conscious  Me.  That  is 
whatever  happens  to  be  the  condition  or  conditions 
belonging  to  the  external  object,  as  for  example, 
mineral  or  metal,  solid  or  liquid,  in  regard  to  touch  ; 
black,  or  white,  round  or  square,  in  regard  to  sight  ; — 
tuneful  or  harsh,  harmonious  or  discordant  in  regard 
to  hearing  ; — fragrant  or  fetid  in  regard  to  smell  ; — 
these  and  other  conditions  applicable  to  matter  are 
equally  conveyed  in  spirit-form  by  the  appointed 
nerve  channels,  adapted  for  their  respective  functions, 
and  are  each  and  all  carried  to  the  same  central  Ego 
of  the  living  frame  ;  and  there  is  consequently  in  this 
conscious  self-hood,  a  specific  consciousness  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  in  those  details  of  which  each  person  has 
had  the  experience.* 

Having  ascertained  the  foundation  of  mind  and  the 
service  and  process  of  the  great  fundamental  Faculty 
of  Perception,  whereby  we  are  cognisant  of  the  exter- 
nal world,  we  shall  come  to  see  how  and  in  what  way 
the  other  Faculties  of  the  Mind  are  framed  ;  and  if 
these  are  found  to  be  framed  on  the  same  satisfactory 
principles,  it  becomes  tolerably  certain  that  the  a  priori 
philosophy,  as  a  system  of  transcendentalism,  has  no 

inconsistencies.  We  lay  down  the  doctrine  that  there  i»  not  a 
phenomenon  indicatetl  by  matter,  but  fintls  its  quality  hidden  in, 
and  developed  again  by  Ether  in  the  cliannel  adapted  for  its 
transmission. 

*  It  will  l>e  noticed  that  what  are  called  **  the  forms  of 
thought"  l>y  transcendental  philosophers,  ar«  simply  the  forms  of 
thinf^B  in  their  reality,  as  transniitteil  from  the  external  world. 


Faculties  of  the  Internal  Organs. 


109 


ground  whatever  to  rest  upon.  If  any  feature  of  all 
the  separate  mental  states  can  be  accounted  for  on 
a  posteriori  principles — principles  which  a  sound  in- 
duction alone  can  favour,  then  there  ought  to  arise  a 
new  era  in  our  philosophical  speculations — an  era  in 
which  we  are  no  longer  shrouded  in  the  mist  of  cloudy 
obscurity,  or  left  in  the  bewilderment  of  labyrinthine 
perplexity  ;*  and  thus  made  to  stand  in  a  position 
such,  that  we  know  not  whence  we  have  come,  or 
whether  we  are  going — a  position  wherein  we  are  lost 
in  contradiction  and  mystery. 

Section  5. —  The  Faculties  generally. 

We  come  now  to  the  other  faculties  of  mind.  Here 
we  have  but  to  consider  that,  as  the  various  depart- 
ments of  Perception  are  dependent  on  the  various 
external  organs,  which  are  adapted  for  transmitting  the 
separate  conditions  of  matter,  so  we  must  infer  that 
the  various  phases  of  Memory,  Imagination,  Con- 
ception, Judgment,  Reasoning,  &c.,  are  similarly  de- 

♦  We  get  bewildered,  for  example,  in  endeavouring  to 
master  Kant's  critical  idealism  with  his  "  pure  /,"  and  his 
changeable  / — his  transcendental  self  consciousness,  and  hi.s 
empirical  consciousness— the  /of  pure  psychology,  and  the  /  as 
to  form  or  representation  ;  and  more  confounded  still,  when  told 
that  things  in  themselves  cannot  be  known— that  time  and  space 
are  mere  conditions  of  thought,  that  the  unconditioned  can  have 
no  objective  reality,  that  the  categories  of  the  understanding 
are  simply  forms  whereby  an  object  can  be  known,  while  his 
id(;as  of  pure  reason  are  a  priori  principles  beyond  the  possi- 
bilit}i^  of  ex[)erience.  Well  might  Hamilton  describe  them  as 
"  the  production  of  perverted  ingenuity,"  though  he  himself  got 
involved  in  not  a  few  of  them. 


Saul  Mechanism. 


pendent  on  a  separate  framework  of  internal  organs  as 
equally  adapted  to  fulfil  the  results  which  these 
separate  faculties  accomplish.  The  internal  cerebral 
organization  must  in  the  first  place  contain  a  general 
ground  or  basis  for  the  reception  and  retention  of  im- 
pressions ;*  and  in  the  second  place  must  possess  a 
special  apparatus  of  neural  framework  for  the  abstrac- 
tion and  reinstatement  of  these  impressions  under  new 


*  ''The  elements  of  the  cerebral  s-ibstance,  the  iincouscioiw 
atjents  of  the  inaiiifestiition  of  our  paycho-intellectiial  life,  work  in 
silence  at   the  operations   which  they  accomplish   in  common. 
They  associate  together  with  their  manifoM  properties  in  one  har- 
monious effort,  corresponding  with  one  another  by  the  mysterious 
channels  of  their  anastomosis  ;   and   without   our   knowledge 
preserve  in   their  minute  organism  |K)sthumous   prolongations 
of    past    impressions.      They   act    simultaneously    to    pro<luce 
the  phenomena  of  memory,  and  separately  give  off  reminiscences, 
as  illuminated  bodies  give  off  their  luminous  waves  store<l  up  in 
their  substance."     (Luys  on  the  Brain,  p.  141).     "The  organic 
memory   of   sensory   impressions   is  the   fundament-al   basis  of 
knowledge.      If    the    sense    impressions    were   evanescent    or 
endowed  only  so  long  as  the  object  was  present,  the  range  of 
conscious  intelligent  action  would  be  limited  to  the  present,  and 
we  ahouUl  have  no  real  knowledge.     We  can  only  be  said  to 
know  where  we   recognize  identity  or  difference  between  |iast 
and    present  conscious   mo< I iti cations.     If   we   had    no  organic 
memory  of  the  past  capable  of  re-excitation,  to  serve  as  a  basis 
of  comparison,  we  should  be  unable  to  recognize  either  agree- 
ment or  difference."    (Ferrier  on  the  Brain,  p.  428).    "  It  is  now 
very  generally  accepteil  by  psychologists  that  any  idea  which 
has  once  passed  through  the  mind  may  be  repro<iuced  at  how- 
ever long  an  interval  through  the  instrumentality  of  suggestive 
action."   '*  It  is  obviously  on  this  recording  of  impressions,  so  that 
they  are  reproduced  as  ideas  when  the  appropriate  siiggesting 
strings  are  pulled,  that  all  our  accumulated  knowle<lgedepen<ls." 
(Mental  Physiology,  Carpenter,  p.  A'l^  and  434). 


The  Uses  of  Brain  Organs  not  all  knoivn.    Ill 

relations,  when    the    affinities   by    which    association 
works  draw  them  forth. 

Physiologists  with  all   their  pondering,  allow  that 
they  are  as  yet  but  very  imperfectly  acquainted   with 
the  separate  functions  performed  by  the  varied  organs 
of  the  brain.      They   have   done  all  that  has   been 
hitherto  possible  in  probing  into  the  anatomy  of  this 
wonderful  structure  ;  but  we  are  yet  in  ignorance  save 
as  to  a  few  of  its  departments,  in  regard  to  which  they 
have  attained  to  some  general   notions  as  to  the  pre- 
cise functions   accomplished    by  specific   parts.     We 
may  know  that  the  cerebrum  has  to  do  with  intel- 
lectual operations,   that  the    sensorium    is    the   seat 
when  intelligence  is  developed,  and  that  the  cerebel- 
lum in  all  probability  has  to  do  with  the  regulation  of 
physical  movements  ;*  we  may  know  that  the  fibres 
are  for  the  transmission  of  impressions,  (delicate  for 
their  delicate  work)  and  that  the  cells  in  the  cortical 
substance,  are  for  lodging  injpressions  ;  but  to  say  to 
v\hat  purpose  the  corpus  callosnm,  the  pons   Varolii, 
the  corpora  quadrigemina  and  others  are  devoted,  can- 
not be  surely  understood.!   Nor  is  this  to  be  wondered 

♦  '*  The  cerebellum  would  seem  to  be  a  complex  arrangement 
of  individually  differentiated  centres,  which,  in  associated  action, 
regulate  the  various  muscular  adjustments  necessary  to  main- 
tain the  equilibrium  ami  steadiness  of  the  body  :  each  tendency 
to  the  displacement  of  the  equilibrium  round  a  horizontal, 
vertical  or  intermediate  axis,  acting  as  a  stimulus  to  the  special 
centre  which  calls  into  play  the  antagonistic  or  compensatory 
action."    (Ferrier,  p.  199). 

t  The  cerebral  hemispheres  are  connected  together  by  a 
great  system  of  commissural  fibre,  the  corpus  callosum  which 
forms  the  floor  of  the  longitudinal  fissure,  and  roof  of  the  cerebral 


112 


Soul  MechanisiH. 


at.  The  whole  machinery  is  conducted  so  thoroughly 
in  the  dark,  that  a  complete  insight  into  the  offices 
performed  by  the  respective  organs  has  not  yet  been 
obtained.  We  are  therefore  dependent  to  a  large  ex- 
tent on  analogy  to  explain  the  reflex  phenomena  of 
mind,  in  connexion  with  the  complex  organization  of 
cerebral  matter  with  which  it  stands  connected. 


(I.) — Memory, 

The  first  Faculty  of  Mind  after  that  of  Perception 
that  comes  under  our  review,  is  undoubtedly  that  of 
Memory.  Perception  is  the  cognition  of  ideas  ingatliered 
from  the  external  world  ;  and  the  first  reflex  operation 
of  the  infant  mind   is  the  recallment  of  the  ideas  of 
Perception,  and  the  r^-cognition  of  the  ideas  as  the 
counterparts  of  the  impressions  already  known   and 
recalled  from  the  storehouse  of  memory.     For  what  is 
memory  fundamentally  but  the  storage  of  impressions; 
and  what  are  impressions   but  the  imprints   on  the 
cellular  organs,  which  imprints  are  the  source  of  the 
etherial  forms  called  ideas,  which  become  the  property 
of  the  intellectual  me  when  carried  thither.     There  is 
thus  a  two-fold  copy  of  what  constitutes  the  pabulum 
of  human  knowledge— the  impressionism   lodged    in 
the  cortical  substance  of  the   brain,  and   the  idealism 
which  constitutes  the  foundation  of  the  Ego  or  Mc. 
The   Me  is  properly  the  soul  of  the  man  ;  and   the 
ideas  which  it  receives  constitute  the  knowledge  with 


ventricles."  (Ferrier,  p.  45).  The  relations  of  tlie  Pons  are  verv 
imperfectly  determined.  The  corpora  quadrigeniina  have  *a 
relation  to  the  visual  centres  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres. 


Memory. 


118 


which  it  is  equipped.  Hence,  in  the  matter  of  Memory 
it  behoves  that  in  our  present  constitution  there  is  a 
basis  of  matter  {ox  holding  impressions,  as  well  as  rt: 
basis  of  mind  for  holding  ideas,  and  when  old  impres- 
sions are  returned  to  the  Me  it  has  a  r^-cognition  as 
something  already  acquired. 

In  the  present  constitution  of  our  minds,  with  a 
constitution  which  operates  throughout  by  means  of 
cerebral  instrumentality,  we  are  and  must  be  de- 
pendent on  brain  for  the  efficient  working  of  mind  ;* 
because  the  Me  as  an  hitelligence  is  purely  receptive, 
and  is  cognisant  of  ideas,  only  when  ideas  are  trans- 
mitted to  it.  And  this  explains  what  has  long  been 
the  crux  philosophorum,  viz. : — the  power  of  self- 
insight,  as  if  the  eye  which  sees  other  things  could  by 
any  possibility  see  itself,  apart  from  a  mirror  reflect- 
ing it.t  The  me  sees  and  knows  itself,  not  by  what 
has  improperly  been  called  introspection,  for  that  is  a 

*  "That  the  bi-ain  is  the  organ  of  the  mind  is  a  universally 
admitted  axiom.  We  have  no  proof  of  subjectivity  or  modifi- 
cation of  consciousness  apart  from  the  action  of  the  cerebral 
hemispheres.  Why  couvsciousness  should  arise  only  in  co-relation 
with  the  activity  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres  is  a  question  which 
has  not  yet  received  any  satisfactory  answer."  (Ferrier,  p.  324). 
*'  Nothing  can  be  more  certjiin  than  that  sensational  conscious- 
ness is  excited  through  physiological  instrumentality"  (Carpen- 
ter's Mental  Physiology,  j).  12). 

f  Professor  Calderwood,  p.  6,  mistakes  the  meaning  of 
introspection  when  he  gives  as  example  of  it,  the  consciousness 
of  our  thoughts  and  feelings.  He  says  the  physician  does  not 
hfsitate  to  ask  his  patient  how  he  feels,  and  he  calls  his  experi- 
ence introspection.  Why  I  all  such  experiences  are  not  intro- 
spection, but  the  cognition  of  affections  wrought  upon  us  ah 
extra. 


114 


Soul  Mechanism. 


contradiction  in  terms,  in  as  far  as  the  observer  can- 
not be  the  object  observed,  otherwise  we  confound 
subject  and  object.  There  cannot  therefore  be  an 
intuition  such  as  that  of  self  looking  upon  self  unless 
self  is  somehow  mirrored  as  an  object.  If,  however, 
we  find  self  cognizing  new  ideas,  and  /-^-organizing 
old  ideas:  if  we  find  self  cognizing  ideas  of  Perception, 
and  ideas  of  Imagination,  and  ideas  of  Conception, 
and  ideas  which  are  the  conclusions  of  Judgment,  and 
ideas  which  are  the  inferences  of  ordinary  reasoning  : 
if,  moreover,  we  find  that  the  me  is  conscious  of  the 
knowledge  which  it  possesses  in  the  furniture  of  its 
ideas,  we  are  hereby  able  to  say  what  the  me  is,  as  a 
spirit-formation,  having  the  capacity  of  understanding 
what  sort  of  ideas  are  introduced  to  it,  and  of  laying 
up  these  ideas  in  itself,  as  the  separate  departments  of 
its  knowledge.*  Hence  the  soul  is  a  structure  entirely 
built  up  in  this  world  in  connexion  with  the  body. 

(2.) — Imagination. 

The  next  Faculty  which  naturally  comes  before  us, 
is  that  of  Imagination.  Imagination  differs  from 
Perception,  in  that    Perception  is   dependent  on  the 


*  Hence,  observe  how  we  are  able  to  mark  the  i<lentity  of 
self,  whatever  accessions  it  niav  receive.  The  identitv  of  a 
material  object  is  interfered  with  by  the  accessions  which  it 
receives,  because  it  thereby  loses  its  primitive  form  and 
character  ;  but  tlie  distinction  f»s  applicable  to  the  mental  self  is 
this,  that  each  separate  set  of  experiences  is  preserved  therein 
distinct  and  inviolate  ;  and  we  can  point  to  any  one  set  of  prior 
experiences,  and  fix  them  as  the  realities  applicable  to  our 
inilividual  case. 


Imagination. 


115 


external  world  for  its  ideas,  and  lays  a  foundation  for 
the  exercise  of  Imagination.  Perception, y?r.f/  of  all, 
fills  the  mind  with  fundamental  ideas  ;  and  when  we 
think  of  the  whole  process  of  our  education  in  the 
world,  not  only  by  observation,  but  by  reading  in  all 
departments  of  literature,  we  might  say,  that,  in  Per- 
ception we  lay  up  a  store  of  these  impressions  in  the 
cortical  substance  of  the  brain,  with  their  counterpart 
ideal  forms  in  the  spirit-substance  of  the  me  ;  and 
Imagination  as  well  as  Memory  operates  on  this  foun- 
dation ;*  and  in  their  exercise  these  lay  a  farther 
extension  of  forms  on  this  foundation.  It  is  out  of 
this  foundation  that  both  Memory  and  Imagination 
find  the  supply  of  their  respective  materials.  But 
there  is  this  difference  betwixt  Memory  and  Imagi- 
nation, that  the  former  deals  with  the  recurrence  of 
ideas  in  their  integrity :  the  latter  partakes  of  the  re- 
currence of  ideas  or  of  parts  of  ideas  which  are  first 
broken  up  by  analysis  and  jDuilt  up  anew  by  synthesis 
into  new  forms.  For  example,  we  may  have  first  of  all 
by  Perception  received  the  idea  of  an  orange:  the  parts 
of  that  idea  are  colour,  shape,  ruggedness,  sapidity,  etc. 
What  does  Imagination  do?  It  takes  any  one  or 
more  of  these  parts,  and  dresses  an  object  of  its  own 
of  different  material,  and  consistency,  and  applies  its 
colour  to  it,  and  its  shape  to  it,  and  perhaps  the 
characteristics  of  something  else  to  it.     In  this  way  a 

♦  If  Perception  does  not  lay  a  foundation  of  pabulum  for 
all  the  other  faculties  of  the  mind,  tlien  we  must  be  constrained 
to  suppose  that  after  all,  there  is  a  transcendentalism  applicable 
to  the  human  mind,  which  contributes  by  itself  to  human 
thought ;  but  this  is  contrary  to  the  whole  structure  of  mind  as 
we  have  represented  it. 


IIG 


Spul  Mechanism. 


fresh  picture  of  things  is  set  up — set  up  as  made  of 
elements  all  culled  out  of  ingredients  which  have  been 
primarily  obtained  from  various  objects  received  in 
the  exercise  of  Perception. 

What  may  be  the  precise  instrumentality  of  the 
Brain  for  the  borrowing  of  certain  attributes  of  con- 
crete ideas,  and  of  building  them  up  into  a  new 
picture,  as  presented  in  the  exercise  of  Imagination,  it 
is  not  easy  to  say  ;  but  this  much  is  obvious,  that, 
while  Remembrance  is  the  calling  up  of  ideas  in  their 
totality,  Imagination  is  the  calling  up  of  ideas  and 
such  attributes  of  ideas,  as  are  sought  for  to  constitute 
some  analogy  or  resemblance.*  Attention  should  be 
had  to  the  source  of  this  power,  in  calling  up  what  is 
wanted  from  the  territory  of  the  stored  up  material. 

It  may  be  asked,  by  what  power  are  we  enabled  to 
summon  up  old  impressions,  or  parts  thereof,  to  the 
central  formation  that  is  immediately  before  the  mind? 
The  answer  no  doubt  is  by  Association!  But  what  is 
Association  ?  It  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the 
operation  of  Affinity  between  an  impression  before 
the  mind  in  a  state  of  want ^  and  an  impression  in  the 
store-house  which  supplies  that  7i'ant.f  Such  is  the 
exceedingly  delicate  refinement  of  operations  in  the 
cerebral  system,  that  the  intercourse  betwixt  a  subje»:t 


*  "The  faculty  of  Ima^inatioij  works  witlnii  the  same  limits 
as  Recollection."  See  illustrations  in  Carjienter's  Mentiil  Physi- 
ology, chapter  xii. 

t  Every  separate  impression  has  m^  own  distinctive  quality  ; 
and  it  is  in  virtue  of  the  special  conditi  jn  attached  to  each,  that 
the  law  of  attinity  is  found  to  operate  with  such  unfailin]Lr 
accuracy,  thereby  enal)Hn«r  association  to  fulfil  the  most  import- 
ant functions  in  the  exercise  of  mind. 


Conception. 


117 


before  the  mind  and  the  objects  laid  up  in  the  frame- 
work of  impressions,  that  the  felt  necessities  of  the 
subject  or  impression  as  the  idea  before  the  mind,  are 
responded  to  as  by  attraction,  to  complete  some 
analogy  or  picture  sought  to  be  drawn  into  the  com- 
bination. Hence,  it  happens  that,  when  one  has  had 
considerable  experience  of  the  practical  affairs  of  life, 
he  may  by  help  of  these  varied  impressions  revel  in 
manipulating  fresh  pictures  for  himself,  by  making  up 
analogous  scenes.  This  is  the  work  of  Imagination  ; 
and  it  is  carried  on  by  means  of  the  material  organiza- 
tion of  the  brain,  adapted  to  fulfil  such  a  purpose. 


(3.) — Conception. 

But  we  have  another  great  Faculty  of  the  Mind 
known  as  Conception.  Conception  is  that  Faculty 
which  betokens  genius  :  it  is  the  faculty  which  is  em- 
ployed when  we  are  met  by- difficulties,  and  which  aids 
us  in  overcoming  difficulties.  It  is  this  faculty 
which  indicates  resources — the  power  of  origi- 
nality in  fulfilling  some  purpose  of  the  mind — the 
faculty  therefore  which  is  brought  into  play  in  the 
exercise  of  invention.  In  employing  conception  there 
must  always  be  a  purpose  before  the  mind.  A  pur- 
pose is  what  Kant  calls  a  schema — a  form  of  thought, 
expressing  something  that  has  to  be  adopted,  but 
wanting  in  some  element  which  must  be  supplied  to 
it,  before  it  can  be  carried  out — before  the  end  can  be 
realized.  The  instrumentality  of  brain  equipped  for  this 
service  must  be  such  as  to  carry  with  it  the  impress 
of  a  certain  condition  in  zvant,  and  therefore  having  a 
craving  for  a  particular  supply  adapted    to   it  ;    and 


118 


Soul  Mechanism. 


not  only  this,  but  it  must  have  scope  afforded  to  it  of 
feeling  its  way  among  the  stored  up  impressions  for 
the  article  wanted  ;  and  if  there  is  failure  in  finding 
this,  the  mind  is  said  to  be  baffled  in  overcoming  the 
difficulty  before  it,  that  is  in  accomplishing  the  pur- 
pose sought  to  be  realised.  It  is  obvious  that  success 
in  the  exercise  of  Conception,  as  well  as  of  Imagina- 
tion, must  chiefly  depend  on  two  things,  first,  on  the 
varied  store  of  laid-up  impressions  ;  and  second,  on 
the  refinement  of  the  nerve-fibre  in  laying  hold  of  the 
desiderated  form,  which  answers  to  its  want.  While 
r  rccption,  Memory,  and  Imagination  also  so  far 
belong  to  the  lower  animals,  it  does  not  appear  that 
they  are  gifted  with  the  faculty  of  Conception,  in  so 
far  as  no  such  thing  as  a  schema  to  be  filled  up 
comes  before  their  mind,  unless  it  be  in  such  isolated 
cases  as  the  bird  in  building  its  nest,  or  the  bee  in  fur- 
nishing its  hive,  or  the  mother  in  providing  for  her 
young  ;  and  these  cases  are  properly  denominated 
Instinct.*       Instinct    may    be    called   an    exercise   of 

*  The  reason  wliy  the  lower  animals  want  the  faculty  of 
Conception  save  in  such  isolated  cases  as  have  been  referre<l  to, 
lies  in  this,  that  they  have  not  the  power  of  apprehending  the 
relations  of  the  not-me.  Hence,  their  attitude  to  these  relations 
is  that  of  blindness  :  hence,  therefore,  the  narrow  sphere  to 
wliich  they  are  confined — the  sphere  which  alone  concerns  self. 
And  hence,  their  movements  are  influenced  so  far  onlv  a  s 
outward  circumstances  pertain  to  self.  As  not-%elf  opens  up 
indefinitely  the  objects  of  the  world,  and  their  relations 
to  one  another,  and  as  man  has  a  sight  of  these  relations 
especially  as  these  are  conjoined  for  the  fulfilment  of  a 
purpose,  it  is  obvious  that  the  Reason  of  man  is  hereby 
indefinitely  expanded  in  the  adaptation  of  things  to  one  another. 
It  haa  moreover  to  b»^  noted  that  this  pre-eminent  power  of  man. 


Judgment. 


119 


\ 


Reason  confined  to  one  particular  department.  Reason 
is  the  power  of  adapting  one  thing  to  another  gene- 
rally in  the  accomplishment  of  a  purpose.  Hence, 
Conception  may  properly  enough  be  regarded  as  the 
fundamental  faculty,  in  which  Reason  or  the  power  of 
adaptation  operates  as  the  agent  in  the  exercise  of 
human  purposes. 

(4.)_7y/^  Reasoning  Faculties— (a)  Judgment, 

But  there  are  other  aspects  of  Reason  constantly 
predominating  in  the  human  mind,  that  is  in  drawing 
Inferences  or  in  forming  conclusions.  And  without 
doubt  there  must  be  an  apparatus  in  the  Brain  ad- 
apted for  the  accomplishment  of  all  this.  All  infer- 
ences are  obtained  by  compat  ing  one  thing  zuith  another) 
one  of  these  is  called  the  major  premiss,  and  the  other 
is  called  the  minor  premiss— the  former  must  have 
been  acquired  in  the  course  of  experience,  the  latter 
is  the  object  whose  character  has  to  be  ascertained, 
and  before  a  comparison  can  be  made  betwixt  the  one 
and  the  other,  the  two  must  be  cognate,  that  is  analo- 
gous objects,  with  this  difference,  that  the  former 
which  is  embraced  in  our  experience  stands  as  the  best 
of  its  kind  ;  and  the  character  of  the  object  comes  out 
according  as  it  comes  near  to  it  as  the  standard  of  ex- 
cellence. That  is,  the  major  premiss  stands  before 
the  mind,  as  a  standard  of  excellence  or  criterion 
whereby  we  form  our  Judgment ;  and  the  correctness 
of  the  Judgment  must  always  depend  on  the  accuracy 

in  apprehending  the  relations  of  the  n(>t-me,  nnist  be  ascribed 
to  a  peculiar  quality  of  brain  with  which  he  is  gifted. 


120 


Soul  McclianisDL 


or  sufficiency  of  what  may  be  called  our  standard  of 
measurement.  What  the  precise  form  of  organ  is  in 
which  our  standard  ideals  are  registered,  we  cannot 
say  ;  and  what  the  precise  form  of  organ  whereby  a 
fresh  cognate  idea  is  applied,  we  cannot  say,  farther 
than  that  there  is  in  connection  with  Brain-organiza- 
tion a  grand  Register-Department  of  our  experiences; 
and  in  order  to  obtain  the  judgment  required  with 
reference  to  some  object  brought  before  the  mind, 
there  is  the  summoning,  by  association,  of  the  correla- 
tive subject  which  contains  the  required  inference  to 
be  appended  * 

(b.) — Reasoning . 

Such  is  the  process  in  the  exercise  of  Judgment 
whereby  we  are  ad/e  to  indicate  character  as  applicable 
to  objects.  Somewhat  analogous  is  the  process  which 
has  to  be  gone  through  in  what  is  commonly  called 
Reasoning.  Reasoning  is  spoken  of  as  having  two 
great  branches,  that  of  Induction  and  that  of  Deduc- 
tion ;    but  the  process  in  cither  case   is  strictly  the 

*  We  search  in  vain  throujjjli  treatises  on  Phvsiolojrv  to  find 
any  clue  to  the  jnocess  of  brain  operation  in  niakinj;  the  eoni- 
(mrison  of  an  object  which  has  just  entered  into  the  mind,  with 
an  object  already  laid  up  in  the  nnnd.  In  the  exercise  of  judijj- 
ment  the  process  is  onlinarily  automatic,  and  the  pronouncement 
of  the  character  of  that  which  is  presented  to  us  seems  in  certjiin 
Ciises  to  be  immediate.  It  appears  as  if  in  cognate  matters  the 
topography  of  analogous  cases  were  determine<I,  and  that  when 
a  representation  enters  the  optic  thalamus^  it  is  at  once  con- 
fnujted  bv  another  con-similar,  in  virttie  of  which  we  have  an 
immediate  intuition  of  *litierence,  antl  thereby  an  exercise  of 
judgment. 


Reasoning. 


121 


same,  the  distinction  being  that  in  Induction  we  have 
in  po.ssession   the  major  premiss  containing  what  we 
call    a    Cause,   and,   therefore,   we    seek    and    obtain, 
throu^^h  this  an  inference  which  constitutes  the  Cause  as 
adequate  to  account  for  the  conclusion  in  the  minor 
premiss  ;  while  in  Deduction  we  require  to  have  the 
major  premiss  as  containing  the  conclusion  we  seek  for  ; 
and  therefore  we  seek  through  this  an  inference  which 
constitutes   the    Conclusion,   adequate   to   satisfy    the 
Cause    in    the    minor    premiss.       Here,    as    in    the 
exercise  of  Judgment,  there  is  a  comparison  betwixt 
two  cognate  objects,  one  of  them  being  the  minor  pre- 
miss, or  that  to  which  we  wish  to  attach  an  inference, 
the  other  being  the  major  premiss  as  something  laid 
up  in  the  storehouse  of  impressions,  and  brought  for- 
ward by  association   as  containing  the   inference  re- 
quired, whether  by  Induction  in  searching  for  a  Cause, 
or  by  Deduction  in  order  to  find  a  Conclusion.-*^ 

*  The  exercise  of  Reasoning  is  one  of  the  most  perplexing 
to  the  student  of  mind.     It  is  made  obvious  that  it  takes  place 
by  (iomparing  oiie  representation  with  another.     How  that  can 
be  effected  by  any  s])ecifie  organ  defeats  us  to  understand  :  yet 
upon  the  plea  that  like  is  drawn  to  like,  the  process  becomes 
understandable   enough.       We   have   in    our   experience    that 
represenUtion  which  we  have  gathered  as  the  best  of  its  kind, 
and  when  a  cognate  image  is  i)resentetl,  and  confronted  there- 
with we  are  able  at  once  to  pronounce  on  said  injage  according 
as  it  comes  near  to  the  model  with  which  it  is  compared.    This  is 
the  exercise  of  judgment.     Again,  we  have  in  our  experience  a 
subject  to  which  the  cause  and  consequence  are  attached  :  when, 
theiefore,  a  cognate  subject  comes  to  the  optic  thalanuis  with 
the  sjime  conse(pience,  we  find  it  c«)nfronte(l  with  the  subject  of 
our  experience   to  which  the  cause  is  attached,   and   we  draw 
tiience  the  cause  which  we   seek  for.     This  we  call  Induction. 


c^ 


122 


Soul  Mechanisjn. 


(5.) — Brief  Recapitulation. 


Such  is  a  resume  of  the  Intellectual  Faculties  of 
the  human  mind  :  so-called,  not  because  any  use  of 
them  can  be  exercised  apart  from  the  cerebral  instru- 
mentality through  which  the  mind  operates,  but 
because  said  Faculties  stand  preliminary  to,  and  are 
essential  to,  the  operation  of  these  motor  Faculties 
which  have  their  outlet  under  the  title  of  Appetites 
and  Desires,  and  what  is  called  Will-power  which 
is  carried  into  execution  by  our  volitions.  The  in- 
tellectual Faculties  present  different  phases  of  under- 
standing. For  example.  Perception  is  the  ideation  of 
external  things,  which  come  to  us  in  seeing,  hearing, 
touching,  etc. :  Memory  is  the  recallinent  to  conscious- 
ness of  ideas  formerly  entertained :  Imagination  is  the 
groping  together  by  generalization  of  ideas  and  parts  0/ 
ideas  through  preliminary  abstraction,  and  hence 
pictures  which  gratify  the  fancy,  or  illustrate  some 
principle  for  w  hich  we  contend  :  Conception  is  an  ex- 
tension of  Iinagiyiation  into  the  deep  recesses  of  brain, 
in  order  to  find  means  to  ends,  by  the  inventive  or 
creative  processes  of  the  mind,  when  projecting  or 
purposing  new  schemes  of  action.  The  Faculties  of 
Judgment  and  of  Reasoning  are  analogous  in  that  they 
depend  on  the  comparison  of  a  presented  idea  ivith  a 
cognate  idea  already  laid  up,  the  difference  in  the  case 
of  Judgment  being  that  we  have  to  pronounce  on  the 

The  process  is  precisely  tlie  same  in  Deduction.  When  we 
have  a  subject  with  its  cause  given  in  the  presentation, 
and  liave  it  confronted  with  a  cognate  subjec^t  and  cause,  alrea<ly 
laid  up  with  the  conclusiou  attachetl,  we  are  able  to  read  off  this 
conclusion  accordingly,  as  tliat  w  we  seek  for. 


Intelligence  preliminary  to    Will. 


123 


character  of  the  presented  idea  ;  and  in  the  case  of 
Reasoning  that  we  have  to  find  out  a  cause  or  a  con- 
sequence to  the  presented  idea,  according  as  one  or 
other  is  required.  And  further,  in  the  case  of  Judg- 
ment, the  standard  laid  up  is  to  be  regarded  as  \hQ  best 
of  its  kind ;  and  in  the  case  of  Reasoning  the  similitude 
must  contain  the  inference  sought  for. 

Such  are  the  extremely  simple  methods  whereby  we 
are  enabled  to  expound  the  most  difficult  processes 
of  human    thought.      It    indicates   an    extraordinary 
delicacy  and  refinement  of  the  wonderful  operation  of 
Association  in   the  field  of  relationships,  and  of  the 
Affinities    which    subsist    under   these    relationships. 
Under  whatever  mode  of  exposition  we  adopt,  these 
delicate  affinities  shew  themselves,  and  introduce  fresh 
movements  accordingly.     And  we  can  have  no  doubt 
that  in  the  world  of  Spirits  so-called,  it  is  in  virtue  of 
the    affinities    pertaining    to    spirit-forms,  that    their 
relation  (the  relation  of  separate  conditions)  to  one 
another  is  disclosed,  and    their  correspondent  action 
accounted  for.     We  have  but  one  source  of  movement 
made  known  to  us,  and  that  one  source  is  the  opera- 
tion   of  affinity  under  conjoint  relationships.      It  is 
under  these   relationships   that   we  account   for   the 
exercise  of  Will-power,  to  which  we  shall  now  give  our 
attention.     The  material  instrumentality  by  means  of 
which  our  minds  presently  operate,  can  be  regarded  as 
simply  a  crass,  or  if  we  like  better  a  gross  expression 
of  what  is  more  refinedly  manifested   in  the   spirit 
world.    What  we  say  is,  that  it  is  through  such  agency 
(the  agency  of  conditioned  forms),  that  we  have  the 
basis  laid  of  the  Ego  itself,  and  through  such  agency 
that    we   account    for   all   the   operations    of    mind. 


>\ 


124 


Soul  Mcclianism. 


Having   dealt   with  the    INTELLECTUAL  Powers,  I 
now  proceed  to  consider 

IL— THE     EMOTIONAL     POWERS. 

(\?)—  Motives. 

In  prosccutii'g  this  theme  we  shall  have  to  deal 
with  the  great  questions  of  Will  and  of  the  Freedom 
of  Will,  each  of  them  a  crux,  in  the  philosophic 
systems  hitherto  in  vogue.  It  is  unquestionably  the 
Ego  (the  Me,  the  conscious-self)  that  wills  The  first 
question  naturally  is,  under  what  circumstances  is  the 
Will  originated,  and  how  comes  it  to  be  exercised  ? 
There  must  be  a  cause.  We  cannot  imagine  an 
absolute  self  commencement  as  the  cause  of  Will,  for 
that  would  be  a  cause  without  a  cause  ;*  nor  can  we 
suppose  a  movement  having  a  certain  direction,  to 
deviate  into  a  contrary  direction  without  an  iinpelling 

♦  Ami  yet  there  must  be  a  Cause  wliicli  is  itself  without  a 
cause.  And  here  is  the  distinction  wliicli  we  have  to  make. 
The  absolute  Cause  is  the  self-contained  e.ipressiun  «>f  e.s.sential 
causality  in  eternal  existence — that  existence  which  cannot  but 
V>e — that  existence  which  is  not  only  the  source  of  all  derive«l 
beinf'.  but  which  is  the  funtlaniental  expression  of  combined 
conditions  as  the  necessary  source  of  all  derived  phenomena. 
That  existence,  if  we  consider  it  arij^ht  has  in  itself  the  con- 
ditions out  of  which  all  movement  comes  ;  and  if  we  would 
regard  it  aright,  must  have  intellectually  an«l  morally  the  best 
conditions  that  instigate  movement,  with  entire  control  over 
that  movement.  It  is  different  with  respect  to  derive<l  con- 
ditions. For  example,  if  there  is  aught  that  stan<ls  by  itself 
essentially  passive  without  connexion  with  other  c(Hiditions, 
then  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  conceive  that  passivity  of  itself 
becoming  essentially  active. 


Motives. 


125 


cause.     If  the  Me  then  is  in  itself  intrinsically  passive, 
as  being  simply  receptive,  and  therefore  conscious  of 
impressions  received  ;  and  if  the  Will,  as  the  active 
impulsion  of  the  Me,  is  to  be  regarded,  and  must  be 
regarded,  as  an  effect  ;  we  ask  naturally  what  is  the 
operating  cause  by  which  this  effect  is  produced,  or  out 
of  which  it  arises  ?     I  answer  at  once  : —  Will  is  created 
by  the   introduction   of  ideas  into  the  Me.     How  so  ? 
Let  it  be  noted  that  the   Me,  while  it  is  etherially 
a  representation  of  the  body,  is  additionally  a  structure 
of    ideas   through    the    senses :    we    have    therefore 
only      to     remember     that     the     condition    of    the 
Me,    on    the    one    hand,    as    for    the    time    cogniti- 
oned,    and     the     condition    and    character     of    the 
ideas  which  are  carried  to  it,  on  the  other  hand,  create 
an  emotion  or  motive  poiver,  in  precise  correspondence 
with  the  kind  of  affection  hereby  produced  upon  the 
Me.     Or,  shall  I  say,  it  is  by  the  junction  of  the  idea 
with  the  Me,  that  a  characteristic  emotion  is  excited  ? 
There    is  without  doubt  such  a  phenomenon    as   an 
operative  chemistry  in  the  spirit-sphere,  as  unquestion- 
ably there  is  an  operative  chemistry  in   the  matter- 
sphere  ;  and  when    we   come  to    know  more   of  the 
relations  of  spirit-conditions  to  one  another,  and  the 
refined  and  delicate  affinities  of  these  to  one  another, 
this  conclusij>n  will  be  simple  enough,  and  be  seen  to 
be  amply  illustrated  and  confirmed  in  mental  exercises. 
As  emotion,  then,  is  the  motive  power  whereby  Will 
is  engendered,  it  is  of  enormous  moment  to  understand 
under  what  circumstances  motive  power  for  this  end 
is   created    in    the    human    mind.       I  have  said  that 
emotions  may  be  indefinitely  varied  ;  and  they  are  so 
varied  according  to  the  specific  qualities  of  the  ideas 


iifi 


Mil 


Soul  Mechanism. 


that  arc  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Me  ;  and  not  only 
so,  but  varied  also  according  to  the  temperament  in 
which   the    Me   happens  to  be  situated  at  the  time. 
The    process  has  its   direct  analogy  in  the  world  of 
matter,  as  when  an  alkali  and  an  acid  are  conjoined. 
It  may  be  that  an  idea,  when  conveyed  to  the  mind 
(that   is   to   the   conscious    Me),   creates    simply   an 
emotion  which  is  properly  denominated  a  sensation, 
which  may  be  strong  or  weak,  as  when  we  see  a  man 
walking  on  a  rope  raised  aloft,  or  when  he  hears  of 
.some  accident  in  a  distant  land,  which  little  affects 
him,  or  when  a  piece  of  ordinary  intelligence  is  com- 
municated to  him.     But  if  the  idea  introduced  to  the 
mind  be  an  intimation  of  the  death  of  one's  dear  friend, 
a   man    is   affected   according  to   the  quality   of  the 
relationship.      And    here   comes  in    the  operation  of 
Will  under  Emotion.     If  the  emotion  be  that  arising 
from  the  death  of  a  father  or  near  relation,  there  will 
be  the  accession  of  an  idea  craving  for  the  supply  of  a 
want  to  be  fulfilled.     In  short,  when  the  idea  intro- 
duced involves  a  condition  of  need  in  the  object,  or  in 
the  circumstantials  of  the  object,  then  that  very  con- 
dition   engenders   the   operation    of  Will,   that    is  a 
tendency  in  the  Me  to  relieve  the  need.     If  a  man  is 
seen  to   fall  from  a  height,  or  if  there  is  the  know- 
ledge of  an  object  in  danger  or  in  distress,  or  in  any 
special  need  which  our  aid  can  supply,  an  emotion  of 
desire  to  rescue  or  relieve  him  is  at  once  in.stigated  by 
the  very  communication  of  the  idea  ;  and  this  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  want  which  the  idea  involves. 

(2.) — Appetites  and  Desires, 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  law  which  generates 


Appetites  and  Desires. 


127 


Will,  applies  to  Appetites  and  Desires.  Appetites 
have  their  origin  in  purely  bodily  states  ;  these  states 
are  well  known.  Hunger  and  thirst  are  bodily 
cravings,  and  they  are  stimulated  by  the  sight  of  that 
which  responds  to  their  cravings  ;  or  they  may  be 
stimulated  by  the  presence  of  that  which  peculiarly 
gratifies  or  brings  pleasure  in  the  u.se  of  them.  The 
sexual  appetite  in  like  manner  is  aroused  by  the 
presence  or  even  the  imagination  of  that  which  grati- 
fies it.  And  what  is  it  all,  but  that  impulse  of  the  Me^ 
which  in  itself  is  strong  Will  for  indulgence.  The 
circumstances  under  which  the  Will  of  Appetite  is 
frustrated,  are  readily  apprehended,  as  when  inappro- 
priateness  or  when  moral  sentiment  interposes.  These 
will  be  noticed  by  and  bye. 

Desires  have  by  many  philosophers  been  described 
as  something  definite  and  determinate  in  their 
number  and  character  ;  but  this  is  a  mistaken  view. 
There  is  nothing  more  indefinite  than  our  desires,  be- 
cause these  arise  out  of  the  jdiosyncracy  or  disposition 
of  the  individual,  according  to  his  means  and  oppor- 
tunities. Desires,  then,  are  endless  in  their  nature,  as 
circumstances  happen  to  generate  particular  wishes. 
The  sight  of  an  object,  or  even  the  apprehension  of  it 
in  imagination,  may  excite  an  emotion  for  the  gratifica- 
tion, especially  if  there  be  any  natural  proclivity  to- 
wards it.  For  example,  let  a  man  who  is  fond  of  golf, 
chess,  cards,  &c.  have  a  proposal  made  to  him  to  play 
thereat,  the  emotion  which  constitutes  the  will  thereto 
is  at  once  aroused,  if  circumstances  are  otherwise 
favourable  for  the  exercise  ;  and  vice  versa,  there  will 
be  a  repudiation  of  the  proposal,  if  there  be  no  taste 
tendency  or  inclination  for  joining  in  the  game. 


1 


l; 


12S 


Soui  MecJuxyusDi. 


We  see,  then,  what  is  the  source  and  foundation  of 
Will,  in  what  may  be  regarded  as  mere  animalde- 
sires  ;  that  is  of  Will  in  regard  to  which  there  is  the 
natural  excitement  of  the  moment,  that  is  of  Will, 
which  as  a  matter  of  course  would  have  its  impulse 
gratified,  were  there  no  mechanical  or  other  obstacle 
as  a  necessary  interposition  standing  in  the  way.  It 
is  obvious,  that  in  this  case,  sensuous  Will  is  that 
spontaneous  operation  of  the  Me  which  is  created  by 
the  entrance  of  the  causal  idea  as  carnal,  which 
prompts  it  in  the  mind.  It  is  the  mere  phenomenon 
of  law,  as  displayed  by  the  automatic  impulse  arising 
from  the  combination  of  two  distinctive  qualities  ; 
and  it  arises  in  the  Me  as  particularly  conditioned  on 
the  one  hand  by  its  special  consciousness  at  the  time  ; 
and  as  it  is  affected  on  the  other  hand  by  the  particular 
idea  thrust  upon  it. 

(3.) — The  Counteraction  of  Motives. 

So  far  as  we  have  proceeded,  we  have  seen  that 
Will  is  not  only  an  effect,  but  in  what  manner  it  is  an 
effect.  Like  all  other  effects,  /'/  is  the  result  of  at  least 
two  combining  properties  creating  an  emotion,  or  what 
we  ordinarily  call  a  motive  ;  and  we  shall  farther  see 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Will  zvithout  a  motive. 
But  now  we  come  to  see  how  one  emotion  may 
counteract  another  ;  or,  shall  I  say,  how  one  Will  goes 
to  restrain  another,  in  what  we  regard  as  the  mere 
animal  intelligence.  If  we  set  food  before  a  hungry 
dog,  the  impulse  seizes  him  to  lay  hold  of  it,  that  he 
may  have  his  appetite  satisfied  ;  but  if  at  the  same 
moment  we  hold  a  cudgel  over  his  head,  threatening 


The  Restraining  oj  Emotions. 


129 


to  apply  it,  if  he  do  but  touch  the  food,  he  will  be  re- 
strained. The  emotion,  created  by  the  sight  of  the 
stick,  obstructs  and  overcomes  the  emotion  created  by 
the  sight  of  the  food.  The  same  kind  of  motive  power 
may  be  seen  in  man,  as  when  a  thief  is  restrained 
from  stealing,  when  the  eye  of  a  detective  is  upon  him, 
through  whom  he  would  be  visited  with  punishment. 

But  man,  by  means  of  the  wider  range  of  his  appre- 
hension, has  the  prerogative  of  ultroneously  curbing 
his  sensuous  Will,  as  when  their  happens  to  intervene 
the  presence  of  a  restraining  idea  : — a  restraining  idea 
(be  it  observed)  arising  out  of  the  very  presence  and 
operation  of  the  sensuous  Will  in  question.  It  may  be 
asked,  How  does  this  come  about  ?  The  answer  is  by 
observing  the  effect  likely  to  be  produced,  if  the  sen- 
suous Will  be  gratified.  For  example,  there  may  be 
set  before  a  man  food  very  savoury,  and  for  which  he 
has  a  natural  craving,  as  being  very  gratifying  to  the 
taste,  and  therefore  creating  a  desire  to  partake  of  it 
when  presented  ;  but  in  th^  very  circumstances  there 
arises  a  sentiment  that  said  food  is  injurious  to  his 
constitution  ;  and  this  idea  (that  of  the  injury  to  self) 
operates  restraint  upon  the  sensuous  emotions,  just  as 
the  threatened  blow  on  the  dog's  head  operates  to  re- 
strain him  from  the  dish. 


(4.) — The  Foundation   of  Morals  and  the  Law 

of  Morals. 

There  is  a  general  source,  whence  a  restraining  idea 
proceeds  in  order  to  counteract  the  sensuous  Will. 
We  know  that  the  law  of  Morals  is  constantly  at 
work  in  this  sphere  of  action,  and  its  operation  is  seen 


Soul  Mechanism. 


in  the  application  of  incidents  to  others  as  well  as  to 
self.  It  is,  therefore,  of  essential  moment  that  this 
knotty  question  of  morals  should  be  fairly  analyzed, 
and  that  the  source  of  its  operation  should  be  clearly 
and  satisfactorily  traced  and  determined.  Whence 
then  comes,  and  how  comes,  the  restraining  idea  in 
morals  ?  The  answer  is — from  a  Moral  Idea.  But 
what  is  a  Moral  Idea  ?  I  answer  a  moral  idea  is  one 
which  affects  the  well-being  of  a  sentient  creature^ 
that  is  a  creature  susceptible  of  pleasure  or  of  pain. 
Every  animal  having  the  attribute  of  consciousness  is 
capable  of  pleasure  and  of  pain  ;  and  moreover  every 
animal,  as  naturally  endowed  with  its  own  inherent 
constitution,  has  what  may  be  called  its  God-given 
rights,  as  the  attributes  essentially  belonging  to  its 
tribe. 

Now,  the  fundamental  rule  of  moral  laiv  is  to  respect 
those  rights  — the  rights  that  are  the  essential  prero- 
gatives of  the  creature's  very  existence  ;  and  these 
rights  are  to  be  regarded  as  sacred  in  proportion  to  the 
scale  of  elevation  in  which  the  creature  happens  to  be 
placed.  Hence,  there  exists  of  necessity  a  line  of 
moral  gradations.  We  should  say  the  rights  of  no 
creature  are  to  be  unnecessarily  disturbed,  i.e.,  if  there 
be  no  good  motive  or  inducement  thereto.  But  when 
the  requirements  of  the  higher  nature  demand  that 
those  of  the  inferior  creature  shall  be  sacrificed,  if  the 
latter  stand  in  the  way  of  the  former,  it  is  expedient 
therefore  that  the  inferior  creature  must  give  place  for 
the  sake  of  the  superior.  In  the  same  sense,  what 
would  be  regarded  as  maining  and  cutting  of  the 
animal  frame,  a  thing  immoral  in  itself,  must  yet 
in  the  circumstances  be  regarded  as  highly  moral,  if  it 


The  Foundation  of  Morals. 


131 


subserves  the  end  of  removing  worse  ailments.  Ab- 
stractly an  inaniiuate  object  has  in  itself  no  rights. 
Whatever  may  happen  to  be  its  characteristics,  these 
exist  as  mere  property  for  the  use  of  the  animal  crea- 
ture endowed  with  consciousness,  and  more  especially 
for  man,  the  highest  specimen  of  beinghood  upon  the 
earth.  Hence,  one  may  mow  down  grass,  pluck 
flowers,  cut  down  trees,  or  hew  rocks,  to  serve  his 
purpose,  so  far  as  he  happens  to  be  proprietor  of 
these.  There  is  no  infringement  of  moral  law  so 
far  as  the  things  themselves  are  concerned.  But  if 
the  things  interfered  with  belong  to  another  person  we 
cannot  appropriate  them  without  affecting  him,  and 
we  may  not  invade  his  rights.  The  superior  rights  of 
the  general  community  may,  however,  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances demand  this  infringement,  in  as  far  as  a 
community  are  of  more  importance  than  the  indi- 
vidual, and  then  legislative  authority  may  intervene 
for  this  end. 

(5.) — The  Moral  Idea  the  root  of  Moral  Law, 

It  is  observable,  then,  that  the  foundation  of  moral 
law  lies  in  the  maxim,  suum  cuique  tribuito :  allow  to 
every  sentient  creature  its  own  inherent  rights  ;  and 
this  implies  that  we  should  do  injury  to  none  beyond 
what  a  higher  moral  law  demands.  We  are  in  a 
situation  now  to  see  how  and  under  what  circum- 
stances a  moral  idea  comes  in  with  a  restraining 
emotion  to  check  or  to  suppress  a  sensuous  emotion 
which  otherwise  would  become  Will. 

We  have  seen  that  the  introduction  of  an  idea  to 
the  Me  raises  an  emotion  in  the  Me  precisely  corres- 


II 


132 


Soui  Mechanism. 


ponding  to  the  relation  of  that  idea  to  the  Me,  and 
thereby  constituting  what  is  the  foundation  of  specific 
Will.  It  happens  in  these  circumstances,  that  when  a 
sensuous  emotion  for  Will  is  apprehended  or  regarded 
as  a  Volition,  which  must  affect  either  self  or  any 
other  sentient  creature,  then  this  t^ery  apprehension  is 
the  introduction  of  a  moral  idea;  and  there  immediately 
arises  a  moral  emotion,  an  emotion  of  approval  or  dis- 
approval as  regards  the  volition  in  question — an 
emotion  which  restrains  the  sensuous  Will,  if  the 
sensuous  Will  is  regarded  as  a  wrong  done  ;  but  of 
justification,  if  the  deed  is  regarded  as  appropriate  or 
helpful  to  the  creature. 

(6.) — Human   Responsibility. 

We  see,  then,  what  is  the  foundation  of  the  ought 
and  of  the  ought  not.  If  a  wrong  is  done  to  the  rights 
of  another,  or  if  it  is  seen  being  done  to  the  rights 
of  another,  by  fulfilling  a  certain  action,  a  restraining 
emotion  of  ought  not  comes  into  play,  unless  the  de- 
mands of  a  higher  moral  law  come  in  to  over-ride  the 
same.  The  sight  of  a  beautiful  flower  might  induce 
me  to  pluck  it  and  appropriate  it ;  and  if  in  no  man's 
land,  this  might  be  done  without  offence  to  any  ;  but 
if  said  flower  happened  to  be  in  the  garden  of  another 
man,  the  very  fact  of  his  ownership  must  restrain  me 
from  taking  it,  unless  I  have  his  consent  or  authority 
to  do  so.  The  amputation  of  a  limb  would,  in  need- 
less circumstances,  be  a  wrong  on  the  sentient  creature; 
but  if  the  limb  were  diseased,  and  threatened  the  ruin 
of  its  possessor,  the  act  would  be  regarded  as  a  boon 
conferred  upon  him  and  therefore  highly  moral.    What 


An  Abnormal  State. 


133 


then,  we  say  is  this,  that  man,  being  endowed  with 
the  prerogative  of  seeing  the  right,  or  (as  the  case  may 
be)  the  wrong,  of  an  action,  before  the  action  is 
fulfilled,  hath  every  where  in  his  vocabulary  the 
ought  or  the  ought  not  brought  before  him  as  the 
expression  of  the  emotion  aroused.  And  what  I  now 
call  special  attention  to,  is  this,  that  said  emotion 
becomes  properly  the  judgment  of  his  Reason^  and  he 
feels  himself  responsible  as  to  the  action  which  he 
pursues. 

No  doubt  the  confession  of  the  ancient  poet  has  often 
to  be  made  video  meliora  proboque  deterioi^a  sequor. 
But  this  fact  (the  fact  of  an  evil  tendency  in  one's 
heart)  cannot  alter  the  responsibility.  It  must  be 
sufficient  that  a  man  has  before  him  two  ways,  and 
the  power  and  freedom  of  taking  the  one  or  the  other, 
after  he  has  seen  the  consequences  in  either  case ;  for 
then  his  choice  is  that  he  embraces  the  consequences 
of  the  alternative  which  he  adopts.  It  may  be  said 
that  for  the  moment  he  is  blind  to  consequences,  and 
is  influenced  by  an  over-ruling  passion.  All  that  can 
be  said  in  these  circumstances  is  that  he  is  in  an 
abnormal  state.  An  abnormal  state  is  out  of  the 
category  of  reason.  It  is  a  state  of  passion.  Passion 
will  prevail  for  a  time  and  will  blind  a  man,  who  has 
not  learned  to  regulate  his  emotions  in  conformity 
with  moral    law.*     David,  under  the  spell  of   Bath- 

-•'  It  has  been  sjiid  "  A  man  with  a  criminal  nature  and  edu- 
cation under  given  circumstances  of  temptation,  can  no  more 
help  committing  crime,  than  he  could  help  having  a  headache 
under  certain  conditions  of  brain  and  stomach.  Botli  the  crime 
and  tl»e  headaclie  result  from  a  series  of  antecedent  causes, 
culminating   in   their  eti'ects.     The   man  inherits  his  brain  as 


134 


Soul  Mechanism. 


sheba,  became  blind  to  the  rights  of  Uriah.  But  there 
comes  a  time  when  passion  being  ended  or  arrested, 
there  arises  a  sight  and  a  sense  of  the  wrong  done, 
and  the  moral  judgment  pronounces  the  deed  as  evil, 
and  the  man  says,  "  I  have  sinned  against  the  Lord." 
Then  it  is  that  under  an  apprehension  of  the  evil,  a 
discipline  may  be  applied  for  restoration  to  greater 
moral  strength  for  resistance  in  time  to  come,  when  a 
fresh  paroxysm  of  craving  returns. 

(7.) — A  higher  Law  than  that  of  mere  morals 

creates  Religion. 

We  ought  not  to  forget  that  under  the  Christian 
economy  there  comes  into  the  Me  for  operation  a  still 
higher  presentation  than  that  of  any  merely  moral 
idea,  in  that  it  is  received  as  coming  from  God,  an 
authoritative  presentation  which  occasions  the  strong- 
est and  most  powerful  emotion  possible  in  inducing 
the  exercise  of  the  Will,  that  is  beyond  any  and  all 
other  ideas,  and  which  is  therefore  properly  the  highest 
law  of  mind  in  the  circumstances.  If  we  believe  that 
certain  maxims  or  principles  come  from  God.  and  if 
we  regard  God  as  the  highest  and  most  authoritative 
of  all  beings,  and  if  we  believe  our  accountability  to 

much  as  he  inherits  his  estate."  (Cotter  Morison,  p.  289).  This 
is  granted  ;  but  the  two  cases  of  headache  and  crime  are 
certainly  not  analagous.  The  heada«!he  will  arise  from  physical 
conditions,  and  will  not  he  motlified  by  the  presence  of  others  : 
the  crime  can  be  and  is  controlled  and  restrained  in  the  presence 
of  others,  shewing  that  there  is  a  power  of  restraining  the  Will 
in  the  matte)  of  crime.  We  cannot  suspend  a  headache,  but 
villains  can  and  do  suspend  a  crime. 


The  Source  of  Religion  in  the  SouL         135 

God.  it   is   obvious  that   in    this   we   have   the   very 
foundation   of  what    is    strictly   known    as   Religion, 
There  has  been  much  discussion  among  philosophers 
as  to  the  real  source  of  the  religious  principle  in  the 
human  mind.     We  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that 
it  lies  in  a  belief  in  God,— in  the  belief  of  a  certain 
invisible  Power  to  whom    we  are   amenable.     If  we 
could  get  rid  of  all  faith  in  such  a  Being,  this  very  fact 
would  do  away  with  the  religious  feeling.     Religious 
feeling  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  feeling  of  being 
bound  in  responsibility  to  the  demands  of  some  sup- 
posed Supreme  Authority,  under  hope  of  reward  for 
obedience,  or  under  pain  of  punishment  inflicted  by 
him  for  disobedience.     Whatever,  therefore,  happens 
to  be  the  faith  which  we  entertain  respecting  the  God 
whom  we  own  and  acknowledge,  in  precise  conformity 
thereto  will  be  the  religion  which  we  cherish.     With- 
out God,  the  reign  of  moral  law  would  alone  be  that 
which  would  characterize  us,  and  this  under  circum- 
stances in  which  it  would  be  terribly  contravened  by 
carnal  proclivities.      In  a  savage  state  it  is  the  most 
natural  thing  for  man  to  entertain  the  notion  of  an 
unseen  authoritative  Being.     They  see  around  them 
what   they  cannot   but    regard    as   effects,   and    they 
ascribe  the  effects  to  some  great  Cause.     The  sun  and 
the  moon  send  forth  light  and  heat :  they  rise  and  set : 
again,  the  winds  and  waves,  the  clouds  and  showers, 
and  a  hundred  things  besides,  are  regarded  as  effects, 
and    must  have  causes  ;  and  hence  the  natural  con- 
clusion, that  there  must  be  a  Supreme  unseen  Power 
over   the    operations   of   nature :    whatever   demands 
therefore   are    ascribed    as    the  requirement    of   this 
Superior  Power,  have  naturally  the  strongest  efficacy 


II 


i! 


136 


Soul  Mechanism. 


in  creating  an  emotion  influential  above  all  others. 
Hence,  ideas  which  are  believed  to  be  from  God,  are 
held  to  over-rule  every  other  consideration.  Moral 
law  would  tell  us  that  it  is  cruel  to  slaughter  need- 
lessly a  living  creature ;  but  if  the  idea  prevails  that 
this  is  demanded  as  a  sacrifice  to  please  God,  moral 
law  is  made  to  yield  to  the  Divine  Law;  and  this 
because  of  the  tremendous  sanctions  by  which  the 
Divine  behests  are  attended. 

It  may  be  said  that  practically  under  Christianity, 
in  which  the  element  of  Divine  teaching  is  peculiarly 
and  strictly  enforced,  the  lower  and  sensuous  Will  is 
notwithstanding  frequently  the  prevaih'ng  one.  This 
must  be  admitted  :  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  is 
constant  transgression  of  laws  which  are  believed  to 
be  expressly  from  God.  How  is  this  to  be  explained  ? 
No  doubt  chiefly  on  the  ground  of  the  immediate  im- 
perativeness of  the  carnal  law  ;  but  there  is  more,  it  is 
to  be  explained  partly  on  the  ground  of  the  weakness 
of  our  faith,  and  partly  on  the  ground  of  our  belief  in 
an  escape  from  punishment.  If,  for  example,  the 
doctrine  is  implicitly  entertained  that  Jesus  Christ  has 
been  substituted  for  us,  and  hath  suffered  the  punish- 
ment due  for  our  sins,  we  are  fain  to  cling  to  the  prin- 
ciple that  a  righteous  Being  will  not  inflict  punishment 
twice,  that  is  upon  us,  as  well  as  upon  our  Substitute. 
Moreover,  there  is  also  the  less  impulse  to  put  a  check 
upon  our  passions,  if  it  is  taught  that  our  so  doing  is 
not  to  be  reckoned  an  ingredient  of  our  acceptance 
with  God.  It  is  a  matter  of  profound  regret  that  such 
teaching  should  prevail  in  the  church  of  Christ — a 
teaching  whose  tendency  is  to  lead  to  such  laxity  in 
the  discipline  of  our  passions. 


How  can  the   Will  be  Free? 


137 


(8.) The  Freedom  of  the  Will  under  imperative  Laws. 

But  here  comes  in  one  of  the  most  puzzling  problems 
which  any  philosopher  has  had  to  encounter,  and 
which  amid  all  the  varied  resources  of  human  investi- 
gation has  never  yet  been  fairly  grappled  with,  much 
less  solved,  viz.,  the  freedom  of  human  willing,  in  con- 
sistency with  the  undoubted  fact  that  human  willing 
is  itself  a  result  of  antecedent  causation.  It  is  allowed 
that  there  is  not  a  single  example  of  the  exercise  of 
Will,  but  we  can  trace  the  same  to  the  play  of  prelimin- 
ary elements  upon  the  mind,  and  that  therefore  we  can 
always  trace  the  same  as  arising  out  of  this  combina- 
tion of  ideas  operating  on  the  Me.  How  then,  it  is 
asked,  can  the  Will  be  regarded  as  free?*     This  has 


*  It  would  be  an  almost  endless  task  to  quote  the  many 
authors  who  have  insisted  in  the  doctrine  of  necessity  in  regard 
to  the  Will.  I  quote  two  specimens  of  the  argumentation  em- 
ployed. "  It  is  strange  to  see  Wow  some  who  confidently  come 
to  base  their  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  God  on  the  ground 
that  everything  in  nature  must  have  a  cause,  are  content  in 
their  zeal  for  Free  Will  to  speak  of  the  Will  as  if  it  were  self- 
determined  and  had  no  cause.  As  thus  vulgarly  used,  the  term 
Will  has  no  definite  meaning,  and  certainly  is  not  applicable  to 
any  concrete  reality  in  nature,  when  in  the  matter  of  Will,  as  in 
everv  other  matter,  we  perceive  effect  witnessing  to  cause,  and 
varying  according  as  the  cause  varies."  In  this  statement,  Dr. 
Mau<le8ley  is  right.  But  he  goes  on  to  say,  **  It  would  be  vain 
to  pretend  to  throw  any  sure  light  upon  a  subject  which  has 
been  discussed  over  and  over  again,  and  the  opponents  on  each 
side  convinced  that  they  have  gained  the  day.  The  question  is 
one  which  will  not  be  settled  by  controversy,  but  by  the  pro- 
gress of  hun»an  knowledge,  the  time  being  probably  not  far 
distant  when  men  will  wonder  that  so  much  subtle  ingenuity 


V:| 


138 


Soul  Mcchanisw. 


This  has  been,  and  still  is  the  chief  stumblins:  block— 
the  crux  philosophorum.  It  is  allowed,  moreover,  that 
we  have  the  consciousness  of  freedom  ;  but  when  this 
consciousness  comes  to  be  analyzed,  wc  are  told  it 
must  after  all  be  regarded  as  a  delusion.  If  a  delusion, 
it  is  a  most  inexplicable  delusion  ;  for  in  the  first  place, 
every  rational  man,  without  exception,  has  this  con- 
sciousness ;  and  because  he  has  this  consciousness,  he 
feels  his  responsibility  ;  and  explain  it  how  we  may, 
he  feels  that  he  is  not  a  mere  automaton,  that  is,  a 
thing  moved  only  when  a  power  external  to  itself 
pushes  it  on.  A  man  feels  that  he  can  determine  as 
he  pleases,  that  he  can  make  choice  as  he  pleases,  and 
that  he  is  responsible  for  the  choice  he  makes  ;  and 
yet  his  philosophic  friend  tells  him  that  when  he 
makes  his  choice,  and  determines  in  one  way  rather 
than  another,  he  is  prompted  thereto  by  some  impulse 
which  influences  the  Will  to  determine  in  one  direction 
rather  than  in  another.     Is  it  come  to  this,  then,  after 

and  zealous  labour  should  have  been  bestowed  upon  it."  (Physi- 
ology of  Mind,  p.  409). 

"Man  is  a  protluct  of  nature  in  body  and  mind.  Hence, 
not  merely  what  he  is,  but  also  what  he  does,  wills,  feels,  and 
thinks,  depends  u})on  the  same  natural  necessity  ;is  the  whole 
structure  of  the  worhl.  Only  a  superficial  observation  of  human 
existence  could  lead  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  actions  of  nations 
ami  individuals  were  the  result  of  a  perfectly  Free  Will.  Human 
liberty  of  which  all  bojist  (says  Spinosa)  consists  solely  in  this, 
that  a  man  is  conscious  of  his  Will,  and  unconscious  (.f  the  causes 
by  which  it  is  determined."  (Blichner's  Force  and  Matter,  p.  239). 
It  is  one  of  the  most  curious  exemplifications  of  non-observation 
that  it  shoidd  have  escaped  philosophers  that  what  has  been 
called  the  self-determination  of  Will  is  only  a  question  of  Jud^^- 
ment. 


How  Freedom  is  Manifested. 


139 


all,  that  reason  and  logic  must  disallow  the  truth  of 
this  feeling — the  feeling  of  a  conscious  freedom?  It 
may  be  thought  that  after  so  much  vain  warfare,  there 
is  now  no  way  out  of  the  dilemma,  and  that  the  prob- 
lem is  insoluble. 

Let  us  yet  more  closely  examine  this  vexata  questio 
of  Freedom.     It    is  allowed — it   must  be   allowed — 
that  Will  as  such,  in  all  cases  is  an  effect,  and  that  we 
can  point  to  the  cause,  in  that  it  is  brought  about  by 
the  contact  of  an  idea  with  the  Me  ;  out  of  which  con- 
tact arises  an   emotion  or  motive  which  is  the  source 
of  Will.     There  is  no  such  thing  as  Will   without   a 
motive,  and   in   all   cases  a  motive  is  the  impulse  or 
craving  which  arises  from  the  circumstances  in  which 
we  may  happen  to  be  placed.     It   may  be  thought  by 
this  admission   that  we  necessarily  give  up  the   whole 
question,  because  it  is  nothing   less  than  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms  to  say  that  the  Will  cannot  be  free,  and 
at  the  same  time  i\\Q  puppet  of  extraneous  movements. 
The  matter  requires  yet  cXosqy  consideration  in  coming 
to  our  conclusion. 

Taking  such  an  example  as  the  very  common  one 
of  an  impulse  on  the  carnal  side,  and  a  restraining 
impulse  on  the  moral  side,  or  on  the  Christian  side, 
how  does  the  Me  stand  with  respect  to  both  ?  Does 
it  not  properly  become  a  matter  of  Judg^nent,  as  to 
which  of  the  two  is  best  for  the  Me?  In  all  normal 
action  this  is  the  case  ;  and  I  hold  that  it  is  this  very 
consideration  that  creates  the  responsibility.  There 
may  be  a  strong  iinpulse  on  the  carnal  side,  to  give 
way  to  the  craving  ;  but  that  the  Me  is  not  a  mere 
puppet  under  the  craving  is  manifested  by  the  fact 
that,  when  persons  are  present,  before  whom  it  would 


A 


140 


Soul  Mechanistn. 


be  unbecoming  or  improper  to  give  way  to  it,  it  can 
be  resisted  ;  and  that  the  real  situation  of  the  Me  be- 
fore two  or  more  competing  claims  is  first  to  JUDGE 
which  of  the  two  is  most  suitable  and  most  profitable, 
that  is  most  desirable  on   the  whole,  to  be  adopted. 
It  is  not  the  Will  therefore  which  choses, 
when  there  is  an  alternative  before  the  Me,  BUT  THE 
Me  itself  in  the  exercise  of  Judgment,  which 
pronounces,  and    through   this    shows   a    preferential 
attribute  for  the  one   impulse  rather  than  the  other.  I 
do  not  say  that  the  Judgment,  in  weighing  probabili- 
ties, will  always  come  to  a  wise  conclusion.     The  wis- 
dom or  non-wisdom  in  willing  does  not  enter  into  the 
consideration.      What    enters    into   the    consideration 
is,  that  when  there  is  a  competition  of  claims   before 
the  mind,   it  is  the  Me  itself  that  pronounces  on  the 
character  of  the  conclusion,  and  hence  the  responsibi- 
lity of  the  Me  in  favouring  the  conclusion,  which  the 
Me  prefers  ;  and   hence  the  Will   follows.     Let  it  be 
seen  then,  that  in  all  cases  of  self-determination,  the 
Will  operates  through  the  exercise  of  Judgment.     If  we 
prosecute  the   inquiry  respecting  any  case,  in  which 
there  is  an  alternative  course  of  action,  and  if  we  de- 
mand   why    the    determination    of  the    Me,   has    a 
preference  of  the  one  over  the  other,  I  have  to  say 
that  in  all  normal  cases,  this  arises  in  the  exerci.se  of 
Judgment,  which  pronounces  on  what  it  likes  as  most 
desirable  ;  and  this  Judgment  constitutes  the  free  atti- 
tude of  the  Me,  as  to  the  character  of  these  contend- 
ing claims,  and  consequently  this  free  preference  forms 
the  source  of   the  movement  of  the  Will   in  favour  of 
that  claim  for  which  the  decision  is  given.     It  will  be 
seen  therefore,  in  cases  of  what  is  called  self-determi- 


The  Laiv  of  Human  Freedoom. 


141 


nation  that  fudgment  is  the  servitor  of  the  Will  It  is 
that  attitude  of  the  Ego  which  pronounces  on  charac- 
ter, and  which  therefore  induces  a  choice  betwixt  two 
or  more  objects.  Hence,  it  is  the  arbitrament  or  de- 
termination for  which  the  Ego  is  responsible.  It  will 
be  observed,  then,  that  while  Will  in  all  ordinary  cases 
is  the  effect  arising  from  the  emotion  created  under  the 
prevailing  idea  which  enters  the  Me,  in  all  cases  where 
there  has  been  what  is  improperly  termed  the  deter- 
mination of  the  Will,  as  between  two  contending 
claims,  the  element  of  freedom  comes  in,  when,  under 
the  exercise  of  Judgment,  the  Me  gives  a  preference 
for  one  such  rather  than  another.  In  these  circum- 
stances the  exercise  of  Will  is  the  free  volition  of  the 
Me  as  giving  preference  to  one  impulse  rather  than 
another.  This  Will  is  the  decision  of  Judgment,  and 
Judgment  is  an  exercise  of  the  Reason, — that  exercise 
which,  in  a  matter  of  this  sort,  accords  best  with  the 
condition  of  the  Me,  as  most  satisfactory  to  it. 

^9.) —  The  Circumstances  under  which  Freedom  Prevails, 

Have  we  then  untied  this  gordian  knot  of  Free- 
Will  ?  Of  course,  if  there  be  no  alternative  before  the 
mind,  there  can  properly  be  no  exercise  of  Judgment, 
and  therefore  we  cannot  speak  of  freedom,  becau.se  in 
the  circumstances  there  is  no  choice  ;  but  when  there 
is  an  alternative.  Judgment  rightly  or  wrongly  pro- 
nounces in  behalf  of  one  in  preference  to  the  other. 
Here,  then,  I  detect,  and  here  I  proclaim,  the  law  of 
human  freedom  1  Liberty  is  simply  the  power  of  the 
Me  when  confronted  with  two  or  more  ideas  for  adop- 
tion, to  judge  which  is  the  preferable,  and  to  pro- 


142 


Soui  Mechanism. 


nounce  in  favour  of  one  or  other  of  them,  in  order  to 
the  exercise  of  Will.  The  claim  has  been  misappre- 
hended as  that  of  the  Will,  but  i/ie  icill  cannot  choose  : 
Will  is  the  result  of  choice  in  this  case  ;  and  here  it  is 
that  the  endless  confusion,  distraction,  misunderstand- 
ing, and  misrepresentation  have  arisen.  The  free  in- 
tellectual pronouncement  of  the  Me  in  the  exercise  of 
Judgment,  I  repeat,  simply  defines  the  attitude  of  the 
Me  to  the  proffered  objects,  and  this  very  attribute 
connects  the  Me  by  association  with  that  which  is 
[)ronounced  to  be  best,  and  hence  the  operation  of  Will 
is  but  the  self-movement  of  the  Me  to  that  object 
which  Judgment  presents  to  it. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that,  in  all  cases  where  there 
is  presented  two  or  more  ideas  before  the  mind, 
whether  in  the  sensuous  department,  or  in  the  moral 
department,  or  what  may  be  called  the  spiritual  de- 
partment, there  is  a  sense  of  responsibility  because 
there  is  a  feeling  of  freedom.  The  feeling  of  freedom 
may  be  very  different  in  different  circumstances.  We 
are  all  familiar  with  the  case  when  there  may  be  no 
bias  in  the  mind  in  favour  of  one  item  more  than 
another,  and  when  the  Judgment  is  undecided  in  its 
conclusions.  There  may  be  a  number  of  candidates 
for  an  appointment  :  in  that  case  the  Me  has  to  be 
informed  as  to  the  fitness  of  each  ;  and  then  a  pro- 
nouncement of  superior  fitness  being  made  by 
the  Judgment  in  favour  of  one,  the  Me  is  drawn 
to  that  one  ;  and  it  wt7/s  accordingly.  Or  there 
may  be  a  variety  of  patterns  of  paper  set  before 
the  Me  for  choice  to  cover  the  walls  of  a  room  : 
Judgment  in  like  manner  brings  these  to  the  standard 
of  taste  which  happens  to  exist  in  the   mind  ;  and, 


Freedom  in  its  Diverse  Operations.  14-*J 

accordingly,  that  which  comes  nearest  to  this  standard 
is  fixed  upon  :  and  the  Will  operates  accordingly.  In 
morals  the  self  same  process  exists.  An  honest  man 
will  not  rob  his  master,  though  he  may  have  the  op- 
portunity, because  of  the  injury  which  the  robbery 
might  inflict  not  only  on  his  master  but  on  his  own 
self-respect.  He  may  be  in  want  of  the  money  ;  but 
as  one  paying  more  respect  to  the  law  of  morals  than 
to  the  sensuous  craving,  he  pronounces  for  the  oiight- 
not,  and  therefore  the  Me  wills  for  restraint.  Another 
not  so  refined  in  moral  honesty,  may  be  induced  to  take 
the  opportunity  of  appropriating  to  himself  what  is 
not  his  own  ;  but  here,  as  in  the  former  case,  it  is  still 
a  matter  of  judgment,  in  as  far  as  the  man  shuts  out 
the  moral  impulse  as  weak,  and  is  the  slave  of  what 
would  satisfy  the  covetous  nature.  Take  a  case  in 
which  a  man  is  supposed  to  be  taught  his  duty  by 
God.  Joseph  in  the  hour  of  temptation  judged  it  to 
be  wrong  to  yield  to  it,  because  in  direct  contraven- 
tion of  the  command  of  God  ;  David,  on  the  contrary, 
gave  way  to  it.  How  is  this  explained  ?  It  may  be 
explained  that  in  the  latter  case  there  was  very  little 
room  permitted  for  the  exercise  of  Judgment ;  the 
overweaning  power  of  the  passion  blameably  repelling 
the  employment  of  calm  Judgment,  the  strength  and 
imperativeness  of  the  passion  for  the  moment  shutting 
out  all  other  considerations.  But  then,  David  could 
scarcely  be  said  to  have  lost  his  freedom,  in  as  far  as 
there  were  many  conceivable  circumstances  in  which 
he  would  have  restrained  himself.  In  fact,  whatever 
his  bias  or  passion  was,  his  freedom  lay  in  pleasing 
himself  See  how  Annanias  was  found  fault  with 
in   the   conduct   which   he   practiced   in    the  selling 


i 


144 


Sou/  Mechanism. 


of  his  land.  His  desire  was  great  to  stand  well  with 
the  church,  as  one  giving  up  all,  and  thus  to  gain 
credit  for  his  sell-devotion  in  giving  up  his  all  for  the 
common  good  ;  at  the  same  time  he  had  personally 
and  privately  another  and  equally  strong  desire,  viz., 
to  be  the  possessor  of  means  apart  from  his  share  in 
the  common  stock.  How  was  he  to  gratify  both  pro- 
pensities ?  It  could  only  be  by  preferring  to  utter  false- 
hood. We  have  heard  of  a  banker  who  gave  largely  of 
his  means  to  christian  charities,  and  to  the  schemes  of 
the  church,  for  the  piopagation  of  the  gospel,  and  who 
at  the  same  time  was  guilty  of  forgery  and  doing  other 
deeds  of  villany.  His  freedom  of  Will  lay  in  the  fact 
that  this  species  of  character  pleased  him — that  it 
pleased  him  to  gratify  two  inconsistent  propensities 
which  could  only  be  done  by  playing  false  to  the  one 
or  to  the  other.  Hence,  where  the  impression  of  the 
moral  law  or  of  the  Divine  requirement  is  weak,  and 
the  sensuous  desire  is  strong,  judgment  is  perverted, 
and  the  man  being  carried  away  by  the  imperative 
character  of  the  desire,  the  Will  in  these  circumstances 
acts  freely  accordingly.  It  cannot  be  said  that  a  man 
hath  in  such  a  case  lost  his  freedom,  because  it  is  cer- 
tain that  had  the  facts  been  known  to  his  fellow-crea- 
tures, he  would  in  that  case  have  restrained  himself 
from  practising  deceit,  because  of  the  disgrace  thereby 
accruing  to  himself  A  man  may  choose  to  be  false  in 
order  to  commend  himself  to  another. 


CHAPTER    III. 


CONCLUDING    OBSERVATIONS. 


1'T  has  occurred  to  me  while  presently  residing  at  a 
-^  rural  resort  for  the  sake  of  bracing  the  bodily 
constitution  somewhat,  that  some  general  observations 
— not  for  anticipating  any  difficulties  which  may  be 
entertained,  or  for  obviating  objections  which  may 
likely  be  expressed  on  some  of  the  intricate  questions 
which  have  been  more  or  less  brought  under  review  in 
the  preceding  pages,  but  at  all  events  for  concentrating 
the  scheme  of  thought  which  has  been  propounded, 
and  for  bringing  into  clearer  relief  their  harmony  and 
scientific  character.  As  to  objections  that  may  pre- 
sent themselves  to  my  readers,  it  is  perhaps  impos- 
sible here  to  forestall  them,  and  I  can  only  promise 
that,  if  this  volume  is  honoured  to  be  promoted  to  a 
second  edition,  I  shall  do  my  best  to  obviate  such 
difficulties  as  may  be  fairly  propounded,  and  in  the 
spirit  of  one  who  seeks  for  truth,  and  cares  only  for 
the  attainment  of  truth. 

I  may  state  that  where  I  am  now  placed,  I  stand 
under  one  great  disadvantage,  that  of  being  without 
books,  and  at  a  distance  specially  from  such  books  as 
would  be  servicable  to  me ;  and  hence  I  cannot  quote 
the  words  of  authors,  nor  pretend  to  give  their  argu- 
ments. I  have,  however,  some  knowledge  of  the 
current  of  thought  which  has  prevailed  in  discussing 


146 


Concludins:  Obsen^ations, 


the  problem  in  question,  and  if  I  refer  to  any,  these 
can  be  authenticated. 

Let  me  here  say  that,  while  I  regard  the  externals 
of  the  world  with  which  are  surrounded,  as  </>aivo/x€va, 
I  regard  them  also  as  owia,  as  therefore  realities  of 
which  we  have  to  give  an  account,  of  which  it  behoves 
us  to  say  how  they  have  come  to  pass.     Every  phe- 
nomenon is  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  effect ;  and  hence 
I  say  that  all  phenomena  lie  in  the  category  of  Caus- 
ality.     Then,  on  coming  to  the  category  of  Causality, 
we  have  to  ascertain  in  what  it  consists.     And  to  this 
we  answer — in  these  two.  Condition  and  Relativity.  But 
what  is  Condition  and  what  is  Relativity?  I  answer  Con- 
dition is  the  particular  modification  ivhich  may  be  imposed 
upon  Quality  or  of  ivhich  Quality  is  susceptible  \?iX\d  Rela- 
tivity has  respect  to  the  particular  relation  in  ivhich  a 
combination  of  conditions  may  be  made  to  stand  to  one 
another.     It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  association  of  con- 
ditioned objects  must  be  in  such  conjunction  or  con- 
tiguity, as   to  be  brought  within  the  sphere  of  each 
other's  influence.     Then,  and   only   then,   it   is   that 
Causality  operates — operates  in  virtue  of  the  Affinity 
that  exists  among  the  conditions  concerned.    Affinity, 
therefore,  is  shewn  and  expressed,  when  separate  con- 
ditions are  brought  within  the  range  of  each  other's 
influence.     It  is  to  be  noted  that  each  variety  of  con- 
dition changes  the  character  of  the  affinity  which  an 
object  would  otherwise  present  to  the  adjacent  objects, 
and  it  will  affect  also  the  affinity  whereby  the  mole- 
cules of  any  one  object  cleave  to  one  another,  making 
it  what  we  call  a  solid,  or  a  liquid,  or  a  gas.     It  is 
found  as  a  rule,  that  the  application  of  heat  relaxes  the 
attraction  which  the   atoms  have  to  cohere;  and  in 


The  Characteristics  of  Substance, 


147 


some  cases  it  creates  a  very  strong  repulsion,  which 
becomes  sudden  and  violent,  as  when  a  lighted  match 
is  applied  to  gunpowder. 

We  come,  then,  in  the  process  of  our  inquiry,  to  ask 
what  is  Quality  as  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  sub- 
stance, and  our  reply  is — Quality  is  that  characteristic 
of  substance  which  constitutes  the  very  basis  of  sub- 
stance, which  is  inseparable  from  substance,  and  with- 
out which  there  cannot  be  substance;  and  it  exists 
essentially  and  primordially  in  substance  in  conglom- 
erate union  as  one  comprehensive  and  absolute  totality, 
out  of  which  all  particulars  of  Quality  are  derived. 
Substance  is  known  as  such,  by  reason  of  the  inherent 
attribute  of  Quality  ;  and  we  say  that  specific  sub- 
stances are  different  from  one  another  according  as 
their  Qualities  are  particularized.  We  are  acquainted 
with  a  good  many  different  Qualities  of  substance — 
Qualities  which  are  essentially  different  from  one 
another ;  and  yet  these  Qualities  have  not  only  an 
affinity  for  one  another,  in  that  they  enter  into  re- 
lationship with  one  another,  according  to  certain 
definite  and  fixed  laws,  but  exchange  conditions  with 
one  another  as  we  see  in  the  conversion  of  the  sap  of 
the  soil  into  the  protoplasm  of  the  plant,  whatever 
may  happen  to  be  the  characteristics  of  the  plant. 
Hence,  we  are  compelled  to  infer  that  there  is  and 
must  be  a  unity,  under  which  they  all  stand  connected 
as  one.  As  condition  is  lost  in  quality,  as  being  the 
accident  of  quality,  so  we  say — all  qualities  are  lost  in 
one  generic  quality  which  comprehends  them  all  as 
the  colours  of  the  rainbow  are  lost  in  generic  light. 

There  is,  then,  a  primordial  substance  from  which 
all  others  are  derived.     Of  this  substance  we  have 


f ! 


148 


Concluding  Ohsennitions. 


come   to   have  practical  experience  in  the  Ether,  of 
whose  presence  and  services  we  are  made  cognisant 
from  a  variety  of  considerations,  but  especially  from 
an    inquiry    into  the  phenomena  of  light.       On  this 
point  I  must  refer  to  the  valuable  observations  of  Pro- 
fessor Stokes,  given  in  Appendix  I.     I  have  noticed 
also  that  it  has  an  inherent  Dynamic  as  well  as  Qualita- 
tive attribute,  and  that  as  particulars  of  Condition  are 
changed,  so  correspondingly  particulars  of  Energy  are 
changed.    Energy  when  particularized  becomes  Force. 
We  therefore  come  to  know  what  is  the  very  founda- 
tion of  Force.     As  I  have  said  that  every  change  of 
Condition    creates    a   change  of  Affinity,  and    every 
change   of  Affinity  is   Force  ;  and  Forces  are  of  all 
kinds  from  the  extremes  of  attraction  to  the  extremes 
of  repulsion.    We  find  that  there  is  a  law  of  contiguity 
among    separate    objects,    so   that    these   affect   one 
another  in  consequence,  and  that  the  connecting  link 
between  them  is  Ether,  which  hereby  joins  the  affini- 
ties  and   brings  out  their  operation.      And  however 
many  and  however  diverse  be  the  conditions  involved 
(and  they  must  in  numberless  instances  be  operating 
in  all  possible  directions)  Ether  as  the  inexhaustible 
spirit-servitor  fulfils  all  requirements,  without  collision 
and  without  confusion. 

liut  while  Quality  and  Energy  are  the  inherent  and 
inseparable  attributes  of  substance,  in  its  primordial 
and  essential  being,  as  natively  existing  in  a  generic 
state,  and  therefore  without  the  demonstration  of  any 
particulars,  and  in  this  state  it  behoves  that  all  particu- 
lars being  held  in  perfect  balance  in  pure  Ether,  there 
should  not  be  in  these  circumstances  aught  that  should 
disturb  the  energy— aught  that  should  carry  it  to  display 


M odifications  of  Affinity. 


149 


force  one  way  or  another.  We  have  come  to  be  practic- 
ally acquainted  with  such  a  substance,  and  this  in  its 
primitive  and  self-existing  nature,  in  that  all  things  arc 
found  to  live  and  move  and  have  their  functions  there- 
in— in  that  it  has  a  sympathy  with  every  particular  of 
existing  matter,  and  gives  efficacy,  i.e.,  force  there- 
unto. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  what  are  called  the  primary 
elements  of  matter  have  their  origin  in  primitive  sub- 
stance, and  therefore  that  they  have  a  natural  affinity 
for  one  another,  as  being  every  one  of  them  the  off- 
spring of  the  same  mother-substance ;  and  hence 
that  they  have  a  definite  and  fixed  relationship,  in 
which  they  come  to  be  chemically  combined,  when 
placed  in  a  natural  attitude  to  one  another,  while,  of 
course,  there  will  be  more  or  less  a  repulsion  from  one 
another,  in  circumstances  under  which  they  cannot 
combine  ;  and  further,  that  in  circumstances  where 
the  particles  of  matter  are  combined  into  one  solid 
consistency,  and  then  have  their  condition  altered, 
there  are  cases  in  which  their  affinity  is  so  changed 
hereby,  that  they  suddenly  fly  asunder  with  an  explo- 
sion. As  regards  the  material  state  of  quantities 
primarily  etherial,  we  may  say  that  atoms  arise  from 
the  fact  that  qualities  created  in  the  etherial  medium 
have  by  the  application  of  some  mysterious  influence 
which  we  may  call  temperature,  have  become  thick- 
ened into  grossness,  and  hence  are  divisible  into  the 
minutest  parts.  It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  sensible 
qualities  of  matter,  which  show  themselves  more  im- 
mediately to  the  external  senses,  such  as  hardness, 
colour,  odour,  savour,  and  sound,  though  not  directly 
manifested  to  us  in  the  spirit-world,  yet  may  in  some 


150 


Concluding  Observations. 


i 


sense  exist  therein.  That  there  are  forms  in  the  spirit- 
world,  and  variously  endowed  with  different  qualities, 
is  not  to  be  questioned  ;  and  that  living  beings  in  the 
spirit-world  are  able  to  communicate  with  one  another 
under  circumstances,  if  not  wholly  analogous  to  those 
which  are  familiar  to  ourselves,  yet  certainly  by  the 
aid  of  the  universal  ether,  as  in  our  own  case,  is  not  to 
be  doubted  ;  but  only  in  a  manner  much  more  refined 
than  pertains  to  the  material  world. 

What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  spirit-world,  which 
we  hold  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  material  world  ? 
Therein,  we  say.  Forms  which  are  made  determinate 
bodies  (if  we  may  here  use  that  term)  live  and  move 
and  have  their  being  in  the  fathomless  ocean  of  spirit- 
substance    which    abounds    everlastingly    and    end- 
lessly,  as    the    link    of    conditions    which    are    the 
mainspring     of     individual     activity.        Hence     we 
say,  all  matter  has  its   foundation  in  the  economy 
of  spirit ;  and    matter   itself  is   to   be   regarded   as 
an  economy  of  grosser  forms  adapted    for  the  pro- 
pagation of  a  race  having  grosser  forms  ;  but  in  the 
case  of  man,  who  is  so  united  with  the  spirit-form  called 
soul,  which  is  itself  generated  in  ether  by  means  of 
the  pre-existing  bodily  form,  the  bodily  form  being 
accompanied    by   its    attendant    spirit   form,    shews 
the  fact  of  a  harmonious  intercourse  between   them, 
and   explains   what   has   hitherto   been    regarded   as 
the  mystery  of  mysteries,  the  mutual  interchange  of 
influences,  and  the  mutual  action  of  the  one  upon  the 
other.  We  know,  indeed,  that  this  action  is  constantly 
interchanged   in  the  purely  objective  economy,  and 
is  illustrated  in  all  the  forces  of  nature,  such  as  Gravi- 
tation, Light,  Heat,  Electricity,  and  Magnetism  ;  and 


M 


The  Formation  of  an  Intelligent  Me,         151 

in  the  mind  of  the  animal-creature  it  is  made  to  play  a 
new  and  remarkable  office. 

It  is  here  that  this  same  medium,  when  made  repre- 
sentative of  the  bodily  Me,  is  enabled  to  give  forth  its 
highest  and  noblest  prerogative,  viz.,  consciousness, 
and  hence  the  foundation-consciousness  of  every  animal- 
creature  in  all  cases  is  the  consciousness  of  its  body, 
that  is  the  consciousness  of  self,  that  is  self-conscious- 
ness ;  and  to  this  comes  to  be  added  other  forms  of 
consciousness,  according  to  the  number  of  inlets  which 
are  supplied  for  this  purpose— inlets  not  only  from  the 
external  world  whereby  information  of  external  objects 
is  communicated,  but  inlets  also  from  the  storehouse 
of  impressions  that  are  lodged  in  the  cortical  substance 
of  the  brain,  and  which  are  separated  by  a  process 
of  analysis  into  parts,  when  there  is  abstraction  of 
parts,  with  synthesis  into  new  forms  ;  while  also  the 
operations  of  Reason  and  of  Reasoning  are  variously 
performed.  And  hereby  a  spirit-ego  or  personality  is 
formed  varying  according -to  the  furniture  with  which 
it  is  equipped  in  the  exercise  of  experience. 

In  this  process  of  furnishing  an  intelligent  Me,  we 
are  made  acquainted  with  the  various  methods  of  ful- 
filling the  higher  ends  of  being.  We  see  under  what 
circumstances  the  various  faculties  of  the  mind  come 
to  be  exercised,  and  how  we  are  enabled  to  employ 
them.  There  has  been  much  said  and  written  on  the 
inherent  powers  of  mind  in  engaging  by  itself  the  great 
powers  of  Reason,  and  of  the  self-possession  by  itself 
of  the  ideas  of  Time  and  Space,  of  Moral  Feelings,  of 
Causality,  and  such  like.  If  our  exposition  of  the  Ego 
and  of  its  origin  is  sound,  this  cannot  be  ;  but  as  cer- 
tain portions  of  our  mental  states  arc  unmistakeably 


M' 


ill 


III 


162 


Concluding  Observations. 


traceable  to  the  instrumentality  which  is  furnished  by 
the  material  apparatus,  so  we  are  prepared  to  show 
that  all,  even  the  most  complex  of  the  loftier  powers 
of  mind,  are  due  to  this  source,  whether  it  be  Me- 
mory or  Imagination,  Conception  in  framing  means 
for  the  fulfilment  of  a  purpose,  or  Reasoning  in  draw- 
ing conclusions  from  premisses  ;  or  whether  it  be  the 
Intuition  of  moral  obligation  or  the  Apprehension  of 
the  relations  which  indicate  Time  and  Space,  we  can 
clearly  show  the  entire  dependence  of  the  mind 
throughout  on  the  wonderful  organization  that  is  pro- 
vided for  these  ends.  And  if  this  should  happen  to  be 
questioned,  we  are  prepared  to  point  out  under  what 
processes  the  operations  are  accomplished. 

Nor  is  it  in  the  field  of  mere  Intelligence  only, 
that  the  organization  with  which  we  are  supplied  by 
our  cerebral  apparatus  fulfils  the  accomplishing  of  the 
great  offices  of  the  mind,  but  in  the  exercise  of  Will, 
whether  in  the  origination  of  Will,  in  the  suspension 
of  Will,  or  in  any  modifications  of  Will  ;  in  short,  in 
the  entire  management  of  Will,  organization  fulfils  its 
indispensable  part  ;  and  without  this,  we  can  honestly 
feel  and  bodily  avow  that  we  are  endowed  with  the 
great  prerogative  of  exercising  full  freedom  as  to  the 
forth-putting  or  the  non-forth-putting  of  Will  in  any 
set  of  circumstances  ;  the  fact  being  that,  while  Will 
in  all  cases  must  be  regarded  as  an  effect,  the  Ego  in 
the  exercise  of  its  Judgment  as  to  the  propriety  or 
utility,  or  advantage  of  its  immediate  volition,  finds 
itself  drawn  for  the  exercise  or  non-exercise  of  its 
function :  the  idea  that  is  interposed  at  the  last,  con- 
stituting the  final  arbiter  in  the  emotion  which  has  to 
be  fulfilled. 


\4i 


Cause  and  Effect  matter  of  Experience.      153 

It  is  obvious  that,  constituted  as  man  is  in  relation 
to  the  world  outside  of  him,  he  is  enabled  to  exercise 
all  the  powers  of  Mind  and  of  Will,  which  we  have 
ascribed  to  him  ;  and  among  the  special  ideas  which 
arise  in  his  mind  is  that  of  a  great  First  Cause.     He 
cannot  get  rid  of  this  conclusion  under  the  principles 
we  have  adopted.  It  arises  from  the  very  circumstance 
that  when  he  sees  an  effect,  it  forcibly  occurs  to  him 
that  there  must  be  a  Cause.     His  whole  experience 
connects  the  two.     Yes  !  in  all  the  departments  of  life, 
and  from   his  early  days  in  which  cause  and  effect  are 
constantly  illustrated  before  his  eyes.    When,  therefore, 
he  looks  on  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  and  sees  them 
as  effects,  he  is  bound  to  infer  that  they  have  a  Cause. 
He  may  not  be  able  to  point  out  the  immediate  as 
apart  from  the  remote  cause.     But  it  comes  to  this, 
that  there  must  be  a  primary  Cause  in  the  first  intro- 
duction of  the  foundations  of  the  world.     What  then 
can  we  say  as  to  the  first  and  independent  Cause,  the 
Framer  of  all  things,  the  Source  of  all  limited  being- 
hood  as  found  in  our  world  ? 

This  question  has  been  a  perfect  puzzle  to  inquirers. 
Inquirers  have  reached  what  they  have  called  the 
"  Unconditioned,"  and  there  they  have  been  launched  in 
a  mare  infinitum,  without  a  margin  or  shore  whereat 
to  touch  ;  in  plain  terms  there  is  no  peg  to  hang  any- 
thing upon,  and  indeed  without  a  single  relic  to  set  up.* 

*  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton  tells  us  that  "the  unconditioned  is 
incognizable  and  unconceivable,  its  notion  being  only  negative 
of  the  conditioned,  which  last  can  alone  be  positively  known  or 
conceived."  (Discussions,  p.  12).  His  unconditioned  was  tanta- 
mount to  annihilation,  in  as  far  his  unconditioned  was  the  abro- 
gation of  all  quality. 


'vy 


154 


Concluding  Obsen'aiions. 


u  ■ 


^1 


Others  have  taken  refuge  in  the  eternity  of  matter,  and 
have  supposed  a  universe  of  atoms  or  monads,  as  the 
centres  of  power,  and  have  awkwardly  enough  sup- 
posed a  structured  universe  spontaneously  coming  out 
of  these  *    Forgetful  of  the  great  doctrine  of  Causality, 

♦  Priestly,  Hartley,  and  Hobbes  contended  for  an  absolute 
materialism  with  more  or  less  modifications.  Blichner  «<ay8 — 
"  The  immortality  of  matter  is  now  a  fact  scientifically  estab- 
lished and  can  no  longer  be  denied."  (Force  and  Matter,  p.  13). 
Dr.  Maudrtley  says — "  We  find  it  a  hard  matter  to  declar*?  at 
what  |>oint  tlie  brain  loses  all  its  inherent  properties  as  livinj^' 
structure,  an«l  becomes  the  passive  instrument  of  an  immaterial 
entity.  Those  who  repudiate  such  materialism  niuy  comfort 
theniselves  by  conceiving  a  fine  matter  of  extreme  subtlety  an<l 
tenuity — a  sort  of  immaterial  matter — whether  they  spiritualize 
matter  in  this  way,  or  materialize  mind,  is  a  (piestion  of  words, 
not  of  facts."  (Physiology  of  Mind,  p.  128).  This  gentleman 
ouMit  to  have  recognized  that  matter  is  not  simply  a  question  of 
tenuity,  seeing  one  characteristic  of  spirit-substance  is  its  in- 
definite capacity  of  involution.  Mr.  Picton  says—"  If  by  sub- 
stance we  mean  that  which  is,  and  must  be,  then  we  know  that 
life  is  ;  but  we  do  not  know  anything  else.  And  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  physical  world  are  at  least  conceivably  explicable  on  the 
hypothesis  of  ultimate  centres  of  energy,  which  centres  may,  for 
au^dit  we  know,  be  to  our  consciousness  the  elementary  phen- 
omenal definition  of  a  Universal  Spiritual  Power.  Life  we  know ; 
Force  we  feel ;  nothing  more."  (The  Mystery  of  Matter,  p.  54). 
Mr.  Barrat  says — "The  difficulty  which  at  present  is  felt,  is 
how  consistently  with  reason  ami  fact,  to  conceive  the  ultimate 
relation  of  these  few  existences,  Matter,  Force,  Energy,  and 
Motion.  Some  conclusions  in  respect  of  them  are  pretty  clear. 
For  instance.  Matter  is  a  system  of  centres  of  force — force  is 
known  oidy  as  a  function  of  Motion.  Energy  is  measured  by 
the  motions  or  the  condition  of  the  motions  of  masses;  and  mass 
depenils  only  on  the  number  of  gravitating  atoms  or  ftnce 
centres;  and  finally,  motion  is  of  atoms  and  the  aggregates  of 
atoms,  that  is  again  of  centres  of  forCe."  (Physical  Metempiric, 


K4 


Mystery  in  Present-Day  Science.  155 

as  invariably  and  irresistibly  fulfilling  an  effect  pre- 
cisely in  accordance  with  the  Causal  ingredients  and 
relationship  into  which  they  have  entered  into  com- 
bination in  producing  an  effect ;  forgetful  also  of  the 
equally  imperative  doctrine  that  in  initio  before  Caus- 
ality  can    fulfil    its   end    in    symmetrical    order    and 
harmony,  there  must  needs  be  a  designing  and  order- 
ing   mind,  not  only  in   devising  and  preparing  con- 
ditions, but  in  adjusting  one  condition  to  another  in 
the  fulfilment  of  an  end,  they  have  begged  the  doctrine 
of  an  absolute  Evolution  as  the  law  of  mere  existence, 
in  accounting  not  only  for  the  progress  of  phenomena 
but  for    the  primary   initiation   of  bcinghood    as  we 
now  have  it.     What  we  say  is,  that  it  becomes  men 
endowed  with  lofty  reason — reason  based  on  great  ex- 
periences, not  to  build  up  theories  which  have  in  them 
no  naturalness — theories  which  are  unsupported  by  any 
analogies — theories  which  are  not  only  adverse  to  all 
experience,  but  to  all  that  we  can  imagine  as  proba- 
bilities— theories  which  subvert  our  common  under- 
standings as  to  what  is  probable  or  possible.     If  there 
were   nothing    in  eternity  but   atoms — a  universe  of 
atoms,   call    them    monads  or   any  other    name,   the 
query   is,    How    came   they   to   be    constituted    into 
structures?    No  man  can  tell.    All  inquirers  with  such 
data   only,  are   left   in  the   depths  of  utter  mystery. 
And  if  they  establish  a  foundation  of  structure  whether 
a  jelly  fish  or  anything  else  simpler,  and  say  that  there 
has  been  descent  therefrom  by  a  process  of  evolution, 
the  mystery  is  not  in  the  least  degree  removed,  but  if 

p.  C!)).     I  trust  there   has  been   already  shewn  herein  a  more 
excellent  way. 


\      i 


hi 


W 


i" 


150 


Concluding  Observations. 


possible,  deepened,  in  as  far  as  no  answer  can  be  given 
to  the  question — Whence  came  the  jelly  fish,  or  the 
amoeba,  or  whatever  the  given  foundation  is ;  or  whence 
arose  the  multiplication  of  new  forms  and  new  qualities 
in  such  exceeding  great  complexity,  and  yet  no  less  in 
beautiful  arrangement  and  harmony  of  parts.  Talk  of 
natural  selection  !  This  only  confounds  the  problem. 
Whence  came  the  material  to  be  selected  ;  and,  grant- 
ing that  there  were  sets  of  independent  materials, 
whence  came  the  very  wonderful  concatenation  of 
elements.  To  us  it  seems  not  only  a  miracle  of  opera- 
tion, for  which  natural  law  has  no  answer,  to  assemble 
a  series  of  separate  and  independent  ingredients  to 
compose  beautiful  and  refined  structures  without  an 
adjusting  hand,  guided  by  a  purposing  Intelligence  a 
conclusion  of  which  nature  (if  we  examine  it  fairly)  gives 
no  experience.  It  is  said  that  millions  upon  millions  of 
years  were  required  for  this.  We  only  darken  counsel 
by  taking  refuge  in  the  category  of  Time.  It  is  de- 
monstrable in  the  doctrine  of  chances,  that  a  universal 
harmony  could  never  have  been  achieved  under  such 
circumstances.  As  well  might  we  believe  that  any 
number  of  letters,  if  allowed  to  float  in  the  great  void, 
would  in  time  adjust  themselves  into  a  beautiful  poem 
We  believe  in  the  doct .  'ne  of  evolution  ;  but  not  in  an 
evolution  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  law  of  natural 
generation,  and  involves  in  it  nothing  less  than  an  in- 
telligent creating  hand  ;  for  assuredly  if  there  is  found 
one  distinct  and  definite  species,  and  another  separate 
and  definite  species  which  contains  properties  and 
forms  for  which  there  was  no  natural  pathway  by 
natural  propagation,  which  no  natural  causality  could 
have    introduced,   and    which,   therefore,   could   have 


An  Intelligent  First  Cause. 


157 


made  its  appearance  only  through  the  interposition  of 
an  intelligent  arm,  we  are  constrained  in  these  circum- 
stances to  have  resource  to  an  all-intelligent  Author. 
Every  thing  betokens  this,  if  we  would  be  fair  to  our 
reason,  to  our  own  experience,  and  to  the  conclusions 
which  we  are  accustomed  to  draw  in  analagous  exem- 
plification. 

We  are  constrained,  then,  to  infer  the  operation  of 
an  Intelligent  Reason,  in  tracing  the  beginnings  of 
things  to  a  Universal  First  Cause,  while  in  the  con- 
tinuity of  things  created,  we  are  equally  constrained 
to  see  that  there  is  a  law  of  propagation — of  like  pro- 
ducing like,  with  varieties  according  to  the  external 
influences  that  happen  to  have  been  introduced  into 
the  Causal  operation.  And  if  we  could  but  discern 
what  these  influences  precisely  are,  we  should  then  be 
in  a  position  to  foreshow  and  to  detail  the  evolutionary 
changes  occasioned  thereby.  We  should,  in  these  cir- 
cumstances, be  qualified  to  observe  not  only  the  wide 
distinction  betwixt  creation  and  propagation,  but  to 
find  that  it  is  only  in  the  latter  category  that  there  can 
be  evolution  ;  and  further,  that  there  can  be  no  evolu- 
tion till  creation  has  laid  the  basis  of  develop- 
ments in  the  processes  of  propagation.  Assuredly 
there  is  no  consistent  ground  for  the  primary  initiation 
of  evolution  apart  from  creation. 

Here  we  have  to  tackle  a  very  difficult  problem. 
We  have  already  had  before  us  the  universal  ground 
of  Existence  in  what  I  have  styled  the  absolute  Im- 
personality, out  of  which  all  particular  substances 
have  been  derived,  and  I  have  also,  in  connection 
therewith,  spoken  of  the  absolute  Personality  as  the 
intelligent   Deviser  and  wise  Architect  by  whom  they 


158 


Concluding   Obsen'ations. 


have  been  conceived  and  framed  ;  and  here  the  ques- 
tion is  raised — What  do  we  say  about  the  personality 
of  Deity  ?  We  hear  of  "  the  form  of  God."  And  the 
very  name  and  nature  of  "  form  "  involves  limitation  ; 
nay  more,  the  very  conditions  of  thought  itself  involves 
limitation,  in  as  far  as  there  is  the  distinction  of  one 
thought  from  another,  and  the  thought  of  any  definite 
object  is  limitation  ;  and  in  the  Divine  Personality 
there  must  be  what  we  call  a  definite  constitution. 
How  otherwise  could  definite  objects  be  inaugurated  ? 
We  must,  therefore,  imagine  to  ourselves  a  definite 
Personality  as  characteristic  of  Deity. 

Now,  if  we  apprehend  in  God  a  definite  Personality, 
as  we  are  bound  to  do,  how  are  we  to  suppose  this 
Personality  as  equally  absolute  with  the  infinite  Im- 
personality ?  We  are  assisted  somewhat  in  this  in- 
quiry by  asking — how  is  it  that  inferior  personality  is 
displayed  in  the  great  spirit-medium  by  which  all 
worlds  and  all  objects  are  enveloped,  or  in  which  they 
are  contained  ?  We  find  that  Form  is  equally  dis- 
played over  the  whole  arena  or  range  in  which  the 
radiation  of  the  object  extends.  It  is  ascertained,  as 
has  been  frequently  noticed,  that  individual  forms 
while  extending  according  to  their  mass,  show 
diminished  form  according  to  the  inverse  square 
of  the  distance.  What  then  ?  Why,  here  is  this 
very  remarkable  fact,  that  every  portion  of  the  sphere 
to  which  the  radiation  extends,  is  filled  with  that 
form.  This  is  proved  by  a  simple  experiment.  Set 
up  a  mirror,  say  three  feet,  as  a  radius  from  the  object; 
the  object  is  depicted  thereon  all  throughout  in  every 
direction  in  a  circle.  Carry  back  the  mirror  three  feet 
or  six  feet,  or  any  number  of  feet,  and  the  radiation  of 


On  the  Form  of  God. 


159 


IM 


the  form  is  still  in  every  part  complete  all  round,  but 
proportionally  reduced.  What  lesson  does  this  teach 
us  in  regard  to  the  Divine  form  as  displayed  in  the 
etherial  medium — a  medium  which  I  have  ventured  to 
name  Pneum,  in  order  to  point  to  it  as  indicative  of  a 
peculiar  spirit-nature.  Form,  as  manifested  in  the 
material  world  is  a  distinct  and  definitely  localized 
filament  or  configuration  ;  but  so  far  as  it  is  manifested 
in  the  spirit-medium,  it  is  not  so  treated  and  localized, 
but  pervades  the  area  to  which  it  belongs  ;  and  this 
at  every  point.  It  has  margin  throughout.  It  is  diffi- 
cult for  us  to  realise  how  this  should  be  ;  and  it  helps 
to  open  our  understandings  as  to  the  extraordinary 
nature  of  spirit-substance  in  its  exhaustless  power  of 
representation.  What  can  we  say  then  as  to  the  re- 
presentation of  the  Form  of  God  ?  We  must  of 
necessity  believe  tha  there  is  some  Form  attached  to 
the  Personality  of  God  ;  but  we  can  predicate  nothing 
whatever  respecting  the  character  of  that  form,  nor 
can  we  with  any  propriety  ^ssign  absolute  boundaries 
to  that  form  ;  or  rather,  if  we  cannot  think  of  form 
without  boundaries,  it  is  not  easy  to  say  where  or  how 
the  boundary  begins  or  ends.  W^e  are  taught  by  the 
limitless  extension  of  creation,  that  the  expansion  of 
the  Divine  Works  do  not  admit  of  contraction,  as  if 
saying — "  Thus  far  and  no  farther  shall  creation  be 
displayed."  Whatever  then  we  may  think  about  the 
Form  of  God,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  no  extension 
reached  by  the  arm  of  the  Most  High,  but  it  may  be 
advanced  still  farther,  and  that  there  is  no  part  of  the 
vast  compass  of  nature  but  He  can  interpose  therein. 

And  here  we  have  one  or  two  questions  which  have 
been  regarded  as  puzzling  enigmas  which  it  behoves 


A 


160 


Concluding  Observations. 


us  to  take  into  consideration.  One  is  the  grounds  of 
causality  and  of  varied  productiveness  in  Deity  in  the 
creation  of  the  world  ;  and  another  is  to  show  that 
such  manifestations  as  Space  and  Time  have  of  ne- 
cessity had  their  validity  as  integrants  in  the  personal 
Absolute  ;  and,  still  further,  we  may  enter  into  the 
consideration  of  a  difficult  doctrinal  problem  touching 
what  is  known  as  the  Predestination  of  God,  that  is 
the  decisions  of  the  Divine  Will  in  connexion  with  the 
knowledge  or  foreknowledge  of  the  Divine  Intelli- 
gence. 

We  may  begin  with  the  simplest  of  these  questions, 
the  origin  of  Space  and  of  Time.     Now  what  we  say 
is  that  Space  is  a  certain  limitation  in   Infinity,  and 
Time  is  a  certain  limitation   in  Duration.     Space  has 
reference  to  extension  :  Time  has  reference  to  transi- 
tion.    Space  marks  the  negation  which  lies   between 
certain  boundary  lines  ;  Time  marks  the  negation  which 
lies  between  the  passage  of  an   object  from  any  one 
point  to  any  other  point.     Space  is  marked  out  by 
each  one  of  the  globes  which  fill  the  heavens,  and  the 
interjacence  or  chasm  between  them  ;    and  Time  is 
marked  out  by  the  movements  of  these  globes,  and  is  the 
intermittence  of  duration  which  marks  a  constant  trans- 
ition ;  or,  shall  we  say,  it  is  the  interval  of  duration  which 
elapses  betwixt  a  movement  from  any  one  point  to 
any  other  ?     For  example,  we  say,  the  sun  rises  and 
the  sun  sets,  and  the  interval  between  the  two  we  call 
Time  ;  and  Time,  like  Space,  can  be  diminished  inde- 
finitely. By  means  of  clock  movements  we  can  divide 
the  day  into  hours,  and  the  hours  into  minutes,  and 
the  minutes  into  seconds,  and,  if  we  chose,  the  seconds 
into  still  smaller  minicles  of  time.    There  is  no  limit 


Ideas  Embraced  in  Infinity  and  Eternity.     161 


to  the  subdivision  of  time.  Suppose  an  object  moving 
with  the  rapidity  of  light  :  and  suppose  it  to  move 
along  a  line  divided  into  yards  feet  and  inches,  what 
would  be  the  period  of  time  in  which  the  object  would 
take  in  moving  from  the  one  line  of  division  to  the 
other  ?  It  might  be  calculated  in  figures,  but  could 
not  be  realized  as  an  interval  in  our  experience. 

What  do  we  say  then  as  to  an  absolute  infinity  and 
an  absolute  Eternity?  Infinity,  we  say,  is  extension 
without  any  boundary  lines  whatever  ;  and  Eternity,  we 
say,  is  duration  without  any  beginning  or  ending.  What 
then  ?  The  very  fact  of  envisaging  personality  or  what 
we  may  call  individualism,  of  necessity  implies  the  idea 
of  space.  In  the  Personality  of  God,  therefore,  we 
cannot  get  rid  of  the  idea  of  space  ;  and  yet  it  is  that 
space  to  which  we  can  assign  no  limit.  The  operations 
of  God  may  not  be  confined  to  any  particular  space  : 
but  the  very  thought  of  a  personality  of  necessity  im- 
plies space,  but  obviously  it  is  that  space  which  does 
not  admit  of  restriction.  Again,  we  cannot  suppose 
Deity  to  be  a  dead  and  immovable  thing  ;  on  the  con- 
trary, his  being  implies  a  living  and  constantly  mov- 
ing being — a  being  having  thought,  and  therefore  the 
transition  of  thought.  What  then  ?  Why,  it  follows 
that  as  Infinity  carries  space  in  its  bosom,  so  Eternity 
bears  time  in  its  bosom.  We  have  our  philosophers 
telling  us  that  they  "  cannot  conceive  an  absolute 
commencement,"  and  when  all  is  reduced  to  what  has 
been  called  the  Unconditioned,  they  cannot  con- 
ceive an  initiation  of  space  that  is  a  limitation  in 
extension.  But  if  it  be  considered  that  space  is  an 
inherent  prerogative  in  Infinity,  and  that  time  is 
an  inherent  prerogative  in  Eternity,  we  are  no  longer 


162 


Concluding  Observations. 


B^.         ! 


i  ;■ 


troubled  about  an  absolute  commencement,  knowing 
that    there  is   no  such  phenomenon    in    the    Absolute. 

And  nowwe  come  to  the  great  question  of  Creation. 
Creation,  of  course,  has  had  its  beginning,  as  we  are 
able  in  our  present  circumstances  to  apprehend  it ; 
but  its  beginning  only,  as  a  continuation  of  that  ever- 
living  action  which  belongs  to,  and  is  inherent  in  God. 
The  thought  has  occurred  to  man,  How  could  crea- 
tion arise,  and  whence  could  creation  be  produced,  if 
before  what  is  technically  called  "  the  Beginning," 
Deity  was  alone,  sublime  in  the  ever  constant  activity 
of  his  own  thoughts.  The  mystery  behoved  to  be  in- 
surmountable, if  we  were  unable  to  entertain  the  idea 
of  an  Impersonal  Infinity  of  fundamental  substance  as 
well  as  a  Personal  Absolute,  from  whose  devising  all 
things  have  sprung.  The  mystery  would  also  be  still 
further  insurmountable,  if  we  were  unable  to  see  what 
constitutes  the  nature  and  foundation  of  Causality  ; 
and,  further,  if  we  were  unable  to  discern  that  this 
foundation  essentially  resides  in  God.  Need  .we  re- 
peat in  what  this  foundation  consists  ?  We  speak  of 
the  All-conditioned  in  contrast  to  the  Unconditioned. 
It  is  a  mistake  to  think  otherwise  of  the  Personal 
Jehovah.  Grant  that  in  him  resides,  and  to  him 
essentially  belongs,  what  forms  the  fundamental  quali- 
ties which  constitute  the  very  nature  of  his  beinghood, 
and  we  have  the  case  of  the  Creator  before  us. 

What  constitutes  Causality  ?  We  answer,  the  junc- 
tion of  one  quality  brought  into  combination  with  an- 
other, so  conditioned  as  to  produce  the  effect  desired 
by  the  operation  of  their  affinity.  We  have  only  to 
understand  that  God  .sees  by  his  intelligence  what 
quality  would  require  to  be  joined  with  another  in 


Existing  Laws  Traced  to  God. 


163 


order  to  produce  the  tertium  quid.  Recognizing  this 
much,  we  cognize  under  what  circumstances  this,  that, 
and  the  other  device,  that  has  come  forth  from  the 
mind  of  God,  hath  had  its  origination.*  And  as  regards 
the  materials  from  which  he  hath  obtained  his  objects, 
we  have  already  indicated  the  inexhaustible  quarry  of 
the  ctherial  medium,  through  which  an  endless  supply 
could  be  obtained.  In  truth,  we  see  that  there  behoved 
to  be  ever  before  the  mind  of  God  an  objective  arena 
for  the  foundation  of  worlds,  and  for  the  enlargement 
of  worlds  upon  worlds,  and  for  the  furnishing  of  them 
with  suitable  objects  adapted  to  the  wants  of  the 
creatures  which  he  has  made.  In  our  experience  we 
discover  and  discern,  that  all  material  objects,  under 
the  light  of  day,  have  their  phenomena  radiated  in  the 
etherial  medium  or  pneum,  according  to  the  law  of 
inverse  squares  ;  and  that  the  representation  hereby 
projected  does  not  only  pervade  the  whole  area  which 
it  involves,  but  that  it  carries  out  in  spirit-condition 
the  precise  quality  and  form  of  the  original  which  it 
delineates.  If,  then,  the  All-conditioned,  operating  as 
Cause,  and  having  the   Impersonal  to  operate  upon, 

*  It  may  appear  i)resiimptuous  to  some,  to  argue  about  the 
mode  of  Divine  (»])er;iti(ni  in  Himself  as  a  Personality — but 
what  is  it  which  every  rational  man  pursues  in  his  reasonings, 
and  is  obliged  to  pursue  /  Is  it  not  the  application  of  ascertained 
principles  i  If  we  have  got  a  principle  which  satisfies  and  ex- 
plains the  great  problem  of  Causality,  are  we  not  entitled  to 
maintain  that  the  principle  holds  good  throughout  ?  We  are  not 
called  upon  to  suppose  that  in  this  matter,  there  are  more  prin- 
ciples of  a<jtion  in  fulfilling  a  function,  than  one.  There  may  be 
mt)re  methods  than  one  ;  but  the  principle  in  each  must  be  the 
same.  It  is  here  the  maxim  is  particularly  applicable,  **  entia 
nou  sunt  multiplicauda  praeter  uecessitatem," 


4    ! 


II 


HI 


11 


iHf 


164 


Concludiusr  Observations. 


constitutes  from  his  own  inherent  conditions,  any 
special  object,  and  sets  it  forth,  what  follows  ?  Why, 
upon  the  principles  which  we  find  realized  among 
ourselves,  this  very  creation,  by  an  inherent  law,  begets 
consimilar  representations  in  the  endless  ocean  of  Ether. 
No  doubt  as  we  experience  these,  they  are  but 
transitory  representations,  existing  or  subsisting, 
so  long  as  the  original  remains,  even  as  our 
image  exists,  while  it  continues  before  the  mirror. 
Yet  as  we  ourselves  can  fix  that  image  when  it  alights 
and  takes  effect  upon  an  impressible  plasma,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  imagine  how  the  Omnipotent  might  mul- 
tiply forms  and  qualities  that  shall  be  permanent  to 
any  extent.  We  are  not  to  suppose  that  one  can 
fathom  and  compass  the  many  ways  in  which  the  Om- 
niscent  One  might  construct  creation  ;  but  it  is  a  per- 
fectly legitimate  process  for  us  to  argue  from  what 
takes  place  in  our  experience,  to  what  in  analogous 
circumstances  might  take  place  in  the  hands  of  our 
Maker. 

We  can  imagine,  then,  how  Nature  (as  we  term  it) 
came  into  being,  and  how  natural  law  came  to  have 
its  province  as  a  valid  operation  in  the  world.  It  be- 
hoved God  first  to  create  the  rudimentary  elements,  as 
the  basis  out  of  which  he  would  construct  the  more 
complex  phenomena  of  the  universe.  We  have  the 
letters  as  the  foundation  of  our  syllables  ;  and  syl- 
lables as  the  foundation  of  our  words  ;  and  words  as 
the  foundation  of  our  senteces  ;n  and  our  sentences  as 
the  foundation  of  our  literature,  and  they  have  to  be 
curiously  built  together  and  interlaced  to  answer  the 
ends  of  a  living  language,  and  so  become  the  source  of 
living  communication   between   man   and  man.     Wc 


The  Kingdom  of  Nature. 


165 


find,  in  like  manner,  that  it  behoved  the  Creator  to 
institute  an  alphabet  of  creation,  and  accordingly  we 
have  what  are  called  the  primary  elements,  all  of  which 
could  separately  be  obtained  from  the  generic  ground  of 
all  substance.  These  elements  would  each  have  its 
own  distinctive  quality  ;  and  being  one  and  all  de- 
rived from  a  source  where  they  had  originally  their 
entire  union  and  amalgamation,  it  behoved  that  they 
should  have  affinity  with  one  another,  and  accordingly 
that  they  should  of  necessity  be  qualified  to  enter  into 
varied  union,  according  to  the  relation  in  which  they 
miglit  happen  to  be  associated.  It  is  easy  to  suppose 
that  the  All-wise  Intelligence  would  build  them  up  in 
such  forms  and  conditions  as  would  answer  the  pur- 
poses which  he  desired  that  they  should  serve.  As  a 
fact,  we  find  the  worlds  and  the  furniture  with  which 
they  are  equipped  so  constructed.  And  this  we  call 
the  great  kingdom  of  nature. 

We  find  that  the  Kingdom  of  Nature  hath  its  own 
operations.  What  are  these,  and  how  do  we  account 
for  them  ?  They  are  the  Forces  which  are  variously 
found  in  constant  operation  —  forces  whereby  the 
operations  of  nature  are  carried  on — forces  whereby 
worlds  are  not  only  sustained  in  being,  but  whereby  the 
creatureship  of  the  world  is  propagated  and  maintained 
for  the  continuance  of  life,  while  the  preservation  and 
development  of  being  are  displayed  in  freshly  improved 
condition.  There  are  what  we  call  the  laws  of  nature; 
and  they  are  dependent  not  only  on  Energy,  which  is 
the  inherent  attribute  of  substance  dynamically,  but 
upon  the  Quality  or  Qualities  of  the  Substance  present, 
which  give  law  to  the  force  or  forces  which  energy  de- 
scribes.    Hence,  not  only  is   Force   the   product   of 


\ 


.( 


M 


i. 


166 


Concluding   Observations. 


Energy  according  to  the  conditions  which  happen  to 
be  allied  in  its  production,  but  whatever  be  the  forms 
under  which  force  operates,  these  very  forms  it  carries 
with  it  in  the  minutest  features  into  the  all-pervading 
Ether ;  and  if  there  is  the  medium  of  an  organizable 
plasma,  this  plasma  is  correspondingly  affected  ;  and 
hence,  we  account  for  growth.  And  agreeably  to  this 
law,  we  find  each  tree  producing  after  its  kind,  and 
each  animal  producing  after  its  kind,  and  all  because 
the  laws  of  causality  are  of  the  most  precise  and 
determinate  character. 

And  on  this  very  principle  also,  viz.,  the  fixed  and 
unvarying  laws  of  Causality,  we  can  account  for  all 
the  changes  which  take  place  in  the  processes  of  Evolu- 
tion. There  is  nothing  surer  in  nature  than  that  "  like 
produces  like  "  :  this  is  an  iron  law  which  admits  of  no 
deviation  whatever  ;  and  it  is  because  of  the  inexorable 
fixedness  of  this  law,  that  any  extraneous  influence 
entering  into  the  category  of  operation,  of  necessity 
shews  itself.  A  single  letter  of  the  alphabet  entering 
in  among  the  letters  of  an  existing  word  will  entirely 
change  that  word,  and  the  nature  of  the  change,  more- 
over, will  very  much  depend  on  the  place  which  is 
assigned  to  it  in  the  association.  It  is  the  same  in  the 
kingdom  of  nature.  The  same  ingredients  as  have 
been  noticed  when  differently  associated,  will  produce 
different  results,  and  if  additional  ingredients  are  add- 
ed, these  will  show  a  corresponding  modification  in 
the  effects.  The  office  of  nature  is  production  accord- 
ing to  the  ingredients  which  are  associated  in  the  Causal 
nexus.  Hence,  we  ask,  if  there  is  no  extraneous  hand 
to  introduce  new  forms  and  new  conditions  which 
constitute  an  entirely  new  type  of  creature,  whence 
could  such  new  devices  have  come  ? 


Earthly    Things  a  Basis  fo*-  Spiritual.        167 


We  come,  now,  to  ascertain  what  is  the  nature  of 
the  providence  of  God  in  connexion  with  the  great 
ends  which  He  has  to  serve  by  Creation?     We  may 
well    believe   that   such    an    elaborate  mechanism  of 
things  has  not  been  introduced,  simply  that  they  may 
by  and  by  be  dismantled  and  discharged  and  annihi- 
lated ;  and  all  for  the  mere  purpose  of  beholding  their 
temporary  beinghood.     It  might  suit  the  mere  creature 
to  be  amused  with  childish  toys,  and  by  and  by  to 
wish  them  destroyed  ;  but  we  have  to  regard  the  pur- 
poses of  an  Almighty  and  All-Wise  Creator  ;  and  we 
say    it  is  alone  worthy  of  Him  to  have  had  an  all- 
important  and  permanent  end  before  Him,  to  be  ful- 
filled by  this  grand  work  of  Creation.     We  have  seen 
upon  what  grounds  the  animal  creature  is  made  to  live, 
and  upon  what  still  higher  grounds  man  stands  as  a 
mere  creature  of  earth.     We   see   that   as   such,   his 
knowledge  is  of  the  earth  earthy,  and  that  as  sure  as  his 
body  dies,  so  his  mind  as  a  mere  intellection  of  earthly 
elements  must  die  also.   The  things  of  this  world  can- 
not give  immortality  to  the  soul  ;  there  is,  and  can  be, 
no   immortality   in    mere   material  things  ;  and  they 
cannot  give  that  which  they  do  not  possess  in  them- 
selves.    Material  things,  of  necessity,  serve  but  a  tem- 
porary purpose  ;  however  long  their  preservation  may 
be  protracted,  they  arc  constantly  changing,  and  con- 
stantly wasting,  and  in  the  nature  of  things,  go  in  the 
long  run  to  destruction.     But  they  may  be  the  instru- 
mentality for  supplying  a  basis  on  which  to  engraft 
spiritual  things— things  which  are  essentially  eternal. 
Accordingly,   it   has  pleased  God   to  reveal  Himself 
specially   to   man,  and   through  this,  to  implant  the 
seeds  of  the  Divine  nature  in  his  soul.     The  nature  of 


168 


Concluding  Observations. 


Ill 


this  revelation  is  such,  that  when  duly  embraced,  it 
takes  the  soul  out  of  the  perishing  elements  in  which  it 
lies  naturally  immersed  in  this  life,  and  gives  it  an  ad- 
hesion to  the  things  of  a  more  refined  and  permanent 
life.  The  very  fact  of  man  having  a  revelation  of  God 
— of  the  sublimity  of  His  nature — of  the  purity  of  His 
character — of  the  equity  of  His  righteousness — of  the 
glory  of  His  truth — of  the  sacred ness  of  His  faith- 
fulness and  perfect  integrity,  without  malice,  guile, 
or  hypocrisy,  is  of  unspeakable  moment  to  man  ;  in 
that  there  is  hereby  an  engrafting  upon  His  soul  of 
principles  that  can  never  perish,  when  they  become 
the  principles  of  action  by  which  the  soul  is  character- 
ized. These  principles  are  inconsistent  with  a  mere 
subjection  to  carnal  and  worldly  likings.  Hence,  the 
necessity,  in  order  to  immortality,  of  a  weaning  from 
an  attachment  to,  and  a  dependence  on,  mere  material 
things,  as  if  these  constituted  all  our  care  and  concern, 
and  of  a  holding  to  things  which  are  revealed  to  us  as 
characteristics  of  God.  We  believe  that  such  a  spiritual 
state  has  been  manifested  to  men  by  Jesus  Christ. 
Hence,  the  life  and  the  principles  of  Jesus  Christ  con- 
stitute for  us  the  ladder  whereby  we  are  to  climb  to 
immortality. 

This  immortality  comes  to  be  nothing  less  than 
salvation,  that  is  an  escape  from  a  death,  which  is,  strict- 
ly speaking,  an  extinction  of  our  earthly  being,  and  a 
preservation  in  life,  that  savours  of  permanency,  as 
being  a  sharing  of  what  belongs  to  God.  The  renewal 
of  the  soul,  therefore,  in  the  Divine  life,  ought  to  be 
the  chief  end  of  man  in  the  discipline  that  is  appointed 
for  him  in  the  life  that  now  is.  It  is  a  strange  and 
remarkable  fact,  that  there  should  be  so  much  diversity 


llie  Foundations  of  Human  Sin. 


169 


of  thought  in  respect  of  the  pursuit  of  immortality. 
No  doubt  the  difificulty  which  has  prevailed,  and  which 
still  prevails,  is  to  be  traced  to  the  ideas  of  sin,  and  of 
the  removal  of  sin  from  the  human  constitution — ideas 
which  have  unfortunately  been  ingrained  in  the  church 
through  the  interpretations  which  have  come  down  to 
us,  and  have  had  place  and  position  in  the  church,  be- 
cause of  the  ignorance  of  the  human  constitution  and 
the  consequent  misinterpretation  of  Scripture.  As 
churches,  we  have  greatly  failed  to  realise  the  true 
attitude  in  which  Jesus  Christ,  who  is  set  forth  as  our 
great  Exemplar,  stands  to  sin,  and  consequently  the 
true  attitude  which  He  sustains  towards  the  great 
question  of  taking  away  sin. 

Let  it  ever  be  remembered  that  human  sin  funda- 
mentally springs  from  the  flesh,  as  being  antagonistic 
to  spiritual  life  ;  and  necessarily  so,  because  spiritual 
life  goes  to  restrain  carnal  life.  Hence,  St.  Paul's 
saying,  "  They  that  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please  God." 
The  reason  why  they  caonot  please  God  lies  in  this, 
that  they  cannot,  as  carnal  persons,  practise  spiritual 
life,  and  therefore  cannot  prepare  for  immortality. 
Now  that  God  hath  revealed  Himself,  and  thereby 
given  to  man  the  principles  of  a  new  and  spiritual  life, 
the  pursuit  of  carnal  and  worldly  things,  as  ending  in 
death,  cannot  satisfy  God,  who  desires  that  man  may 
have  immortal  life.  Hence,  under  the  new  regime 
which  God  hath  ordained  in  the  New  Testament,  the 
carnal  mind  is  regarded  as  "  enmity  with  God "  ;  in 
other  words,  adherence  simply  to  the  calls  of  the  flesh 
as  our  all  in  life,  is  regarded  as  sin,  in  as  far  as  it  is 
antagonistic  to  divine  principles.  Christ  Jesus,  we  are 
told,  "  came  to  put  away  sin,"  and  he  did  so  by  '*  the 


I 


1 1 
t 


II 


i  I. 


M 


Concluding  Obseri  uttious 


sacrifice  of  Himself."  How  so?  We  are  told  He  took 
to  Himself  the  body  of  our  flesh,  and  through  this, 
"  He  was  in  all  respects  tempted  like  as  we  are  ;  "  but 
He  overcame  all  the  allurements  and  temptations 
wherewith  He  was  beset,  and  lived  wholly  in  accord- 
ance with  Divine  principles.  All  the  influences  of  the 
flesh,  and  of  the  world,  and  of  the  devil,  had  been  ap- 
plied to  Him,  but  in  vain  ;  for  He  could  say  to  His 
Father,  "  I  have  finished  the  work  which  Thou  gavest 
Me  to  do,"  viz.,  that  of  sacrificing  the  flesh.  Hence, 
Christ  is  said  to  have  *'laid  that  foundation,  other  than 
which  none  can  be  laid,"  for  securing  eternal  life.  This 
accomplishment  involves  what  is  called  Atonement,  in 
as  far  as  it  was  the  removal  of  the  carnal  life,  as  at 
best  no  preparation  for  God,  and  the  substitution  of 
the  spiritual  as  the  requirement  of  God. 

Now,  this  life  of  Jesus  Christ  is  revealed  to  us,  and 
is  recommended  to  us  for  our  instruction  and  imitation ; 
and  when  we  adopt  His  principles  and  imitate  His  ex- 
ample, we  are  said  to  have  faith  in  Jesus  Christ,  and 
hereby  to  have  the  application  of  His  atonement  to  us. 
Hence,  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  means,  not  the  substitution 
of  CJirist  for  us,  but  the  application  of  Christ  to  us  ;  for 
hereby  it  is  that  we  are  made  one  with  Him,  and  be- 
come partakers  with  Him.  What  we  say,  then,  is  this, 
that  Christ  is  shewn  to  be  the  grand  standard,  and  the 
indispensable  foundation  of  Divine  life  for  humanity,  in 
the  plan  of  God  for  accomplishing  the  sacrifice  of 
bodily  lusts,  and  of  bringing  about  the  immortalization 
of  men. 

The  church  has  puzzled  and  perplexed  herself  about 
the  introduction  of  sin  into  the  world,  and  the  preval- 
ence of  sin  in  the  world.     There  are  two  kinds  of  sin 


TJie  Alternative  to  the  Entrance  of  Sin.      171 

in  the  world,  the  sin  of  living  simply  to  the  flesh  when  a 
contrary  call  is  made  on  us  ;  and  the  sin  of  knowingly 
perverting  the  truth,  despising  the  Divine  command, 
and  defying  the  express  threatening  of  God.  To  be  a 
mere  creature  of  the  flesh  was  obviously  man's 
created  state  ;  and  as  such,  he  could  hardly  be  said  to 
have  sin  while  knowing  nothing  better :  but,  as  a 
creature  of  the  flesh  he  could  have  no  eternal  life, 
in  as  far  as  he  could  be  made  to  have  eternal  life 
only  by  the  communication  of  God's  word  ;  and  this 
was  what  God  intended  and  desired  him  to  have. 
Hence,  God  revealed  His  own  mind  to  him.  He 
took  him  into  Eden  for  that  purpose.  This  of 
necessity  involved  opposition  to  the  laws  of  the  flesh; 
and  hence,  "  the  flesh  lusted  against  the  spirit  and 
the  spirit  against  the  flesh  ;"  and  hence,  in  that  case, 
the  flesh  became  sin.    There  was  no  alternative  to  this, 

for  i:iTHER  MAN  MUST  PERISH  AND  BE  NO  MORE,  OR 
SIN  MUST  HAVE  AN  ENTRANCE  INTO  THE  WORLD. 
It  was  for  the  glory  of  God  that  sin  should  be  en- 
countered, that  it  might  be  overcome,  rather  than  that 
man  should  perish  with  the  beasts,  and  have  no  im- 
mortality secured  for  him,  and  the  great  end  of  creation 
therefore  be  frustrated.* 

The  great  struggle  has  been  going  on  for  ages  past, 
and  in  the  course  of  events,  man  is  becoming  increas- 

*  Here,  then,  is  a  very  simple  explanation  of  the  fall,  or  in 
other  words  of  the  intro<luction  of  sin.  How  came  sin  ?  The 
answer  is  and  must  be,  through  the  ministration  of  the  Divine 
Spiritvto  man.  Apart  from  this,  man  had  not  known  sin.  He 
could  not,  if  he  had  received  no  revealment  of  the  Divine  law; 
for  sin  is  the  transgression  of  this  law.  Sin,  then,  began  in  man 
when  lie,  following  the  impulses  of  the  tiesh,  rebelled  against  the 


!  I 


:    J 


)■ 


172 


Concluding  Obseri  nUions. 


ingly  prepared  for  more  fully  realizing  the  boon  which 
is  ordained  for  him.  He  will  be  matured  for  this  in  the 
course  of  Divine  procedure.  But  the  question  arises — 
How  comes  it  to  pass  that  the  desire  of  God  is  so  long 
in  being  accomplished  ?  Does  not  sovereignty  belong 
to  God?  Is  not  God  at  the  helm  of  affairs?  and  what 
obstacle  is  there  which  God  cannot  overcome?  The 
answer  is,  that  it  is  for  the  glory  of  God  that  man 
should  be  left  to  the  freedom  of  his  own  will  and  by 
his  own  ivill  be  brought  to  salvation.  This  explains 
the  long  delay  which  takes  place,  ere  the  world  of  man- 
kind are  turned  in  obedience  unto  God.  God  is  thus 
constrained  to  wait  upon  man's  blindness  and  obstinacy 
as  refusing  the  rulership  of  God. 

But  this  view  of  the  case  seems  only  to  deepen  the 
mystery  ;  for  it  is  asked,  How,  in  these  circumstances 
can  God  be  said  to  be  the  Author  of  man's  salvation  ? 
And  if  a  man  turns  to  the  Lord,  how  can  the 
honour  and  glory  thereof  be  assigned  unto  God  ? 
It  is  said  —  If  man  be  left  to  himself,  and  if 
God  has  to  wait  for  a  change  of  will  on  the  part  of 
man,  then,  it  follows  that  surely  man  must  have  power 
in  himself  and  by  himself  to  become  Godlike  in  his 
nature  !    Or  again,  taking  the  other  alternative,  it  is 


Divine  law.  Under  this  law,  man  was  between  two  cjreat  in- 
fluences, the  law  of  authority  grafted  on  him  from  without,  and 
the  law  of  the  flesh  which  was  natural  to  him.  He  yielded  to 
the  latter,  and  ran  counter  to  the  former.  Hence,  he  has  for- 
feited the  promise  of  life,  and  the  struggle  has  gone  on,  till  it 
has  been  found  that  the  second  Adam  has  displayed  a  victory 
over  sin,  and  has  displayed  a  new  manhood  absolutely,  under  the 
control  of  the  Divine  Spirit. 


Go(fs   Working  and  Human  Freedom.        \T-\ 


said,  if  man  has  no  power  by  himself  of  fulfilling  the 
Divine  will,  then  must  man  be  regarded  as  altogether 
the  puppet  of  God  ;  and  he  cannot  be  said  to  have 
entire  freedom  of  will  in  the  circumstances.  Hence, 
the  perplexity  by  which  theology  is  puzzled.  It  is 
most  true  that  man  left  to  himself  has  no  power  to 
turn  unto  God  ;  and  most  true,  that  if  a  man  turns 
unto  God,  the  glory  thereof  belongs  unto  God  ;  and 
with  all  this,  it  is  most  true  that  man  is  left  to  the 
freedom  of  his  own  will.  How  is  all  this  explained  ? 
The  answer  is  that  God  supplies  the  motives  to  man's 
conversion.  Without  the  motives,  man  would  have  no 
inducement,  no  will,  no  ability  to  change  his  mind  ; 
without  divine  motives  there  could  be  no  divine  will, 
and  no  sanctification  of  soul.  But  what  are  motives  ? 
They  are  teachings,  encouragements,  and  inducements 
to  follow  a  certain  course  ;  but  they  are  not  compul- 
sions and  they  do  not  at  all  interfere  with  man's  free 
will  ;  for  man  is  left  hereby  to  weigh  consequences, 
and  to  determine  as  seemeth  good  to  himself,  and  this 
explains  the  whole  matter  of  human  freedom  under 
the  discipline  which  God  has  ordained. 

But  why,  it  is  asked,  Has  God  ordained  that  some 
should  be  predestined  to  everlasting  life  ;  and  by  conse- 
quence that  others,  to  say  the  least,  should  be  passed  by ; 
and  this,  through  a  decree  pronounced  from  the  begin- 
ning? We  are  persuaded  that  much  misconception 
also  prevails  in  connection  with  this  great  doctrine.  Of 
course  it  behoved  that  God  in  creating  the  world  should 
have  a  great  and  final  purpose  before  him.  We  have 
seen  that  the  purpose  was  not  (could  not  be)  fulfilled  by 
the  introduction  of  mere  earthly  things,  because 
earthly  things  perish ;  we   have  seen  that  God's  pur- 


\      ■*! 


I     ■' 


(I 


•I 


i 


174 


Concluding  Observations. 


pose  lay  through  this  in  promoting  and  preparing  a 
people  for  eternal  life  ;  and  God  saw  clearly  at  the 
same  time  that  in  securing  this  purpose,  there  would 
be  large  numbers  among  the  generations  of  men,  who 
would  fail  to  come  under  the  category  of  immortality; 
and  no  doubt  also  some  who  would  abuse  the  great 
privileges  of  grace  offered  to  them,  by  turning  a  deaf 
ear  to  his  call,  and  even  by  profaning  the  name  and 
the  laws  of  God.  What  then  ?  Was  God  hereby  to 
be  prevented  from  introducing  his  great  scheme  of 
immortality  ?  Here  lies  the  terrible  alternative. 
Were  he  to  do  so,  then  the  world  and  the  things  of  the 
world  would  have  to  be  blotted  out;  and  man  too,  like 
the  beasts  and  all  perishable  things,  would  become  as 
if  they  had  never  been,  and  the  elaborate  work  of  God 
in  the  creation  of  the  world  would  have  been  vain  and 
rcsultless.  But  that  would  have  been  wholly  un- 
worthy of  God.  Hence,  it  came  to  this,  that  the  fore- 
sight and  the  fore-knowledge  of  the  waywardness  of 
some  must  not  prevent  the  bestowment  of  eternal 
privileges  on  those  who  would  be  induced  to  listen  to 
his  voice  and  to  obey  ;  and  so  secure  for  them  a 
glorious  immortality. 

Let  it  not  be  thought  that  God  was  hereby  a  Res- 
pecter of  persons.  Who  they  might  be  abstractly  that 
should  fulfil  his  will,  and  who  they  might  be  that 
should  reject  his  counsel,  was  nothing  to  him.  The 
failure  of  some  to  come  under  his  covenant,  and  the 
blameworthiness  of  others  who  might  rebel,  did  not 
concern  the  righteousness  of  the  great  object  which  he 
had  at  heart;  for  he  would  offer  the  word  of  life — not 
to  individuals  as  separate  from  the  mass,  but  to  all 
who  lay  within  the  sphere  of  its  deliverance  ;  and  his 


Predestination  not  Founded  in  Sovereignty.     175 

proclamation  was  this,  that  to  those  who  should  obey 
the  general  call  upon  all  to  repent  and  forsake  their 
sins,  there  should  be  a  special  call  given  to  become 
inheritors  of  eternal  life.  Could  anything  be  more 
natural,  or  more  equable,  seeing  that  such  parties  only  as 
break  loose  from  the  trammels  of  the  flesh  are  adapted 
to  exercise  faith,  and  to  receive  the  grace  of  life,  and 
be  made  heirs  of  salvation  ? 

The  church  hitherto,  when  speaking  of  the  lost,  has 
been  able  simply  to  ascribe  all  to  the  mere  sovereignty 
of  God ;  and  in  blank  helplessness  to  expound  the  ways 
of  God,  it  could  only  say  "  Even  so  Lord,  for  so  it 
seemed  good  in  Thy  sight."  It  no  doubt  becometh  us 
to  bow  in  meek  humility  under  the  mighty  hand  of 
God,  in  cases  where  we  do  not  understand,  whatever 
be  the  trying  experiences  to  which  we  may  be  sub- 
jected, resting  assured  that  what  we  know  not  now,  we 
shall  know  hereafter  ;  but  as  regards  the  great  plans 
and  purposes  of  God,  we  know  and  are  assured  that 
things  are  not  left  to  the  operation  of  mere  sovereignty, 
and  that  what  may  appear  questionable  to  our  limited 
understandings  is  not  the  outcome  of  irresponsible 
power,  but  oi power  directed  by  what  is  right.  Whatever 
were  the  Divine  purposes  before  the  foundation  of  the 
world,  we  are  certain  that  these  purposes  were  not  aban- 
doned to  the  exercise  of  mere  sovereign  authority,  but 
to  authority  guided  by  the  highest  wisdom  and  inspired 
by  unbounded  love.  It  is  therefore  demonstrably  im- 
possible, looking  to  His  very  nature  and  attributes, 
that  God  could  have  a  priori  fore-ordained  any  to 
eternal  pains  and  penalties.  The  Apostle  Peter  lays 
down  the  principle  of  fore-ordination  very  clearly  and 
succinctly.     He  tells  us  that  election  is  "  according  to 


\   \ 


i 


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I 


I  M 


176 


Concluding  Obsenuiiions. 


fore-knowledge  "  ;  it  must  be  so  ;  it  cannot  be  other- 
wise. In  other  words,  it  intimates  that  Intelligence  in 
the  very  nature  of  things  must  be  antecedent  to  Will 
We  find  this  realized  in  our  own  case,  and  were  it 
otherwise,  the  Will  would  be  neither  more  nor  less  than 
blind  impulse.  To  suppose  this  of  the  All-wise  and 
omniscient  Being,  would  not  only  be  derogatory,  but 
extremely  absurd ;  and  yet,  we  have  those  who 
tell  us  that  God  forsees  things  only  from  the  fact 
that  he  has  fore-ordained  them.  Such  persons 
know  not  what  they  say.  Before  creation,  God  knew 
all  possibilities  ;  and  seeing  these,  he  determined  on 
what  it  was  best  to  adopt — best  in  order  to  fulfil  the 
great  purposes  which  were  before  His  mind. 

One  other  point — one  that  is  not  a  matter  of  natural 
science  but  of  revelation  in  scripture,  I  touch  upon  ; 
first,  because  I  have  implicit  confidence  in  scripture- 
statement;  and  second,  because  the  knowledge  of 
nature,  as  it  increases,  is  sure  to  bring  clearer  light 
to  bear  on  scripture  truth.  The  point  I  refer  to  is 
that  of  a  second  Personality  in  God-head.  That 
God  should  have  an  alter  ego,  brought  out  through 
Himself  from  the  Impersonal  All,  seems  to  me  the 
most  natural  and  likely.  There  is  nothing  incon- 
sistent in  the  statement  that  an  image  of  himself 
should  exist  before  the  world  was.  We  are  no  more 
hedged  up  from  believing  in  this  great  revelation, 
than  we  are  prevented  from  tracing  the  things 
that  are,  to  a  primary  root  and  source.  If  we  were 
better  acquainted  than  we  are  with  the  capacities 
of  substance,  and  its  susceptibility  of  bringing  out  into 
manifestation  another  self — a  beinghood  after  the 
manner  of  that  which  has  been  as  a  self-existence  ab 


The  Fatherhood  of  God. 


177 


eterno  ;  and  if  we  knew  that  the  begetting  of  this  Per- 
sonality was  essential  to  the  production  of  inferior 
orders  of  creation,  we  should  then  know  that  it  con- 
sists with  the  facts  of  Divine  Personality,  that  there 
must  be  a  Divine  Fatherhood  in  connection  with 
the  everlasting  Impersonality  which  accompanies  His 
Beinghood;  and  that  through  this  Impersonality  there 
must  be  a  representation  of  Himself  This  com- 
mends itself  to  our  thinking,  though  probably  if  left  to 
ourselves,  we  should  scarcely  have  discovered  this  as  a 
necessary  fact  in  the  great  field  of  nature.  That  the 
eternal  offspring  of  God  should  himself  be  made  the 
Builder  and  Framer  of  the  world,  as  himself  derived 
from  the  same  inexhaustible  Fountain  of  beinghood 
is,  we  think,  at  once  rational  and  credible.  And  that 
the  Ivithcr,  in  the  prosecution  of  Intellection  should 
devise  and  communicate  his  devices  to  the  Son  ;  and 
that  the  Son,  as  himself  made  of  that  which  consti- 
tutes creation,  should  be  so  to  speak  Operator  accord- 
ing to  the  will  of  the  Father,  is  not  only  a  revelation 
which  we  are  asked  to  receive,  but  it  is  one  in  perfect 
consistency  with  reason  as  well  as  with  revelation. 

It  does  not  concern  me  here  to  point  out  how  the 
eternal  Son  must  be  regarded  as  the  Holy  Ghost  of 
Scri[)ture  ;  and  that  He  should  communicate  himself 
to,  and  manifest  himself  in,  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ 
of  Nazareth  ;  but  assuredly,  when  rightly  interpreted 
and  duly  considered,  there  is  nothing  in  the  statements 
revealed  that  need  be  regarded  as  unnatural  much  less 
improbable.  The  fact  of  God  being  in  Christ  Jesus,  is 
simply  initiatory  of  the  fact  of  God  communicating 
himself  to  man  as  the  foundation  of  a  new  nature  ; 
and  the  case  of  Christ  seems  to  differ  from  the  case  of 


11 


i 


N 


i 


178 


Concluding  Ohsennitions. 


true  Christians,  in  that  the  fulness  of  the  Divine  mind 
was  conveyed  to  Christ,  and  that  he  walked  in  entire 
obedience  to  Divine  principles,  and  perfectly  overcame 
the  antagonistic  influences  that  were  inherent  in  the 
flesh,  and  that  assailed  him  throu^^h  this  world  and 
the  devil.  In  this  way  Christ  introduced  and  con- 
solidated a  new  manhood,  as  the  pattern  after  which 
we  are  to  be  formed. 


APPENDIX     I. 


ON    ETHER. 


— ^ — 

PRorKSSOR  Stokes  says :  "  Tlie  fundamental  hypothesis  of 
the  existence  of  a  medium  to  which  we  give  the  name  of  Ether, 
I  have  already  noticed.  We  might  not  have  been  disposed  on 
tlie  fii-st  instance  to  believe  that  such  a  solid  material  as  glass 
reall}'  had  Ether  pervading  it.  But  we  must  beware  of  applying 
to  the  mysterious  Ether  the  gross  notions  which  we  get  from 
the  study  of  ponderable  matter.  The  Ether  is  a  substance,  if 
substance  it  may  be  called,  respecting  the  very  existence  of 
which  our  senses  gives  us  no  direct  information  :  it  is  only 
through  the  intellect,  by  studying  the  jjlienomena  which  nature 
presents  to  us,  and  finding  with  what  admirable  simplicity  those 
of  light  are  explained  by  the  supposition  of  the  existence  of  an 
Ether,  that  we  become  convinced  that  there  is  such  a  thing. 
We  know  that  a  magnet  attracts  iron  through  a  piece  of  glass  ; 
and  yet  the  magnetic  influence  is  one  which  we  can  neither  see 
nor  feel.  Why  then  should  not  Ether  exist  within  the  glass 
and  be  capable  of  vibrating  within  it  ? 

"  It  may  be  readily  supposed,  as  more  probable  than  the 
contrary,  that  the  presence  of  the  ponderable  molecules  inter- 
spersed through  the  Etl'er,  within  the  region  of  space,  which  is 
enclosed  by  the  surface  of  the  glass,  may  have  the  effect  of 
altering  the  velocity  of  propagation  of  the  Etherial  vibrations 
within  it,  and  very  probably  diminish  it.  But  what  may  be 
the  precise  mechanism  by  which  this  result  is  brought  about  we 
do  not  know.  It  is  easy  to  frame  plausible  hypotheses,  which 
would  account  for  the  result  ;  but  it  is  quite  another  matter  to 
establish  a  theory  which  will  admit  of,  and  which  will  sustain, 
cross  questioning,  in  such  a  variety  of  ways,  that  we  become 
convinced  of  its  truth. 


I 


I 


I 


I 


i 
J 


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i 


180 


Appendix  I. 


"  Here  it  may  be  well  to  ])ause,  an.l  contemplate  for  a  little 
the  wonder  with  which  our  study  of  the  phencunena  up  to  the 
present  point  has  shown  that  we  are  surrounded. 

"  First,  we  learn  to  rej^anl  the  interplanet;\ry  and  interstellar 
spaces  as  no  mere  v()i<l,  or  empty  spaces  |)assed  throui;h  by  swift 
messengers,  in  the  shape  of  particles  of  li<;ht  (^onveyin.i,'  infor- 
mationlfrom  «listant  worlds,  but  as  tilled  with  an  ever-present, 
all  pervading;  suKstance,  in  which  the  ultimate  particles  <.f 
ponderable  matter,  includini,'  those  of  our  own  bodies,  ari' 
continually,  as  it  were,  bathed,  and  yet  of  which  our  senses 
give  us  no  correct  cognizance. 

"  Secondly,  that  whatever  other  inj|)ortant  offices  this  Ether 
may  fulfil,  this  one  at  any  rate  belongs  to  it,  that  it  forms  the 
me«'iium  of  visual  communication  between  (.urselves  and  our 
fellow  creatures,  between  ourselves  and  the  various  objects 
around  us,  l)etween  ourselves  and  tlistant  worlds. 

"Thirdly,  that  this  communication  iscarric.l  on  by  tremors 
of  some  kind  propagated  through  the  Ether,  with  a  velocity  s«> 
enormous,  that  for  all  practical  purposes  it  may  be  deemed 
instantaneous.  In  fact,  light  wouhl  tmvel  about  seven  and  a 
half  times  round  the  whole  earth  in  one  second.  But  so  rapid 
are  these  tremors  that  many  hundreds  of  millions  of  millions 
take  place  in  one  second.  Notwithstanding,  therefore,  the 
enonnous  rate  of  propagation,  the  lengths  of  the  waves  are  ex- 
cessively small,  ranging  about  one  fifty  thons;indth  of  an  inch. 
Were  the  length  of  waves  of  light  comparable  with  the  length 
of  the  waves  of  sound,  we  shoidd,  as  regards  the  use  of  our  eyes, 
be  merely  in  the  condition  of  a  man  who  was  all  but  blind,  whi> 
couM  just  distinguish  light  from  darkness,  or  a  gleam  of  red 
from  a  gleam  of  green,  and  no  more. 

*' Fourthlv,  we  learn  that  notwithstan«ling  the  almost  in- 
conceivable  shortness  of  the  tin»e  of  viltration,  a  variation  in  this 
peri<Mlic  time  is  nevertheless  rec(»gnisable  by  our  sen.ses,  and 
that  it  is  to  this  cause  it  is  due,  that  the  face  of  nature  does  not 
present  to  us  light  ami  shade  like  a  photoi^raph,  but  that  we 
have  that  endless  variety  of  colour  that  we  enjoy. 

"  Fifthly,  in  the  plan  of  an  elastic  medium,  conveying  sn:all 
vibrations,  we  have  a  mechanism  of  the  simplest  j)ossibh'  Wind 


Appendix  I. 


181 


having  for  the  result,  that  rays  of  light  from  objects  all  around, 
cross  each  other's  j>aths,  in  all  sorts  of  ways,  without  any  mutual 
<listurbance. 

"When  we  survey  a  varieil  landscape,  each  visible  point  in  it, 
however  mimite,  may  be  regarded  as  an  indepejulent  source  of 
light,  from  which  the  light  j)roceeds  in  all  directions.  True,  the 
objects  are  not  in  general  self-luminous  ;  they  are  seen  by  the 
light  of  the  sun,  or  of  the  clouds,  which  the^'  irregularly  reflect ; 
but  as  regards  the  behaviour  of  the  pencils  which  proceed  from 
theni,  they  are  as  good  as  self-luminous.*  Well  then  :  from 
each  visible  point  however  minute,  there  enters  the  eye  every 
second  a  length  of  light  of  about  18(),000  miles,  that  in  light 
which  would  have  travelled  that  distance  had  not  the  eye  been 
tlien*  to  catch  it,  this  immense  length  being  filled  with  modu- 
lations of  lengths  ranging  about  50,000  to  an  inch.  And  if  the 
landscape  be  contemplated  by  a  multitude  of  persons,  from  each 
visible  point  in  that  vast  length  of  light,  consisting  of  modu- 
lations of  such  excessive  minuteness,  enters  the  eye  of  each 
spectator  every  second  of  time  ;  and  all  these  various  streams 
of  light  proceeding  in  all  sorts  of  directions,  cross  each  other's 
paths  in  all  sorts  of  ways  without  the  slightest  mutual 
ilisturbance.t 

'*  rrofessor  Stokes  speaks  of  "  the  pencils  which  proceed  "  from 
the  objects  around,  saying  that  '*  ihey  are  as  good  as  self-luminous." 
If  they  were  self-luminous,  we  should  fail  to  see  them  as  we  now  do. 
It  is  l>ecause  ihey  are  not  selfduminous,  that  the  objects  lying  in  this  ocean 
of  luminiferous  Ether,  are  pencilled  forth  in  all  their  minuteness  by  a 
univc  rsal  law,  and  are  reflected  on  our  eyes  as  in  a  mirror,  and  are  con- 
veyed in  all  their  qualitative  character  along  the  optic  nerve,  and  re- 
vealed as  they  are  thus  conveyed  to  the  intellect. 


li 


t  Professor  Stokes  states  what  is  realized  as  an  amazing  fact ;  but 
he  fails  to  philosophize  upon  the  fact  ;  when  he  might  have  abundantly 
shewn  that  Ether  had  and  has  characteristics  which  cannot  be  predi- 
cated of  matter— characteristics  which  carrying  forms  in  all  directions, 
crossing  and  recrossing  each  other  without  collision  and  without  con- 
fusion, indicate  a  power  of  endless  service  to  which  common  matter  can 
lay  no  claim. 


I 

I 


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182 


Appendix  L 


"To  one  previously  unacq\iainted  with  the  subject,  these 
statements  seem  like  the  tlreams  of  an  enthusiast,  or  at  best 
the  speculations  of  some  wild  theorist ;  and  yet  there  is  nothing 
in  what  I  have  stated,  beyond  the  sober  conclusions  uf  scientific 
investigations — conclusions  sujiported  by  an  amount  of  evidence 
altogether  overwhelming.  In  saying  this,  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  the  precise  work  of  the  Ether  has  been  left  an  open 
question."  (Nature  of  Light,  ]).  85,  etc.) 

The  Rev.  Mr.  Birks,  Rector  of  Kelshall,  Herts,  as  far  back 
as  1862,  tells  us  that  for  28  ye^irs  he  had  been  engag«*d  in  prose- 
cuting inquiries  into  the  laws  of  Matter  and  of  Etlier.  He  says, 
(1)  "The  simplest  view  of  matter,  derived  at  once  from  the  law 
of  gravitation,  is  that  it  consists  of  monads  or  moveable  centres 
of  force,  unextended  but  definite  in  position,  which  attract  each 
other  with  a  force  varying  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  <lis- 
tance  between  the  centres.  (2)  The  law  of  Gravitation  in 
Matter  so  constituted  will  not  alone  account  for  the  cohesion 
and  solid  structure  of  b«Mlies.  Either  the  law  of  gravitation 
must  be  modified  for  small  distances,  or  there  must  be  some 
other  substance  distinct  from  common  matter  on  which  the 
phenomena  of  cohesion  depend.  (3)  A  self-repulsive  Ether, 
wholly  distinct  from  common  matter,  also  exists,  and  is  diffused 
widely  throughout  all  known  space.*    (4)  No  second  fluid,  of 

*  Mr.  Birks  quotes  the  closing  words  of  the  Principia  of  Newton, 
which  are  like  a  prophecy,  as  follows  :~"  I  might  add  something  about 
a  certain  very  subtle  spirit,  which  pervades  dense  bodies  and  lies  hid  in 
them,  by  the  power  of  which,  bodies  at  very  small  distances  attract  each 
other,  and  when  brought  close  together  cohere  ;  and  electrical  bodies 
act  at  greater  distances,  attracting  and  repelling  neighbouring  bodies  ; 
and  light  is  emitted,  refracted  and  reflected,  and  warms  bodies  ;  and 
sensation  is  excited,  and  the  limbs  of  animals  are  moved  at  will,  through 
vibrations  of  this  spirit,  propagated  through  the  nerves  to  the  brain,  and 
from  the  brain  to  the  muscles.  But  these  things  cannot  be  expounded 
in  a  few  words  ;  nor  is  there  extant  a  sufficient  abundance  of  experiments 
by  which  the  laws  of  the  activity  of  this  spirit  could  be  accurately  de- 
termined." Mr.  Birks  also  quotes  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton's  Optics,  the 
same  thought  in  the  modest  form  of  queries,  as  follows  : — **  Is  not  heat 
conveyed  through  a  vacuum  by  the  vibrations  of  a  much  more  subtle 
medium  than  air  ?     Is  not  this  medium  the  source  by  which  light  is  re- 


Appendix  /. 


183 


caloric,  of  electricity,  or  of  magnetism,  ought  to  be  recognized, 
until  it  can  be  proved  that  the  action  and  reaction  of  common 
matter,  and  a  luminous  Ether  are  incapable  of  supplying  the 
require<l  explanation.    (5)  The  existence  of  Matter  and  of  Ether 
requires  the  admission  of  three  and  only  three  laws  of  force  for 
their   mutual  action— First,  matter  acting  on  matter— sec(md, 
matter  acting   on  Ether,  and   Ether  on  matter— third.  Ether 
acting   on    Ether:    these   two   unknown   laws  cannot   be   the 
same  with  gravitation,  or  vary  only  as  the  inverse  square.     (6) 
The  Ether  of  the  Universe  greatly  excee<ls  in  quantity  or  in  the 
number  of  its  atoms  the  amount  of  ponderable  matter.    (7)  The 
mean  distjuice  of  the  particles  of  free  Ether  must  be  less  and  is 
probably  far  le>,s  than  one  ten  millionth  of  an  inch.     (8)  The 
pressure  of  the  Ether  on  any  surface  must  be  immensely  great. 
(D)  The  action  of   matter  on    Ether  must  vary  as  the  inverse 
cube  or  some  higiier  law,  and  the  repulsion  of  Ether  on  Ether 
as  the  inverse  fourth  or  some  higher  integer  power.     (10)  The 
three  laws  of  force  imply  two  independent  constants,  and  two 
other  results  from  the  acUial  constitution  of  Ether  in  space  and 
of  material  bodies." 

We  cannot  regard  Mr.  Birks'  view  of  matter  or  of  Ether  as 
sound,  for  reasons  which  will  afterwards  appear  ;  but  as  he 
farther  in  his  chapter  on  the  nature  and  properties  of  light  has 
more  to  say  on  Ether,  it  is  well  to  take  an  account  of  his  addi- 
tional statements  as  taken  from  the  theory  stated  by  Sir  John 
Herschel  in  the  Enc.  Metr.,  as  follows.  "(1)  An  excessively  rare 
and  elastic  Ether  pervades  all  space.  (2)  It  pervades  all 
material  bodies,  and  occupies  the  interval  between  their  mole- 

fracted  and  reflected,  and  communicates  heat  to  bodies,  and  is  put  into 
fits  of  easy  reflexion  and  transmission  ?  Do  not  hot  bodies  communi- 
cate their  heat  to  cold  ones  by  the  vibrations  of  this  medium  ?  And  is 
it  not  exceedingly  more  rare  and  subtle  than  air,  and  exceedingly  more 
elastic  and  active?  And  does  it  not  readily  pervade  all  bodies?  And 
is  it  not  by  its  elastic  force  expanded  through  all  the  heavens?"  The 
sagacity  of  Newton  properly  divined  not  only  the  existence  but  m  some 
respects  the  characteristics  of  Ether  ;  but  Mr.  Birks  mistakes  these, 
when  he  speaks  of  Ether  as  self-repulsive  ;  for  Ether  absolutely  per  se 
can  have  no  preferences  and  therefore  no  action,  but  is  the  servitor  of 
the  aftinities  communicated  by  material  objects. 


li 


F 


I 


I 


184 


Appendix  I. 


cules.  (3)  Ether  by  passing  between  them  or  by  its  extreme 
rarity,  offers  no  resistance  to  the  motion  of  the  earth,  jilanets, 
and  comets,  appreciable  by  the  most  delicate  observations.  (4) 
The  molecules  are  capable  of  bein«,'  set  in  motion  by  the  pai  tides 
of  matter,  and  of  comniunicatin*;  motion  to  the  jiarticles  wliich 
are  adjacent.  (5)  It  is  less  elastic  in  refractory  bodies.  ((3)  The 
frequency  of  the  pulses  or  number  of  impulses  made  on  our 
nerves  in  a  given  time,  <leter4nines  the  colour  of  the  light,  and 
the  amplitude  of  the  excursions,  its  brightness  or  intensity." 

Thereafter,  Mr.  Birks  sets  forth  a  nund>er  of  grounds  where- 
by Ether  explains  the  lleflection  and  Kefraction  of  light,  and 
accounts  for  the  dispersion  of  light,  the  polarizjition  of  light, 
circular  polarization,  and  the  probable  relation  between  ra«liant 
heat  and  light,  as  well  as  the  relations  between  light  ami  sound 
with  respect  to  the  variety  of  musical  tones  and  of  coloure.l 
rays. 

I  have  oidy  now  to  make  a  few  remarks  on  the  character- 
istics assigned  to  Ether  by  our  author.  In  common  with  almost 
all  writers,  he  terms  Ether  "an  excessively  rare  and  elastic 
medium  perva<ling  all  space."  This,  as  a  generally  su|)erticial 
definition,  may  be  regarded  as  good,  if  we  understand  the  use 
here  made  of  the  term  "  elastic."  Elastic  must  mean  not  only 
the  property  of  springing  back  to  its  original  form  after  tension, 
but  mainly  and  peculiarly  the  ;x>wer  of  being  indefinitely  ex- 
tended, so  that  when  preoccupied  at  one  j>oint,  it  may  always 
have  a  fresh  surface  for  any  new  form  that  may  be  presentetl, 
and  this  in  eodem  loco. 

It  is  said  to  pervade  all  material  bodies,  but  only  to  occupy 
the  intervals  between  their  molecules.  This  statement,  I  regard 
as  a  misapprehension.  It  implies  thf.t  the  particles  of  matter 
are  impenetrable  by  Ether,  whereas  the  law  seems  to  be  that 
Ether  enters  into  the  very  bosom  of  matter,  and  without  affect- 
ing the  conditions  of  matter,  itself  takes  on  these  conditions,  and 
shares  them,  with  this  distinction  betwixt  itself  and  matter,  that 
the  latter  are  expressed  in  a  gross  or  thickened  aspect,  while  the 
fonner  expresses  the  same  quality  and  form  in  an  esentially 
spirit  state. 

Again,  it  is  said,  Ether  offers  no  resistance  to  the  motions  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.     This  fact  ought  to  go  to  prove  that  Ether 


Appendix  I. 


185 


is  of  a  spirit-nature  ;  for  if  it  were  anything  like  ponderable 
matter,  it  behoves  that  there  should  be  resistance.  But  in  re- 
spect of  motion,  as  well  as  every  other  condition  of  material 
objticts,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Ether  symi)athises  with  these 
niovements,  and.  finds  corresponding  expression  in  itself.  Our 
autiior,  somewhat  out  of  consistency  with  the  non-resistance  of 
Ether,  says, — "  the  pressure  of  Ether  on  any  surface  must  be 
immensely  great."  He  compares  the  velocity  of  sotmd  with  that 
of  light,  and  observing  that  the  velocity  of  a  vibration  varies  as 
the  square  root  of  the  pressure  of  Ether  must  be  i:H  billions  of 
j)ounds  on  the  square  inch,  whereas  that  of  air  is  only  about  15 
pounds  to  tile  square  inch.  But  if  he  had  duly  a|)prehended 
the  character  of  Ether,  he  would  have  found  that  it  exerts  no 
pressure  whatever,  but  is  entirely  negative  in  that  respect,  ami 
is  leceptive,  as  noti«;ed,  of  the  characteristics  of  quality  and  con- 
<lition  and  form  as  pertaining  to  matter,  save  the  fact  of  its 
crassness. 

Our  author  has  regarded  Ether  as  self-repulsive.  He  draws 
thi*  inference  from  the  fact  that  light  travels  throufdi  Ether 
with  such  enormous  rapidity  ;  for,  he  says — "  if  its  particles 
were  mutually  attractive,  they  would  evidently  condense  around 
centres,  when  there  was  anv  excess  of  densitvat  first:  and  linht 
could  not  pass  from  one  of  these  condensing  systems  to  another." 
Hence,  he  infers  that  mutual  repulsions  must  be  one  of  its  fun- 
damental laws.  Surely  the  inference  must  be  the  extraordinary 
attraction  of  Ether  for  the  condition  of  light.  What  is  lifdit  ? 
It  is  one  of  the  con<litions  of  matter,  and  so  great  is  the  affinity 
of  Ether  for  that  condition  that  it  takes  it  on  with  amazing 
readiness,  and  spreads  it  with  inconceivable  rapidity.  He  sj)eaks 
of  the  particles  of  Ether  as  if  they  were  atomic  and  se[)arable 
like  matter,  indicating  that  in  his  day,  however  strange  and 
puissant  Ether  had  been  suspected  to  be,  Mr.  Birks  and  others 
had  failed  to  guess  its  real  character. 

Again,  it  is  noticed  that  "  the  existence  of  matter  and 
Ether  requires  the  admission  of  three  and  only  three  laws  of 
force  ;  first,  matter  acting  on  matter  ;  second,  matter  acting  on 
Ether,  and  Ether  on  matter  ;  and  third,  Ether  acting  on  Ether." 
It  is  verv  doubtful  whether  matter  acts  directlv  on  matter,  that 
is  apart  from  the  connecting  link  of  Ether,  save   mechanically 


-' 


Ml! 


186 


Appendix  I. 


when  one  body  comes  into  collision  with  another.  We  believe 
that  the  cohesion  of  the  |)articlesof  matter  is  |)r(Kluceil  by  means 
of  the  all  pervading  Etlier,  which,  taking  <)n  the  affinities  of  the 
particles,  binds  them  together  accortling  to  the  law  of  attraction 
which  inherently  pertains  to  them.  There  is,  therefore,  the 
operation  of  two  great  laws  only,  viz.,  that  of  matter  npon 
Ether,  and  that  of  Ether  upon  matter.  "First  of  all,  by  the  crea- 
tion of  matter  with  its  qualities  anil  conditions,  we  have  Ether 
assuming  the  same  qualities  and  conditions,  while  yet  retaining 
its  c(insistency  as  spirit-substance,  an<l  projecting  those  diminish- 
ing inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance  increases.  When  two 
material  bo«lies  therefore  meet  at  a  distance  from  one  another, 
yet  within  the  range  of  their  respective  affinities,  they  affect  one 
another  precisely  as  if  the  etherial  representation  were  one  solid 
mass  with  the  bodies  themselves,  and  thus  we  account  for  tlie 
great  doctrine  of  gravitation. 

The  author  speaks  of  the  particles  of  Ether,  and  says,  "  the 
mean  distance  of  the  particles  of  free  Ether  niust  be  less,  and 
probably  far  less  than  one  ten  millionth  of  an  inch."  Like 
others  who  have  treated  of  the  great  question  of  Ether,  he  speaks 
of  the  })articles  or  atoms  of  which  it  is  composed.  One  would 
think  that  it  should  have  occurred  to  these  great  men  to  see  from 
the  fact  of  its  extraordinary  elasticity,  to  which  all  of  them  refer, 
that  it  must  be  of  an  absolutely  contiiuious  nature.  We  have 
not  only  referred  to  the  absolute  impossibility  of  finding,  or  of 
procuring  a  vacuum,  in  which  Ether  is  not  persistently  present, 
but  the  very  fact  also  of  that  endless  elasticity,  whereby  it  is 
so  expanded  as  to  present  a  fresh  and  free  front  to  every  add- 
itional object  that  has  to  be  represented  therein,  and  fulfils  that 
representation  notwithstanding  any  pre-occupation,  ought  to  con- 
vince us  that  there  is  nothing  of  a  finite  character  pertaining  to 
it.  Matter  is  seen  an<l  known  to  us  to  be  of  a  finite  character, 
and  whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  the  atoms  into  which  it  is 
divisible,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  is  separable  into  atoms. 

It  may  be  allowed  that  there  is  Ether  in  one  set  of  circum- 
stances more  rare,  and  in  another  set  of  circumstances  more 
dense,  according  as  it  is  absolutely  free  from  all  or  any  influence 
spent  upon  it  from  any  body  of  matter,  or  when  the  space  is 
occupied  by  a  series  of  representations  such  as  the  earth  and  the 


Appendix  I. 


187 


various  conditions  of  the  earth,  and  in  addition  to  the  conditions 
pertaining  to  electricity  and  magjietism,  and  varied  individual 
delineations.  Hence,  it  may  be  that  there  is  a  condensed  Ether, 
as  well  as  an  Ether  of  still  higher  tenuity.  Of  course,  the  Ether 
would  in  these  circnmstamtes  be  most  condensed  in  solid  bodies, 
and  hence,  while  the  free  passage  of  forms  in  light  miirht  be 
ofxin  for  many  repetitions  in  the  free  atmosphere,  it  is  quite 
conceivable  that  a  limit  must  be  had  to  the  transmission  and  re- 
transmission of  messages  through  the  telegraphic  wire.  It  is 
also  quite  conceivable  that  the  velocity  of  a  wave  or  pulse  of 
Ether  in  travelling  through  a  liquid  or  transparent  solid  must 
be  affected  by  the  affinity  of  the  solid  or  fluid  atoms.  Refraction 
seems  to  depend  on  density.  Light  must  have  an  equal  move- 
ment so  long  as  the  wave  travels  in  undisturbed  Ether  ;  but 
when  it  is  permanently  condensed,  as  in  certain  transparent 
solids,  the  path  of  the  wave  takes  a  lateral  direction. 

It  has  been  thought  difficult  to  explain  what  has  been 
called  circular  polarization  as  compared  with  common  light.  We 
have  but  one  explanation  that  is  satisfactory,  and  it  is  this,  that 
in  the  projection  of  an  object  and  its  circumstantials  in  the 
medium  of  Ether,  the  precise  lines  which  characterize  the  object, 
are  represented  as  they  are  contained  in  the  original. 

There  is  a  relation  betwixt  the  vibrations  of  light  and  those 
of  Hountl  ;  but  the  one  is  a  tremor  of  pure  Ether  and  the  other 
has  its  initial  utterance  in  air  ;  and  hence  the  slowness  of  the 
latter  passage  compared  with  the  former. 

We  have  much  to  add  to  the  characteristics  of  Ether,  which 
will  be  found  in  the  effort  made  by  this  publication  to  make 
known  its  properties  generally. 


APPENDIX    11. 

ON  CAUSALITY,  AND  TIIK  liKIXC  <>F  TIIK 

PERSONAL  (ioI>. 


TiiKiiK  are  Lwu  aAi..hi>  wl.ich  arise  as  simple  ;nnl  necessary  iiifr- 
reiices  in  connection  with  human  experience,  ami  which  all  n  »- 
aonahle  beinj^s  have  to  a<,'iee  to,  who  are  ahle  to  enter  on  tiic 
question  :  these  are,  first,  "that  every  .  fleet  must  have  a  cause;" 
and,  second,  that  "the  effect  cannot  contain  mow  in  it  than 
bel(>n<rw  to  the  cause."  It  may  be  asked—what  is  a  cause,  an«l 
what  is  an  etiect,  and  how  »lo  they  stand  related  to  one  another? 
These  are  proper  en(mjL,di  cpiestions.  We  must  have  an  under- 
stamlir.i,'  as  to  what  a  thini,'  is  before  we  can  truly  pronounce 
upon  its  characteristics.  We  define  a  cause,  then,  to  be  t/idt  <i8- 
semblaye  of  inyredients  irUich  u'hen  combined  proiluces  a  definite 
result*     It  is  obvious,  then,  that  cause  and  effect  are  correlative 

*  Many  have  wondered  why  it  hapi)ens  in  the  case  of  every 
rational  being,  that  there  is  this  belief,  that  every  cause  must  have  its 
effect,  and  that  every  effect  must  have  its  cause  ;  but  practically  this  is 
what  a  child  is  leorning  every  moment  of  its  developing  existence. 
Every  mechanical  movcnieni  is  an  illustration  of  cause  and  effect.  One 
cannot  shut  the  door,  cannot  take  food,  cannot  stir  the  fire,  but  there  is 
hereby  the  operation  of  cause  and  effect.  A  child  cannot  see  a  new 
toy  brought  inti>  his  nursery.  <«r  an  old  toy  removed  from  it,  but  he 
observes  cause  and  effect  conjoined.  A  child  from  experience  knows 
that  there  would  be  a  serious  effect  if  his  toy  w  ere  put  into  the  fire,  or  if 
a  pail  of  nippers  were  to  lie  applied  to  one  of  his  fingers.  In  con- 
struction also,  the  child  learns  the  connexion  l)ctwixt  cause  and  effect. 
He  sees  a  doll  dresseil,  or  he  sees  a  house  made  of  wooden  blocks,  or 
he  may  come  to  assist  in  piecing  the  cuttings  which  go  to  make  a  map 
or  picture  :  when  therefore  the  effect  is  shewn  he  can  state  the  cause. 
In  this  way  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  becomes  unconsciously 
familiar  to  him. 


I' 


Appendix  II. 


180 


teinia  for  one  and  the  same  thing,  the  difference  beinfj  the  cause 
is  the  ingredients  in  conti;j:uity  in  onler  to  their  conibinati(m  ; 
and  effect  is  the  aceompUshment  of  the  combination.  Cause 
and  effect  imply  one  and  the  same  array  of  factors  ;  but  the 
relationship  is  differejit.  In  the  cause  we  have  respect  to  the 
particular  and  sj)ecific  elements  which  enter  into  the  combina- 
tion ;  in  the  effect  we  have  respect  to  their  congUmieration  into 
on(»  wh(de.  When,  however,  a  combination  of  elements  has 
bet!n  once  effected,  there  may  be  introduced  an  additional  ingre- 
dient, which  ingre«lient,  of  course,  produces  a  change  in  the 
result.  We  sj)eak  of  that  ingredient,  therefore,  as  the  cause  of 
this  change  ;  but  in  respect  of  the  whole  question,  that  ingre- 
dient is  but  an  individual  factor  whereby  the  result  as  a  whole 
is  constituted. 

Having  pren)ise<l  this  much  resjiecting  the  intimate  relation 
which  subsists  between  cause  and  effect,  we  come  now  to  the 
alisidute  and  uncaused  (iround  which  lies  obviously  before  us, 
viz.,  that  of  an  infinite  Ether,  which  as  a  medium  we  have  seen 
is  one  continueil  and  unbroken  unity  and  unif(jrmity  through- 
out, in  itself  undisturbeil,  save  in  so  far  only  as  it  is  affected  by 
the  individual  objects  with  which  space  is  fiUeil.  These  objects 
without  exception  bear  on  them  the  marks  of  constmction^  in  as 
far  as  they  shew  the  adaptatiwi  of  things  in  themselves  indepen- 
dent of  one  another,  and  which  have  in  themselves  no  natural 
connexion,  brought  together  and  conjoined  obviously  in  the  ful- 
filment of  a  j)urj)ose.  Supposing  these  constructed  objects  to  be 
out  of  the  way,  and  removed  entirely,  what  have  we  to  all  ap- 
pearance left  ?  We  have  simply  the  universal  Ether — an  Ether 
to  which  we  can  ascribe  no  limit,  and,  therefore  we  naturally  or 
necessarily  predicate  respecting  it,  that  such  has  the  characteristic 
of  infinite  substance.  That  is,  we  have  hereby  a  8[)irit-substance, 
as  the  absolute  basis  of  beinghood,  in  one  continuous  and  bound- 
less existence.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  utterly  inqjossible 
to  conceive  the  beginning  of  a  disturbance.  As  existing  in  equi- 
librio  by  itself,  there  is  nothing  to  derange  that  equilibrium, 
nndei'  the  sup])osition  of  an  absolute  substance  without  parts. 
I;  there  comes  to  be  an  agitation  of  this  univeral  substance,  it 
behoves  that  there  must  have  been  a  cause  ;  and  that  cause 
must  have  been  an  ingredient  in  some  sense  out  of  itself.      We 


J  1 


190 


Appendix  II. 


can  have  no  conception  of  cause^  apart  from  a  plurality  of  con- 
ditions. 

Looking,  then,  to  the  facts  of  the  world  as  they  8taii<l  before 
us,  we  are  necessarily  shut  up  to  the  conclusion,  that  there  be- 
hoved to  be  in  a  sense  outside  the  universal  substance,  a  positive 
entity,  having  the  power  of  creating  a  change  of  condition. 
What  this  power  might  be  has  been  the  theme  of  many  a  pen. 
Happily,  there  is  no  antagonism  among  parties  as  to  the  great  fact 
of  there  being  a  ro(»t,  a  positive  root^  from  which  all  derivetl  exis- 
tences are  supposed  to  have  sprung.  The  sole  question  has  been, 
as  to  the  nature  of  this  initiatory  beginning  of  individualism. 
Some  will  have  it  that  it  was  inherent  in  the  primal  substance, 
and  that  it  has  spontaneously  developed  in  the  course  of  many 
ages  into  the  diversity  which  we  presently  see  in  the  world. =- 

Such  a  conclusion  is  a  contradiction  of  all  our  experiences 
touching  the  great  question  of  cause  and  effect.  How  spon- 
taneity in  mere  substance  shouhl,  in  the  negation  of  movement, 
begin  to  move — how  it  should  come  to  operate  by  itself,  in  add- 
ing structure  to  structure,  without  an  antecedent  active  power 
to  introiliice  at  least  the  nucleus  of  that  structure,  utterly  battles 
us  to  comprehend,  or  even  how  there  should  be  a  developement 
in  nature  to  the  attainment  through  a  long  series  of  varied 
creatures,  to  an  individual  such  as  man,  with  reasoning  powers 
and  a  designing  mind,  apart  from,  and  independent  of,  a  great 
Original,  as  the  comprehension  in  himself  of  existing  organization 
anfl  of  existing  capacities,  is  what  I  cannot  imagine.     Such  a 

*  The  standpoint  in  the  philosophy  of  Hegel  is  to  our  view  utterly 
inadmissible.  No  doubt  that  standpoint,  asw  as  that  of  Schellint;,  was 
primarily  an  absolute  identity,  in  which  thought  and  being  were  one  ;  but 
how  this  absolute  One  or  All  should  have  had  a  beginning  of  movement 
is  the  difficulty.  To  talk  of  a  "  becoming,"  or  an  evolution  of  the  con- 
crete, indicates  a  state  of  unrest,  and  destroys  the  absoluteness  of  the 
oneness.  No  doubt  we  may  speak  of  a  germ-cell  as  one  ;  and  in  virtue 
of  the  modifications  within  it  these  develop  into  the  many.  So  they 
do ;  but  this  only  in  virtue  of  the  cell  being  implanted  in  a  suitable 
medium  ;  but  where  is  the  absolute  oneness  in  this  case  ?  The  cjuestion 
is,  How  is  that  which  is  absolutely  one  and  undivided,  to  begin  move- 
ment, if  there  was  no  movement  before  ?  There  can  be  no  self-deter- 
mination in  absolute  and  uniform,  or  rather  formless,  oneness. 


Appendix  II. 


191 


conclusion  is  a  drawing  on  the  credulity  of  rational  beings  in  a 
mo$t  unnatural  fashion.  It  is  not  reason  that  we  should  guess 
at,  atul  adopt  as  possibilities,  what  lies  beyond  and  out  of  the 
liiHi  of  our  experiences.  We  ought  to  be  true  to  ourselves,  and 
follow  the  leadings  of  onlv  rational  argument. 

There  are  no  such  experiences  as  are  here  postulated.  True, 
we  have  the  experiences  of  natural  laws,  as  they  are  presently 
conducted  in  the  world.  But  what  are  these  ?  Unquestionably, 
they  are  comprehended  in  this  formula,  that  each  creature  pro- 
duces after  its  kind,  with  such  deviations  within  the  circle  of 
the  species,  as  the  accidents  of  interposing  influences  may  en- 
gender. To  such  deviations  we  give  the  name  of  evolution. 
Every  fresh  inquiry  confirms  this  conclusion.  We  have  learned 
to  know,  therefore,  what  is  the  law  of  propagation.  It  is  a  law 
entirely  congruous  to,  and  confirmatary  of,  cause  and  effect.  And 
whatever  changes  may  be  effected  in  the  processes  of  propagation, 
there  is  nothing  in  the  effect,  but  that  which  is  contained  in  the 
cause,  in  as  far  as  the  influences  which  have  been  operatiu"-  in 
the  combination,  were  they  known,  would  be  sufficient  to  account 
for  all  results. 

We  are  shut  up  to  this  conclusion  that  propagation 
is  a  totally  different  thing  from  construction  ah  initio  ;  and  still 
further  to  the  conclusion,  that  as  propagation  cannot  introduce 
creations  de  novOy  so  we  must  have  resource  to  a  designing  and 
constructive  Mind  at  the  foundation,  and  before  all  existin<y 
things,  a»  the  jjrimary  Source  from  which  they  are  as  creatures 
derived. 

What,  therefore,  can  we  say  generally  of  the  Personal 
Fountain  of  all  being,  but  that  He  must  be  regarded  as  funda- 
mentally the  Absolute  comprehension  as  a  Cause  of  all  possible 
conditions,  in  positive  primitive  expression ;  even  as  the  Im- 
personal ground  must  be  regarded  as  fundamentally  in  like 
manner  the  absolute  comprehension,  as  a  basis  of  all  possible 
conditions  in  latent  inexpression.  The  one  is  to  be  considered  as 
the  exact  counterpart  of  the  other  ;  and  the  two  departments  go 
to  make  up  one  entire  and  perfect  whole,  through  which  there 
is  a  possible  generation  of  the  heavens  and  of  the  earth,  and  all  the 
objects  that  are  therein.  Beyond  this,  it  does  not  seem  possible 
for  us  to  go  ;  but  thus  far  we  are  clearly  led.    And  we  can  only 


102 


Appendix  II. 


wonder  that  intellij^'ent  men  cm  be  foiiiul  wlio  can  think  that 
Agnosticism,  or  the  unknowableness  of  an  ahsohite  first  Cause, 
1i<as  a  foot  to  stand  iipon. 

As  to  what  constitutes  the  oneness  of  tlie  prinjoidial  per- 
sonal Cause,  it  is  not  easy  to  speak.  The  (h»ctrine  of  Causality, 
as  indicatinj'  movement  in  virtue  of  the  communism  of  at  least 
a  diversity  of  qualities  co-existin«(  in  the  same  orj;anic  unity, 
constrains  us  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  to  the  personal 
Deity  this  diversity  must  be  heM  as  applicable.  Kow  or  in 
what  way  this  variety  in  unity  subsists  in  (iod  is  not  for  us  to 
say.  lint  that  variety  of  condition  must  needs  primarily  be 
in  some  forni  or  another,  and  existinjf  too,  under  limitations, 
whereby  alone  limitations  can  be  [innluced,  is  not  to  be  doubted 
for  a  momt?nt,  while,  at  the  same  time  this  variety  as  conjoined 
in  the  unity  of  a  j)erfect  combination,  must  also  be  received. 
And  this,  ii»  like  manner,  must  be  envisaj^ed  in  the  thoui^ht  of  a 
personal  (iod,  that,  while  he  has  the  platform  of  infinity  before 
liini,  as  attonlint,'  endless  scope  for  the  production  of  works  (or 
shall  I  say  worlds  /)  without  limit,  the  conditions  tjf  his  being 
nnist  Ihj  regarded  as  fundamentally  such,  that  out  of  those  con- 
ditions he  is  able  to  minister  the  ty}u's^  of  thing's  in  the  universe, 
and  by  means  of  these  types  to  draw  forth  from  the  exhaustless 
source  of  the  impersonal  and  unconditioned,  the  stores  where- 
with the  universe  is  filled. 

Thus  ^^L■  ,ite  brou^lit  face  to  face  with  what  we  ref,'ard  as  a 
great  fact,  that,  while  we  first  (»f  all  reach  a  universal  spirit-sub- 
stance tjeneric  in  respect  of  Quality  and  of  Energy,  we  are  also 
of  necessit  V  brouj^ht  into  immediate  cognisance  of  an  absolute 
spirit-substance  having  partirnhtrs  in  respect  of  Quality  and 
Energy  : — that  the  former  must  Ih?  regarded  as  in  itself  abso- 
lute Impersonality/,  and  by  itself  utterly  incapabh' of  originating 
any  definite  or  express  condititui  or  conditions  as  particidars,  or 
indeed  of  l>egii:ning  any  movement  whatever  :  while  the  latter, 
being  a  formal  nrinifestation  of  fundamental  Qualities  and 
Powers,  as  the  primal  constituti<»n  of  his  beinghood,  ami 
omni]»ntence  must  be  regarded  as  absolute  PersonnUt)/ : — 
that  the  former,  as  containing  in  its  bosom  the  exhaustless 
substance,  which  is  thequarrv  of  tlie  |)articulars  of  the  universe, 
is  also  the  basis  on  which  all  beinghoml  rests,  wldle  the  latter  is 


Appendix  II. 


193 


the  Source  or  Original  by  which  all  creaturehood  is  fundament- 
ally constructed  ;  and  that  the  two  are  practically  one  entire 
Absolute,  as  the  only  perfect  complement,  which  accounts  for 
the  introduction  of  the  worhls  and  their  contents.    The  latter  is 
the  positive  aspect  of  primitive  being— the  underived  substantial 
Individuality,  antl   must  be   regarded  as  the   Absolute   Form 
(whatever  that  may  tuean)  in  the  self-subsisting   unity  of  its 
Qualities—  as  the  full  Expression  positively  of  the  inner  possibili- 
ties which  lie  negatively  in  the  Unconditioned,  but  not  Unquali- 
fie<l  Imj)ersonality  ;*  and  therefore  the  Personal  is  the  Source  and 
Spring  of  movement,  and  the  Originator  of  all  derived  conditions 
w  ith  their  respective  adjustments  and  laws  of  operation.  We  have 
c<3mpletest  evidence  for  the  existence  of  an  absolute  Personality, 
as  co-existing,  on  the  platform  of  an  absolute  Impersonality — a 
Personality  which  is  the  exact  con  naturalness  of  all  that  is  con- 
tained in  the  Impersonality,  with  this  distinction,  that  the  one 
contains  in  HiiUvSelf  in  positive  manifestation,  what  lies  hidden 
an<l   concealed  in  the  other.     Without  the  positive  Existence, 
embracing  in  its  bosom  the  fundamental  qualities,  out  of  which 
all  action  proceeds,  there  could  be  no  mind,  an«i  no  movement 
in  accoidance  with   mind  ;  and  therefore  no  manifestation  of 
being  ;  and  without  the  pregnant  soil  of  the  Unconditioned,  as 
at  once  the  ground  to  work  upon,  and  the  mine  to  respond  to 
every  call  made  upon  it,  there  could  have  been  no  production  of 
beinghood  and  no  inbringing  of  the  world  in  any  form.     The 
Personal  without  the  Impeisonal  would  have  been  power  with- 
out the  possibility  of  putting  it  into  practical  action.     The  Im- 
personal without  the  Personal,  would  have  been  material  with- 
out the  power  of  being  modified  into  condition  and  form. 

What  follows  from  the  great  fact  of  their  co-existence  is  the 
process  of  creation  of  which  we  can  grasp  some  idea.  First  (as 
we  conceive),  there  had  to  be  set  forth  the  primary  elements  as 
the  alphabet  of  creation — of  the  varied  substance  of  the  world. 
What  these  elements  were,  it  is  unnecessary  here  to  inquire, 

*  The  Uncondilioned  of  Hamilton  was  made  to  be  also  the  Un- 
qualified. We  have  before  noticed  that  there  is  no  such  entity  as 
substance  without  a  basis  of  Quality.  But  there  may  be  Quality  with- 
out Conditions.  Conditions  are  the  mere  accidents  under  which 
Quality  is  manifested. 


194 


Appendix  II. 


Appendix  II. 


195 


'!» 


but,  coming  from  the  aelf-same  fountain,  they  would  natui-ally 
have  the  affinity  of  attraction  for  one  another  when  placed  in  a 
certain  relationship  to  one  another,  and  the  terms  of  their  union, 
we  can  understand  couM  be  determined,  while,  if  the  relation- 
ship were  changed  it  would  follow  that  the  attraction  would  l»e 
changed  ;  and  it  might  be  ii»to  repulsion.  Second,  we  can  under- 
stand that  there  had  to  be  such  a  variety  of  these  as  would  be 
adapted  for  the  matter  of  the  universe.  The  letters  of  the 
alphabet,  as  illustrating  the  primary  elements,  by  their  union 
first  into  words,  and  then  words  into  sentences,  will  point  out 
the  mode  of  compound  union  in  regard  to  the  composition  of 
matter.  In  the  construction  of  matter  as  inorganic,  we  find 
attention  given  to  the  arrangements  adapted  for  crystalliaition. 
And  finally,  as  a  preparation  for  the  organic  dej)artment,  we  find 
the  introduction  of  a  structural  cell  with  this  proviso,  that  be- 
ginning with  the  siuiplest  of  all,  item  after  item  seems  to  be  en- 
folded therein,  and  made  to  develop  each  its  separate  inclusion  in 
growth  ;  and  another  and  still  higher  organization  seems  to  be 
imparted  to  the  cell  as  the  type  of  a  higher  stage,  and  ho  on  until 
the  case  of  man  was  reached,  when,  of  course,  the  cell  could  de- 
velop no  more  thar.  what  had  primarily  been  bound  up  in 
its  prerogatives.  The  difficulty  of  believing  in  the  fact  of  a  vast 
number  of  separate  branches  of  bcxlily  structure,  and  as  in  the  case 
of  man,  being  all  involved  within  a  very  very  small  compass  such 
as  a  single  cell,  is  not  greater  than  the  fact  which  we  know  to  be 
illustrated  in  the  case  of  Ether,  holding  in  separate  distinctness 
a  vast  multitude  of  separate  forms  ;  or  in  the  case  of  a  human 
soul  being  filled  with  thousands  u|K)n  thousands  of  se))arate  ideas 
constituting  one's  knowledge,  as  we  know  to  be  a  fact  patent  to 
all. 

One  of  the  great  difficulties  in  the  conception  of  Deity,  has 
been  the  assignment  of  limitation  to  Him,  and  consequently,  in 
looking  simply  to  the  infinite  to  show  how  the  finite  couhl  emanate 
from  Him  ;  but  to  Him  belongs  limitation  and  non-limitation — 
limitation  in  respect  to  form  for  the  construction  of  forms,  but 
non-limitation  in  respect  to  the  extent  and  variety  of  the  forms 
that  might  be  brought  upon  the  stage  of  the  universe.  Without 
both,  perfection  would  be  wanting. 

There  is  another  representation  of  Deity  made  known  par- 


ticularly in  the  New  Testament,  which  is  presented  to  us  as  the 
counterpart  of  that  which  stands  in  its  intrinsic  originality.  We 
should  naturally  have  no  knowledge  of  this  representation,  were 
it  not  a  revelation  specially  made  to  us,  and  that  in  a  book  that 
comes  to  us  with  an  overwhelming  evidence  of  its  authenticity 
and  genuineness.  How  this  Image  of  the  Original  Personality 
came  to  be  introduced,  we  do  not  know  ;  but  this  we  must 
know,  that,  while  the  Personality  which  is  original  and 
underived,  must  remain  it  its  intrinsic  and  essential  Form 
of  Beinghood,  that  which  is  begotten  must  be  regarded  as  a 
derived  Form  of  the  same,  but  generated  through  the  uncondi- 
tioned Impersonality.*  Whether  mirrored  therein,  and  made  a 
fixture  therefrom,  as  is  not  impossible  or  unlikely,  it  is  not  for 
us  to  pronounce  ;  but  if  so,  it  could  only  be  the  beginning  of 
that  great  analogy,  according  to  which  we  liave  presumed  that 
all  that  is  in  the  world  is  formed. 

Though  it  does  not  fall  to  us  to  consider  theology  so  far  as 
it  is  revealed  to  us  in  the  Scriptures,  this  question  of  what  is 
therein  called  "  the  only  begotten  Son  of  God  "  is  of  such  enor- 
mous moment  to  those  receiving  the  Scriptnres  as  genuine,  that 
a  few  words  on  the  subject  may  not  be  regarded  as  altogether 
irrelevant  ;  and  we  may  readily  take  up  the  language  of  the 
Nicene  creed  and  regard  thisjsounterpart  of  the  Form  of  God  as 
"  becrotten  of  the  Father  before  all  worlds."  We  may  say  this, 
that  v^'hile  without  the  Divine  record  it  would  in  all  probability 
never  have  occurred  to  us,  that  such  a  production  as  an  entire 
Image  of  God,  in  proper  Personality,  should  have  engaged  our 
thoughts  as  a  sober  reality  apart  from  the  revelation  of  the  fact, 
yet  the  fact,  when  fairly  considere<l,  is  far  from  being  beyond 
the  range  of  our  ordinary  thinking.  All  we  can  say  is,  that  it 
is  the  Personal  reflected  through  the  Impersonal.    And  if  we 

*  Let  it  be  noted,  that  while  we  speak  of  the  unconditioned  Im- 
personality, we  do  not  imply  an  unqualified  Impersonality.  We  have 
asserted  that  Quality  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  substance,  and  con- 
stitutes the  foundation  of  primal  substance  ;  but  then,  primal  substance 
in  its  absolute  state  is  without  conditions.  Conditions  are  the  modi- 
fications which  are  contingent  on  particular  substances  ;  and  contingen- 
cies do  not  exist  in  the  Absolute, 


I 


lOG 


^ 


\ppendix  II. 


consider  the  ijreat  purpose  which  "the  only  begotten  Son"  was 
employed  to  fulfil,  viz.,  to  operate  as  the  Supreme  Agent  by 
whom  creation  should  be  practically  intnxluced,  while  the 
Father  devised  and  originated  the  scheme  of  things  which  had 
to  b«  intnnluced,  it  follows  that  He  nnist  be  one  with  the  Father, 
as  receiving  the  purposes  and  plans,  for  the  accomplishment  of 
which  He  was  delegated  bv  the  Father  to  fulfil. 

While  totiching  u|)on  this  theme  of  a  plurality  of  Personali- 
ties it  may  be  aske«l  where  is  the  Trinity  of  the  orthodox 
churches  ;  for  we  here  present  but  a  simple  Duality  ?  Before 
coming  to  the  question  of  Trinity,  it  may  be  mentioned  that,  in 
the  Eternal  Son  we  have  all  that  is  demanded  by  Old  Testa- 
ment teaching  under  the  name  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  It  was  He 
by  whom  prophets  spake.  What  then?  It  humbly  appears  to 
the  writer,  that  the  pleromn  or  fulness  of  the  Divine  Son,  as 
the  Eternal  Spirit,  was  reflected  in  the  aoid  of  Jesus  Christ,  and 
that  this  constituted  the  personality  of  Christ  to  be  in  oneness 
with  the  Eternal  Son.  Assuredly  this  view  answers  all  the  in- 
timations of  Holy  Writ,  in  as  far  as  it  sets  forth  Christ  as  made 
after  the  manner  of  men,  and  yet  in  respect  of  his  acquisition  of 
the  Eternal  Sonship  "  without  measure"  or  stint,  it  makes  him 
to  be  classified  as  in  point  of  fact  He  who  made  the  worlds.  It 
does  occur  to  me  that  the  view  here  stated,  which  makes  Christ 
one  with  the  Eternal  Spirit,  and  as  one  w}K)se  name  is  made  a 
convertible  term  with  the  Eternal  Spirit — (see  Rom.  VIII.  9,  10) 
— fulfils  the  intimation  of  sacred  Scripture,  wliile  yet  the  invented 
term  of  "  Trinity"  is  hardly  appropriate — a  term  nowhere  found 
in  the  Holy  Word  of  G(k1.  While  this  view  ascribes  the  Divine 
nature  emphatically  to  Jesus  Christ,  it  does  away  with  that 
tremendous  mystery  which  attaches  to  a  personal  change  taking 
place  in  the  Eternal  Son,  as  actually  divesting  himself  of  his 
position  as  such :  the  whole  truth  being,  that  he  imparts  or  ap- 
plies the  fulness  of  his  own  mental  sphere  to  Jesus  Christ.  This 
view,  moreover,  sets  forth  the  grand  analogy  of  the  diffusion  of 
this  same  Holy  Ghost,  being  given  through  Christ  to  the  church 
for  all  believers,  who  are  declared  by  Peter  and  Paul  to  be  par- 
takers of  the  Divine  nature.  This  view,  moreover,  confirms  all 
New  Testament  doctrine  in  respect  of  the  precious  bloo<l  ul 
Christ.     What  is  the  sprinkling  of  the  blood  of  Christ  "  but  the 


Appendix  11. 


197 


bestownu  nt  of  that  whi«'h  constitutes  the  life  of  Christ,  which 
is  **the  blood  of  the  New  Testament  "—the  grace  of  God  which 
bringeth  salvation  ?  There  is  no  other  blood  which  reaches  unto 
us  :  there  is  no  other  blood  that  can  reach  unto  us,  for  the  blood 
of  the  bcxly  was  sacrified  and  therefore  put  out  of  the  way  ;  but 
the  blood  of  God  (so  Ciilled)  which  constitutes  the  life  of  God  in 
the  soul  of  man,  is  vouchsafed  for  all  who  are  open  to  receive  it. 


INDEX, 


A. 


Absolute, 

Affinity, 

Ananias— bis  free«loni, 

Annibilation— absolute,  impossible, 

Ap]>etites. 

A  ])Osteriori  School, 

A  priori  School,  ... 

Ascent  of  Man,   ... 

Association, 

Atoms, 

Attraction  and  Repulsion, 

Attributes, 


B. 


Brain— the  orjjan  of  miml, ' 
Brain  -the  cortical  substance, 


PAGE. 

16,  17,49,  162 
20,  56,  146 
144 
6 
127 
89 
89 
32 
116 
24,90,  149,  155 
149 
1 


68,  70,  113 
115 


C. 


Call,  general  and  special,  ... 
Calder wood,  Professor, 

Causality, 
Causal  nexus. 
Cause  and  Effect, 

Cause,    ... 

Cause-Stuart  Mill  and  Spencer  on, 

Cell-development, 
Cerebellum, 
Cerebral  substance. 
Cerebral  centre,  ... 


175 


103, 

113 

22, 

147, 

155, 

162 

•  •  • 

20 

86, 

App 

endi> 

:II 

121, 

124 

•  •  • 

8 

•  •  • 

33 

•  •  • 

111 

•  • 

110 

•  • 

87 

11 


Index. 


Index. 


Ill 


HI 


PAt.E 

Chemical  combination, 

... 

149 

Colour,  sound,  etc., — how  cog 

nized. 

•  •  •                      •  •  • 

95 

Condition, 

•  •                      •  •  • 

147 

Condition  and  Form, 

•  •  •                     •  •  • 

58 

Conditions — their  mutual  action. 

•  •  • 

150 

Conditioned  and  Unconditioned, 

50 

Conception, 

..      75,  78, 

117,  122 

Connecting  link,... 

•  •                          • «  • 

49 

Consciousness, 

2,  10,  57,  6 

2,  G4,  67.  72 

,  75,  151 

Consciousness — must  have  an 

object. 

*  •  *                         •  •  • 

5 

Consciousness— the  highest, 

•  •  • 

•  •                          •  •  • 

18 

Conscious  Me, 

•  •                          •  •  • 

2«,  106 

Cogito,  ergo  sum. 

•  •  • 

9 

Conservation  of  Energy,    ... 

•  •                         •  •  • 

53 

Contiguity, 

•  •                          •  •  • 

148 

Cosmical  Forces,  ... 

45 

Creation, 

■  •                          •  •  • 

69,  162 

Creation — Divine  object  in. 

•  •                          •  •  • 

167 

Criminal  nature,... 

*  *                          •  •  • 

133 

Crux  philosophorum. 

•  •  • 

183 

D. 

Divid's  sin. 

133,  143 

Des  Cartes  on  Substance,  ... 

8 

Des  Cartes  on  the  Ego, 

10 

Deduction, 

120 

Development — subjective, . . . 

15 

Desire.s,... 

127 

Determination  of  Will, 

30 

Dilemma  of  Philosophers,... 

89 

Divine  teaching — when  resisted. 

136 

Dynamic  attribute  of  Ether, 

« 

148 

Eotype  of  external  object, 
EiFect — how  found. 
Ego— how  originated, 


•  •  •  Ho 

121 
5,  25,  92,  99 


Elective  Affinity, 

Electricity, 

Elements— primary  source, 

Emotions, 

Energy — generic, 

Eternity,  161  ;  of  matter  impossible. 


PAGE 

47 

.       33,  46 

.  149,  165 

.     28,  124 

15,  52,  54 

54 


Ether,  ... 
Evolution, 
Existence, 
Kxternalitv, 


12,  16,  38,  40,  45,  52,  54.  61,  74,  76,  103,  148,  151 
32,59,155,157,166 

...  ...  ...  ...  i)  *^'*)  ^^ 

1 1    Q7 

...  •••  •••  •••  •••  J.i|    %J  I 


Externality — Dr.  Reid  and  Hume,... 


F. 


Faculties — internal. 

Faith  determines  one's  religion. 

Fall  of  man,  how  introduced, 

Faraday  on  Ether, 

Ferrier  on  the  Medulla,     ... 

Fichte  on  the  Ego, 

First  Cause — a  necessity,  ... 

"  Form  of  God,"  how  expressed, 

Forms  in  matter  and  in  spirit, 

Forms  of  thought,  whence. 

Force  lies  in  Causality, 

Forces,  their  source, 

Freedom, 

Free  Will,  the  Gordian  knot  untied, 


G. 


G(k1  not  a  respecter  of  persons, 

God's  working  and  man's  freedom. 

Godhead,  a  second  Personality, 

Gunpowder, 

Gravitation, 

Grey  matter  of  Brain, 

Growth, 


12 


17,  19,  38,  48,  63, 
31,  137,  139, 


109 

138,  169 

171 

39 

101 

10 

153 

159 

8,  25 

108 

23,54 

148,  165 

141,  143 

141 


174 

172 

176 

...  ...  'Jo 

44 

84 

21,  42,  48,  59,  65,  166 


li 


IV 


Hamilton  on  the  Genesis  of  Mind, .. 
Hamilton  on  the  Unconditioned, 
Heat,  24  ;  changCvS  affinity, 
Hegel  on  the  Absolute, 
Herschel  on  Ether, 
Hume,  ... 


Idea,  correlative  of  Impression, 

Idea,  representative  of  a  thing. 

Idea,  the  loftiest  to  be  had. 

Ideas,  found  in  spirit-substance 

Ideas  create  emotions. 

Ideas — repro<luction  of, 

Ideas — innate  do  not  exist. 

Identity  of  self,  ... 

Imagination, 

Immortality,  its  ground,  . 

Impersonality, 

Impressions, 

Induction, 

Inferences, 

Infinity, 

Insight  of  self,     ... 

Intelligence, 

Intelligence — supreme. 

Instinct, 


Judgment, 


Kant  on  the  Ego, 
Kantian  School,  ... 
Kant's  Psychology, 


31,72,79,  119,  122,  140 


10 
9 

109 


J 


Index. 


Kelvin- -Lord,  on  Ether,  ... 
Kinetic  theory,   ... 


PAGE 

39 
52 


Lansre  on  Materialism, 

Law,  its  source,  ... 

Law  of  human  freedom,    ... 

Laws  by  analogy  traced  to  be  in  Deity, 

Life,  wliat. 

Limitations,  52  ;  in  Deity, 

Lower  animals  without  morals. 


M. 


Magnetism, 

Man's  superiority. 

Matter, 

Matter  and  Mind,  nexus,  ... 

Matter-formation, 

Materialism, 

Material  object— the  law  of, 

Medulla  oblongata, 

Mind,    ...  ... 

"Mind-stuff,"      ... 

Mind  graded  by  organs,    ... 

Mind  dependent  on  body,... 

Memory, 

Mental  states. 

Mental  substance  receives  ectype. 

Method  in  philosophizing. 

Morals,...  ... 

Moral  Idea, 
Moral  Law, 
Moral  Emotion,  ... 
Motives,  how  produced,     ... 
Motives,  counteraction  of, 


8 
33 

141 

163 

21,  65 

18 

82 


46 

...  ...  /y 

...    7,24,37,51,150 

96 

43,150 

63 

100 

88,  100 

55,  61,  64,  70,  123,  154 

38,  74 

...  ...       t  ^,  1 1 

...  ...       lo,  lio 

84,  112,  122 
...  ...     9^,  lol 

...  ...  yy 

105 
29,80,92,129 

81,132 

130 

13u 

87,  125,  173 

125 


¥ 


VI 


Index. 


N. 


\ 


Nature,... 
Natural  Law, 
Natural  selection, 
Necessitv — the  doctrine  of, 
Nerves,... 
Nervous  system, ... 
Nervous  centres, ... 
Not-nie,  relations  of, 
Nouraena — Kant's  idea  of, 


Ontology,  Hamilton  on. 
Organization  for  mind. 
Organs  of  thought, 


P. 


PAGE 

59,  100,  UiT) 
33 
60,  150 
139 
83,  95 
66 
100 
79 
10 


Pal mlum  of  knowledge,     ... 

Particular  as  opposed  to  general,    ... 

Passion,  an  abnormal  state, 

Passivity  cannot  change  itself. 

Perception, 

Pei'sonality, 

Perplexities  of  philosophers, 

Pfleiderer  on  Realism, 

Phenomena, 

Physiologists  know  little  of  organ-functions, 

Predestination,    ... 

Priestlv  and  others  on  Matter, 

Primum  cognitum, 

Positivist  School,  defect,   ... 

Pole  of  centralization 

Propagation, 

Purpose  or  decree,  its  basis, 


1,  JH) 

27 

69,  78,  108 


...  112,  115 

148 

133 

124 

96,  106,  115,  122 

50,  75,  158,  161 

37,  57 

93 

9,  91,  146 

111 

..  173,  176 

154 

3 

8 

100 

59 

175 


Q 


Quality.. 


15,  50,  5»,  147 


Index. 


Quantity, 


R. 


Radiation  of  material  objects  in  Ether, 

Reason,  its  basis,... 

Reasoning,  its  process. 

Realism  natural,... 

Reflex  action. 

Religious  feeling,  its  source. 

Relativity, 

Repository  of  Impressions, 

Responsibility,     ... 

Ri'dits,  the  foundation  of  morals,    ... 

Ri'dits  do  not  belong  to  inanimate  objects. 


Schelling  on  the  Ego, 

Selfhood, 

Self  consciousness, 

Sensation,  ...  --.^ 

Senses, 

Sensorium, 

Sensuous  emotion, 

Schemes  of  mind, 

Sin,  its  foundation  and  removal,      ... 

Sin,  the  alternative  if  it  did  not  exist. 

Sin,  why  continued. 

Space  and  Time, ... 

Spencer  on  Substance, 

Spirit-substance,... 

Spirit  and  Matter, 

Spirit-Formations, 

Spirit,  the  basis  of  Matter, 

Spirit  Ego,  how  formed,    ... 

Soul,  origin  of,    ... 

Stuart  Mill  ignores  Causality, 


Vll 
PAGE 


66 
83 

120,  123 
93 

67 
135 
146 

78 
133 
129 
131 


•  •  • 

•  •  • 

63 

•  •  • 

5 

•  •  • 

66 

•  •  • 

107 

25, 

101, 

106 

•  •  • 

131 

•  •  • 

88 

•  •  • 

1C8 

•  •  • 

171 

•  •  • 

172 

•  •  • 

95, 

160 

•  •  • 

11 

19,  37,  68,  7: 

3,98 

•  •  • 

44 

•  •  • 

43 

•  •  • 

150 

•  •  • 

151 

•  •  • 

102, 

114 

8 


'H 


Vlll 


Index. 


Stnicture  requires  a  guiding  hand, 
Stokes,  Professor,  on  Ether, 
Substance  absolute, 
Substance,  not  more  than  one. 
Substance  and  Accident, 
Substance  niust  have  attributes, 
Substance,  fundamental,   ... 
Sul>stratum,  what. 


PAGE 

»  •  • 

•  •  • 

156 

•  •  •                                      • 

148, 

Appendix  I. 

15, 

19,  58 

•  •  • 

8 

•   •  •                                              4 

•  •  • 

6 

•  •  • 

4,  147 

•  •  • 

5,  147 

•  •  • 

C 

Tait  on  Ether, 

40 

Telegraphy, 

45,  70 

Time,     ... 

68,  156 

Thinking,  on  what  it  depends. 

75 

Tyndall  on  Ether, 

39 

Tyndall  on  Forces, 

48 

AVI  it?j       ••*                   •••                   •••                   ••• 

68 

u. 


Unity  developed,... 
Unconditioned,    ... 


W. 


27 
153 


TvIXl|  ••*  ■••  ••' 

Will,  sensuous,    ... 
Will,  curbing  of,  ... 
Will,  does  not  choose, 
White  matter  of  the  brain, 


30,  87,  124,  128,  139,  152 

128 

129 

142 

84 


ABERDEE.V  : 

PRINTED     BY     GEORC.  E     LESLIE, 

3     ADELPHI. 


IJ 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 


0658882 


